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The Merits and Perils of Intra-Party Democracy: Assessing the Effects of Party Reform in 
Germany, France and the United Kingdom 
 
Abstract 
 
Over the past decades, European democracies have experienced diminishing trust in their 
political representative institutions leading to a decline in party membership as well as both 
reduced electoral turnout and overall political participation (Van Biezen et al., 2012). In 
response, many European parties began reforming themselves allowing for the direct 
participation of party members or even non-members in various intra-party arenas, such as 
leadership selections through primaries. Parties claim that such reforms increase intra-party 
democracy (IPD) by making internal organisation more inclusive and by providing all party 
members or even non-members with decision-making power perilously reserved to the party 
elites (Hazan and Rahat, 2010). However, the positive effect of increased IPD on membership 
is highly contested and surprisingly few relevant empirical and comparative studies exist.  
The central research question of this thesis is what are the (different) consequences of adopting 
different types of primary rules for party members? Hence, my aim is to examine whether the 
introduction of primaries is in fact as negative for party members as outlined by Katz and Mair 
(1994), Lefebvre (2011) or Hopkin (2001) or, alternatively, whether it represents a chance to 
revitalize parties as membership organizations (Macpherson, 1977; Ware, 1979; Bille, 2001). 
Primaries are defined as selection process for party leaders and candidates in which the final 
vote rests with either party members in closed primaries, or loosely defined group of party 
supporters or the wider electorate, open primaries. Thus, introducing a primary leads to a 
change in the level of intra-party democracy, as it shifts power from a more exclusive 
selectorate to either of the two selectorates outlined above. While this project focuses on 
primaries that select top-executive candidates, the theory and conceptual framework developed 
can be applied to primaries more broadly. The general argument put forward is that to capture 
the differentiated effects of party primaries we have to study the interplay between the rules 
determining who can vote (selectorate) and who can run (candidacy requirements) in primaries. 
This thesis answers its central research question by developing a conceptual framework that 
combines these two dimensions for party primaries that select the party leader in public office. 
First, it outlines the underlying logic of the conceptual framework that links the two dimensions 
and then provides a theoretical discussion of its consequences for party members looking 
specifically at the interaction between the two. To assess the consequences of different primary 
reforms, the thesis focuses on four dimensions of party membership: the party membership 
level, the turnout in primaries, the quality of membership and the attitude towards the 
leadership. This perspective highlights that different combinations of selection rules and 
candidacy requirements in primaries result in four distinct types of intra-party democracy from 
the perception of party members. In turn, these types lead party members to respond in a 
distinct fashion. Using a mixed-method case study approach, the second part of the thesis tests 
the theoretical framework for various Western European parties. The analysis will mainly use 
primary and secondary document analysis as well as new and existing survey data 
complemented by qualitative in-depth membership surveys. The main conclusion is that only 
some combinations of primary rules can lead to a positive effect for members while others do 
not. For example, closed primaries with open candidacy requirements will lead to more active 
participation of members, while open primaries with open candidacy requirements will reduce 
membership participation considerably. 
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1 Introduction 
Over the past decades, European democracies have experienced 
diminishing trust in their political representative institutions leading to a decline 
in party membership as well as both reduced electoral turnout and overall 
political participation (Van Biezen et al., 2012). In response, many European 
parties began reforming themselves allowing for the direct participation of party 
members or even non-members in various intra-party areas, such as candidate 
selection (Hazan, 2002; Hazan and Rahat, 2010; Rahat and Hazan, 2001), 
leadership selection (Kenig, 2009a; Kenig et al.; 2015b) and policy formulation 
(Gauja, 2013). For example, more inclusive leadership selection procedures for 
both party leaders and chief executive candidates are by now very common in 
Europe with over 24 parties either using closed or open primaries (Sandri et al., 
2015: 10). While parties can use primaries to decide about their personnel, this 
study mainly focuses on one specific type of primary, namely primaries for the 
selection of a party’s candidate for the national chief executive position. 
Parties often claim that by adopting such reforms they increased intra-
party democracy (IPD) by redistributing power to ordinary rank and file 
members, giving them a more significant, if not decisive voice in various 
aspects of intra-party decision-making (Scarrow et al., 2002, Bille, 2001, Hazan, 
2002). The literature points to potential positive effects of such reforms in 
transforming party organizations to be more inclusive, participatory, transparent 
and open (Hazan and Rahat, 2010). However, the positive effect of more 
inclusive leadership selection procedures on membership is highly contested 
(see, for instance, Lefebvre, 2011; Young, 2013; Colomer, 2011) and 
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surprisingly few studies exist that address this question in an empirical, 
systematic and comparative manner. 
While over the past years there has been an increase in studies on 
various aspects of leadership selections and the use of primaries in these 
processes (Cross and Pilet, 2015; Pilet and Cross 2014; Cross and Blais, 
2012a; Kenig, 2009a; Sandri et al., 2015), they largely focus on developing 
tools for measuring, classifying and explaining the adoption of different selection 
processes or study their impact on various aspects, such as electoral 
performance, leadership profile, competition (i.e., the number of candidates and 
incumbency advantages), approval rating and cohesion. However, their 
implications for party membership and especially the perception of the party 
membership itself remain very little studied (Sandri, 2012, Scarrow and Gezgor, 
2010), although many scholars stress the need to do so (van Holsteyn and 
Koole, 2009; Bille, 2001). This lacuna in research is surprising as it seems that 
party membership—and its provision with more or less power—is central to the 
recent debates about the introduction of primaries.  
A second and highly related aspect that remains hardly researched is the 
question of how such reforms affect different membership sub-groups or types 
of members (Sandri, 2011; Kirkpatrik, 1972). Following Hirschman’s argument 
(1970) that measures to recruit new members are often not the same as or 
even in contradiction to measures to keep existing members, the thesis 
separately studies the impact of primaries on members who joined before and 
after the introduction of primaries.1 Thus to fully understand how changes in 
selection rules affect membership, we need to strengthen the party 
                                            
1
 For a detailed discussion of why a classification between existing and new member is suitable, 
see page 18. 
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membership’s perspective in the IPD debate by comparing changes in 
membership characteristics both over time as well as between existing and new 
members. 
The central research question is: What are the consequences of the 
adoption of different type of leadership selection rules for the individual level 
conception of party membership? This thesis is a first attempt to fill the current 
gap in the literature. In doing so, it theorizes and empirically assesses the 
consequences of more inclusive leadership selections (open or closed 
primaries)2 on party members. The overall aim is to test whether the 
introduction of inclusive leadership selection procedures is really as negative for 
party membership, as argued, for example, by Katz and Mair (1994), Lefebvre 
(2011) or Hopkin (2001). They suggest that these procedures reduce 
membership power and diminish the role of active members within party 
organizations in favour of passive or even non-members. Or in contrast, is it a 
chance to revitalize the party as a membership organization by providing new 
participatory opportunities to members and by creating a more direct link to the 
party leadership, thus enhancing accountability, legitimacy and empowering 
member (Macpherson, 1977, Ware, 1979, Bille, 2001). The argument put 
forward in this thesis is that to reconcile these two opposing views, we have to 
theorize and then study the interplay between the rules determining who can 
vote (selectorate) and who can run (candidacy requirements). The need to go 
beyond the study of the role of the selectorate in leadership selection and to 
                                            
2
 In some cases, the party leader is the same as the top executive candidate (see, for example, 
the United Kingdom or Japan), while in other cases they can be separate positions (see 
France). In the first case, the position of party leader acts as a gatekeeper to the highest 
national office. Thus the top executive candidate is defined as the person who would be 
president, prime minister or chancellor in case of a party’s election victory. 
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study other factors that might have influenced or even predetermined the 
outcome of the selection process was pointed out by Aylott and Bolin (2016). 
In contrast to previous studies, this thesis is less concerned with 
comparing the effect of no-IPD and IPD on party membership but rather with 
how different ways of and procedures for implanting direct and inclusive 
leadership selections affect membership differently. To do so, the study looks at 
four indicators: membership level, turnout, quality of membership and members’ 
attitude towards the leadership. These dimensions are crucial, because they 
allow assessing both the popularity and acceptance of primaries among 
members as well as changes of behaviour and attitude at the individual level. 
Thus, these indicators provide us with a more differentiated and nuanced 
understanding of effects on members and goes beyond the simple argument 
that primaries are either good or bad for members. Importantly, exploring 
Hirschman’s observation (1970) of the differentiated effects of these rules on 
existing and new members offers an even more sophisticated insight.  
This chapter is structured as follows. First, it presents the main concepts 
and typologies used throughout the thesis. The chapter then provides a first 
brief outline of its contribution to the field, before critically assessing the current 
state of the arts when it comes to research into the impact of increased IPD and 
more inclusive leadership selection methods on political parties and the 
individual level conception of party membership. It also outlines in more detail 
the growing importance of studying party leadership selections, especially in the 
form of primaries. The chapter ends by outlining the overall structure of the 
thesis and by providing an overview of the remaining chapters. Here, the 
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chapter also provides a first brief outline of case selection, chosen method and 
data used. 
1.1 The Study of Primaries: Main Concepts and Typologies 
Before reviewing the current literature on primaries, intra-party 
democracy and its impact on party membership, it is necessary to define the 
key concepts and terms used in the thesis. This is necessary since many key 
terms, their definition and scope, such as IPD (for a more detailed discussion, 
see Cross and Katz 2013: chapter 1) or even primary (for a more detailed 
discussion, see Sandri et al. 2015: p. 11-13), are highly contested and debated 
in the literature. The key terms defined in the following are intra-party 
democracy (IPD), primary elections, party membership and the two sub-groups 
of existing and new members. The operationalization of the terms defined below 
are discussed in more detail in the chapters two and three. 
IPD-Intra Party Democracy 
The first concept to be defined is IPD and what an increase or strengthening of 
IPD implies. As Cross and Katz (2013: 2) highlight “like democracy itself, the 
definition of IPD is essentially contestable”. Nevertheless, a definition of the 
term needs to be based on, first, its understanding “as a participatory and 
inclusive decision-making processes” and, second, as the democratic outcome 
such process achieves in terms of participation, inclusiveness, centralization 
and accountability. Thus, a primary would provide a vehicle to change the level 
of IPD, and its use would result in a certain level of participation, inclusiveness, 
centralization and accountability within the party. Consequently, an increase or 
strengthening is understood as a positive impact on the democratic outcome 
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after the party adopted a new, more participatory and inclusive decision-making 
process, for example, a shift from a delegate meeting choosing the candidate to 
an open or closed primary. Therefore, the degree of IPD in a party influences 
“to what extent, how, and in which aspects of party life the members are able to 
control what their party does” (Cross and Katz, 2013: 10). Thus, the project 
follows a definition of IPD “as the power relations between party leaders and 
members and in particular as instruments for giving members a greater say” 
suggested by Scarrow (2005) and used by Sandri (2011). Here the main focus 
is on whether members perceive a difference in the level of IPD and act 
accordingly when less inclusive decision-making process are replaced by a 
procedure with a higher degree of inclusiveness. 
 
Party Primary Elections 
Primaries are one instrument in the party’s tool box to increase IPD, but there 
are different forms of primaries that can be used to make different personnel 
choices. Based on Hazan and Rahat (2010) and Pliet and Cross (2013), the 
project uses the definition suggested by Sandri et al. (2015: 11) of party 
primaries as “the internal elections for selecting political leaders or candidates 
for office (either parliamentary elections or for chief executive mandates at all 
levels) that entail full membership vote (closed primary, full membership votes) 
or votes by members, sympathisers and registered voters (open primary)”. The 
empirical focus of the project is on leadership selection process for chief 
executive mandates, however the framework developed here is also applicable 
to other forms of candidate selection. In order to avoid confusion about or 
misuse of the concept of primary, it is necessary to distinguish its use in and 
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outside of the US. While in the US primaries are used to choose candidates for 
subsequent elections (Ware, 2002), outside of the US (Europe and Asia) they 
are more generally defined as party-internal direct elections. Further, as Sandri 
et al. (2015, p. 12) and others (Kenig 2009; Cross and Pilet 2015) point out, in 
the European contest “although the select party leader is not automatically a 
candidate for general or presidential elections at the time of the selection 
procedures, in most parties the leader is designed as candidate for Prime 
Minister (or equivalent) in subsequent elections” (Kenig et al., 2015b: p. 12). 
After the selectorate (open/ close), the second dimension of the definition of 
primaries is who is eligible to run. Broadly speaking candidate requirements can 
be placed on a scale from permissive to strict. While strict is, for example, the 
appointment of candidates by a party committee or based on special status in 
the party such as MP, permissive requirements allow, for example, all members 
to run or require a low threshold of supporting signatures. 
Apart from who can vote or run in them, primaries can also be defined 
based on the election mechanism they use (Kenig et al., 2015a). Most straight 
forward is a ‘one member, one vote’ (OMOV) system or a mechanism in which 
the vote is shared between two groups, such as supporters and members, and 
all votes enjoy equal weight. In both cases, the decisive vote lies within an 
inclusive selectorate. However, parties can also use more complex systems 
with a first round of voting by a non-inclusive body, such as the parliamentary 
group of a party, as, for example, the Conservative Party leadership selection in 
the UK, or a college system, used in the UK Labour Party leadership selection 
until 2010. In order to draw a clear line between selections that are primaries 
and those that are not, the project follows the suggestion by Kenig et al. (2015a) 
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that “for purposes of the inclusiveness criteria, primaries are those selection 
methods in which the cumulative weight of influence of party members, 
supporters and/ or voters is equal to or greater than all other more exclusive 
selectorate(s) combined”. If this condition is met, the selection falls into the 
“primary zone”. Thus, the leadership selection of UK Conservatives falls into the 
primary zone, while the Labour Party selection until 2010 does not.3 
 
Party Membership 
Scarrow (2015: 30-32) suggests six types of party memberships or “affiliation 
modes” based on the cost to join and the rights of individuals under the specific 
affiliation mode. Throughout the thesis, the term membership mainly refers to 
the most costly mode of “traditional individual membership” (Scarrow 2015: 30). 
Compared to other mode of affiliation, it also confers the most political rights 
within the party, and also carries the heaviest obligations. In all cases here, that 
involves paying a membership fees, signed declaration to support party 
principles and prohibits membership in other political parties. In contrast, 
primary voters both spontaneous and pre-registered, the second mode of 
affiliation frequently referred to in this thesis is not very costly and involves little 
if any obligations but only comes with one right: to vote in the primary. Some 
parties’ also introduced light/support membership with reduced fees and limited 
rights. This mode of “second class membership “(Scarrow: 30) often exists 
instead of primary voters mode in close primaries, for example in the French PS 
2006 primary. Having provided a first classification of the different mode of party 
affiliation and which one is most relevant here the next step is to outline what it 
                                            
3
 After the reform of the Labour leadership selection process in 2015, it now falls within the 
primary zone. 
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means to be a party member. Further Gauja (2015, p. 244) suggests, party 
membership is “a contested and constructed concept that is shaped by party, 
state and individual motivation”. All three factors need to be considered to fully 
understand what membership is and, why and how it changes. State 
conceptions of party membership usually provide a clear legal distinction 
between members and non-members and “those who belong are afforded 
recognition, legal protection and […] legitimacy” (Gauja 2015: 236) but also 
responsibility. However, this thesis focuses primarily on the individual 
conception of party membership and its tension with the party organisational 
conception of membership. While from an individual perspective party 
membership is perceived as “diverse incentives that draws citizens to a party 
and the activities they subsequently engage in”, for the party as organization, 
members are a “strategic or functional resource”. More importantly by adopting 
certain new internal party rules to achieve strategic or functional aims, such as 
increased legitimacy, electoral success or reversing party decline, the party can, 
intended or not, affect the concept of party membership on an individual level in 
terms of partisan engagement (Faucher, 2015). As outlined above, here we 
focus on the adoption of leadership selection processes that can either increase 
selective incentives to join and be active in the party (closed primary) or further 
blur the line between formal membership and non-members (open primary) by 
granting the latter voting rights. Either way the question emerges of how these 
organizational reforms affect the conception of party membership on an 
individual level and vis-à-vis the party organization, and the relation between 
members and non-members (i.e., primary voters) in the case of open primaries. 
To study this, the thesis uses the following four indicators: 
 17 
 
Table 1.1. The Four Dependant Variables 
Dimension Short Description 
Quantitative 
Membership level increase/ decline of membership 
Turnout in primary rate and share of member participation in primary 
Qualitative 
Quality of 
membership 
increase/ decrease in intra-party participation 
Membership attitude membership view and relation to the party leadership 
 
A change in level of membership after the introduction of primaries is a 
useful way to see whether it contributed to the revitalization of the organization 
or to its decline (Dalton and Wattenberg, 2002; Lefebvre, 2011), while turnout in 
the primary is a way to capture the mobilization effect of primaries (Norris, 2000; 
Wauters, 2009). The third variable is the impact on the quality of party 
membership composed of changes in the motivations to join the party (Whiteley 
et al., 1994b) and changes in the behaviour of party membership. The last 
indicator is the individual member’s attitude towards the party leadership 
capturing how the relationship between members and the elite changed due to 
the new selection mechanism. Taken together, these variables strengthen our 
understanding of how members perceive party organizational reforms and how 
the latter affects the individual level conception of party membership. Gauja 
(2015) stresses further that the engagement of individuals with parties is diverse 
and can be very fluid. She (Gauja 2015) and others (Scarrow, 2014; Sandri and 
von Nostitz, 2015) primarily stress the difference between full formal party 
membership and new alternative forms, such as supporters or primary voters 
with a less formal and/ or permanent link to the party, which might have an after 
all different conception of party membership. While we only focus on change in 
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the conception of membership in terms of full formal party membership, the 
project nevertheless looks at two sub-groups that potentially have a very 
different conception of membership with regard to their motivation to join and 
respective activities: existing and new party members. While the former are 
members that joined prior to the adoption of primaries, the latter are defined as 
members that joined during the year or after the primary was formally adopted. 
Depending on the rules underlying the primary, the conception of membership 
between these two groups can be largely similar or reveal stark differences. For 
existing members, the change in the rules implies also changes in the 
incentives to be a member. This can either lead them to be loyal and remain in 
the party, voice their discontent or even exit it (Hirschman 1970). In contrast, 
new members join with the new incentives or even because of them. 
Before turning to the literature review, the next section outlines the broad 
normative perspective that underpins this thesis. As with democracy at the state 
level, one central question is what shape IPD should take. Here the three main 
competing conception of democracy at the state level, deliberative, direct and 
representative, are a useful starting point. Given that the aim of parties is, as 
often claimed by them, to use primaries to revive party membership 
participation and encourage party membership growth the guiding principle to 
evaluate which conception of intra-party democracy (IPD) is preferred needs to 
start with the question which one is best from the perspective of the party 
membership. In light of this, the next section first outlines the three conception 
of democracy in the intra-party context and analyses them in terms of the 
process they require and outcome they produce. Hazan and Rahat (2010) 
suggest four democratic outcomes that vary with the process: participation, 
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representation, competition and responsiveness. They argue that it is not 
possible to maximise all four at the same time and thus the main aim is to find a 
balance between them. Here we suggest the balance parties should strike is the 
one that benefits party membership the most.  
The classical and most common way to select the party leader is to use 
the party delegate model. This would correspond to representative democracy. 
Returning to the idea that IPD should take the form that benefits members the 
most with the least cost a party delegate model clearly limits the possibility of 
members to participate in the selection. Further, becoming a delegate can 
require substantial investment in both time and money. Here a direct OMOV 
system would allow for overall more and less costly participation of all 
members. In terms of representation, a delegate meeting usually fares relatively 
well due to rules ensuring all intra-party groups are represented in the voting 
process. Nevertheless, using an OMOV system would allow strengthening the 
voting power of certain groups within the party even further rather than reducing 
their power to one or few token seats. The degree of competition depends much 
more on the candidacy requirements than the selectorate. Thus regardless of 
the type of overall IPD democracy chosen, the competition can only be high and 
meaningful with permissive candidacy requirements. The last aspect raises the 
issue to whom is the leader responsive to: the delegates, all members or the 
supporters of the party more broadly. Most likely, to the delegates as the leader 
requires their approval to be re-elected in future. Thus it seems from the 
perspective that IPD should benefit all members, representative democracy at 
least for leadership selection seems not to be ideal as it somehow limits 
participation, representation and responsiveness to party delegates and does 
not include the whole party membership.  
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The second type of democracy to consider is deliberative democracy. The 
thesis agrees with the strong advocates of a deliberate model of IPD such as 
Teorell (1999) or Wolkenstein (2016) that it would be very beneficial for party 
members in terms of the four above outlined aspects. It would allow for 
discussion and debate among party members to nominate and then vote for 
their leader. Thus, it should produce high level of participation, representation 
and responsiveness as it allows for preference-formation at the partisan base. 
Therefore, as Wolkenstein (2016:297) argues the provision of such deliberative 
fora “makes internal democracy meaningful”. However, the main problem of 
deliberative democracy, at least in the case of leadership selection, is to collect 
and aggregate the decisions of the different deliberative fora. Here the model 
relies on either a delegate model or direct OMOV system. Thus, deliberative 
fora might be a good addition to the either form of democracy but cannot fully 
replace it.  
The last type of democracy to consider is direct democracy using direct 
voting by individuals to make decisions. In the intra-party context, this means a 
vote by all members (OMOV) to produce an outcome, here to select the leader. 
Some parties went further and allowed supports and voters to participate. Such 
open primaries might lead to high participation but from a membership 
perspective are otherwise mainly negative as their voice is crowded out by the 
larger external selectorate. However limiting voting rights to members should 
overall be very beneficial for party members. This should lead to high level of 
participation at a low cost. Further, the selected candidate will represent the 
majority of party members and needs to be responsive to them in order to be re-
elected. In addition, such closed primary would provide insight into the relative 
strength of fractions within the party and would allow the leader to work together 
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with the leaders of these fractions producing an overall more stable and 
responsive intra-party environment. Returning to the guiding principle that IPD 
should produce the higher benefit for party members, it seems that direct 
democracy using a closed primary is the most suited form for democracy in the 
intra-party setting. It not only allows all members to participate with relatively 
low cost involved but also makes the leader highly responsive to the party 
members and representative of the majority in the party. Further, given that 
such a close primary is combined with permissive candidate requirements, 
competition should also be high. 
In short having theoretically discussed how different model of democracy 
in the intra-party setting affect participation, representation, competition and 
responsiveness, it becomes clear that from the membership’s perspective, 
direct democracy is the most beneficial and therefore perceived as more 
democratic. Direct democracy allows for highly inclusive tool that enables party 
members to have the maximum direct influence over the leadership selection 
with minimal effort and cost. Therefore, the closer a party get to this, the more 
democratic it is. This provides the guiding normative underpinning of this thesis. 
It returns to the question of what form of IPD is normatively most desirable from 
the membership’s perspective in the overall conclusion of this thesis. 
1.2 A Review of the Literature and Thesis Contribution 
Based on the above discussion of the main concepts and typologies 
used throughout the thesis, it is now possible to provide a first overview of its 
contribution to the field of political science. It introduces a new analytical 
framework to study the effect of different primary selection rules on party 
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membership’s perceived level of IPD. Thus different primary rules affect the 
individual level conception of party membership either positively or negatively, 
becoming manifest in changes in membership size, primary turnout, 
membership quality and attitude towards the leadership. Overall, the thesis 
demonstrates that it is possible to distinguish between four distinct types of IPD 
(see figure below). As the next section demonstrates, it is possible to formulate 
theoretical expectations for new and existing members along the four indicators 
outlined above to capture how members perceive and react to the four types of 
IPD:4  
Figure 1.1 Four Types of IPD 
Open 
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Example: United States 
Democrats and Republicans 
Disempowering 
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Examples: French Parti 
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Protected 
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Several Portuguese Parties, 
Belgium N-VA 
Controlled 
Democratization 
 
Examples: UK 
Conservative and Labour 
Party, French Parti 
Socialist (1995, 2006) 
Closed Permissive             Candidate Requirements              Strict 
 
It is important to stress that the categories used refer to the members’ 
perception of democratization achieved, and how this in turn affects party 
membership. The next section very briefly outlines the four types of IPD. 
                                            
4
 The case studies chosen and analysed in this thesis are indicated in bold in figure 1.1 above 
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In the first case of Atomized Democratization (permissive candidacy / 
open primary), the party membership loses any control over the outcome of 
leadership contests, as both selectorate and candidacy are completely opened 
up. In this case, organizational boundaries are highly blurred or even non-
existent, and the party ceases to be a clearly defined organizational entity of 
members and becomes a loose assembly of atomized individuals. Thus, the 
classical conception of party membership is replaced leading Berdahl (1942: 
16) to argue that in such cases “party membership is generally not distinguished 
from mere voting affiliation”. Consequently, a negative effect along all indicators 
can be expected. 
In the next case of Disempowering Democratization (strict candidacy/ 
open primary), members feel truly disempowered, atomized and their voice is 
crowded out by a large external selectorate and the process is tightly controlled 
by the elite (Katz and Mair, 1994). However, the party continues to exist as a 
defined organizational entity of members but with a reduced role. Thus, the 
general conception of party membership is adversely affected resulting in 
negative reactions along all four indicators. 
The third category is Protected Democratization (permissive candidacy/ 
closed primary). From a member’s perspective they are empowered as they 
now hold the deciding vote on who will lead the party and their voice is not 
crowded out by a large external selectorate. Further, they can run in leadership 
selection contest if they wish to do so. Thus, members feel their interests and 
organizational role is protected. Thus, an improved impact on conception of 
party membership is expected with a positive increase in all four indicators. 
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Under the last combination of Controlled Democratization (strict 
candidacy/ closed primary) members also perceive that they hold the deciding 
vote on who will lead the party and that their voice is not crowded out by a large 
external selectorate, however, candidacy access is more limited and controlled 
by the party leadership. Thus, in contrast to the above, they feel that their 
interests and organizational role is not only protected but also controlled by the 
elite to prevent members from interfering with its aims. Nevertheless, an 
improved impact on the conception of party membership is expected but slightly 
more moderate across all four indicators. 
In short, the main claim of the thesis that primaries are not good or bad for 
members but positively or negatively affect the individual level conception of 
party membership depends on the combined effect of candidacy and 
selectorate rules, and how this interplay affects the membership‘s perception of 
intra-party democracy. Thus, the thesis developed the conceptual framework 
above to empirically test different hypotheses that rest in different constellations 
of primary rules. 
In addition to its theoretical and conceptual contribution to the field, the 
project collected new individual level party membership survey data and 
conducted qualitative in-depth membership interviews. Further, it combines 
existing pre- and post-reform membership surveys data. This newly collected 
and generated data set can contribute to and inform future research in the area 
of IPD and the development of party membership more broadly. 
More generally speaking, with an increased understanding of the effect of 
different rules on party membership, we also gain new and valuable insight into 
the functioning and effect of such reforms on democracy at the national level. 
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Following the normative assumption that democracy does not only rely on the 
institutions of the state but also on parties that operate within these institutions 
and thereby represent the people. If the reforms are successful in fostering 
more involvement in parties, they could help in counteracting the generally 
negative view of and low trust in parties. The effective use of primaries can thus 
improve the societal linkage function of parties, make candidates more 
representative of the general electorate and increase legitimacy and 
accountability.  
The next section reviews the current debate about IPD, primaries and its 
impact on party membership. It illustrates how and why the thesis arrived at 
identifying the above outlined gap in the current literature. Furthermore, this 
highlights the foundation on which the above framework is based. It also 
elaborates where the assertions about the consequences for party membership 
stem from. 
1.2.1 The Importance of Leadership Selection and its Repercussions for Party 
Membership 
Before discussing the importance of how the party leadership is selected, the 
first step is to define what it means to be a party leader. Pilet and Cross (2014) 
highlight that who is the party leader and the role of the leader can vary from 
party to party. However, two types of party leader can be clearly identified: the 
leader of the party in public office and the leader of the party in central office. Of 
course, they are cases in which both these positions are one and the same, 
held by the same person or even one is a prerequisite for the other. This 
overlap of leadership is very common in Westminster countries but not for 
example in Belgium, Norway or Austria. In these cases, there might be rules in 
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place prohibiting holding multiple leadership positions at the same time. Here it 
is required to identify the dominant leader of the party. Giving the recent trends 
in personalisation, presidentialization (Poguntke and Webb, 2005), changes in 
media cover, party finance regulations and the ascendance of the party in public 
office over the party in central office more and more the party leader in public 
office is or is portrayed and perceived as the dominate leader. Therefore, the 
thesis will focus on the selection of this position. In other words the thesis 
focuses on the selection of the leader of the party that in case of an election 
victory would either assume the top executive position or top cabinet post in 
case of being the junior collection partner. 
The recent increase in studies focusing on various aspects of leadership 
selection in political parties is both proof of its growing importance and the fact 
that is has been overlooked in the past (Cross and Pilet, 2015; Pilet and Cross, 
2014; Cross and Blais, 2012a; Kenig, 2009a; Sandri et al., 2015). One factor 
contributing to the growth in this area of research is that selecting a party leader 
or the chief executive candidate of a country (the focus here) is arguably one of 
the most important functions of parties. This choice determines who might run 
the country either as head of government, cabinet minister or as leader of the 
opposition. A second aspect that reignited the interest in methods of leadership 
selection is the ongoing empirical trend of opening up contests allowing 
members and even non-members to vote. This is often linked to the ongoing 
controversial debates around presidentialization of party politics, whereby 
parties arguably shift intra-party power to benefit the leader and increase his/ 
her autonomy from other intra-party political key players (Poguntke and Webb, 
2005). 
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The importance of studying the effect more inclusive leadership selection 
methods have on party membership is further highlighted by the increasing and 
more frequent use of primaries by many parties outside the US. In the US, 
primaries have a long history and started to spread in the late 19th century. By 
now, virtually all candidates for elected office are chosen in primaries (Ware, 
2015). In some cases, the primary even becomes the actual election (for 
example, non-partisan primaries in Louisiana since 1978). In addition, primaries 
in the US are regulated by individual states rather than parties and thus follow 
more clear, enforceable and stable rules. Outside the US, the uptake of 
primaries accelerated about two decades ago. A recent study by Sandri et al. 
(2015) found that outside the US over 35 parties in 19 countries used primary to 
select their party leader and over 31 parties in 16 countries used either open or 
closed primaries to determine their candidate for the chief executive position. 
Furthermore, in 12 countries more than 18 parties also employed primaries to 
determine their national legislative candidates. In addition, primaries also 
become popular to select candidates for other offices, such as mayoral 
candidates in France (Fekl, 2015). Importantly and in contrast to the US, 
primaries in France, UK or other Western European democracies are adopted 
and regulated by the party itself rather than being state imposed. Thus, each 
party can adopt a different set of rules and change these rules quite easily 
compared to the US. The fast and vast spread of primaries into different 
institutional and political settings therefore underlines the importance of 
grasping how different rules of primaries affect the individual level conception of 
party membership. 
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The growing use and importance of primaries was and is accompanied 
by an increasing academic interest. So far, previous work on the effect of IPD 
on political parties focused mainly on its impact on electoral competitiveness 
(Schattschneider, 1942; Duverger, 1954; Sartori, 1976; Panebianco, 1988), its 
use as an elite tool (Michels, 1911; Katz and Mair, 1994; Young, 2013) and how 
it can create more opportunities for political activism (van Haute, 2009b; 
Kosiara-Pedersen et al., 2014; Gauja and van Haute, 2014). Other studies point 
out how the choice of selection mechanism can affect a party’s electoral 
success and cohesion.5 For example, Kenig and Barnea (2009) show that being 
selected in a primary increase the chances of being selected to the cabinet, 
while Scarrow and Gezog (2010) came to the conclusion that at country level an 
increase in the power of the party membership seem to have led to smaller but 
more representative membership regarding all aspects but age. Existing 
research has also focused on developing tools to measure, classify and explain 
the adoption of different leadership selection processes (Pilet and Cross, 2014; 
Kenig, 2009; Cross and Blais, 2012). Nevertheless, the study of how different 
leadership selection methods affect party membership remains 
underdeveloped, despite many scholars acknowledging the need to do so (van 
Holsteyn and Koole, 2009; Bille, 2001). The study by Sandri (2011) is one of the 
first to empirically and systematically explore the extent to which the 
introduction of primaries affects the role of grass-roots members, and how this 
change was perceived by the members themselves. But rather than tracing 
change in party membership over time, her study provides a snap shot of party 
                                            
5
 See, for example, the fight in the UMP (now Les Républicains) on whether to adopt an open or 
closed presidential primary. With both leading candidates arguing that one gave the opponent 
an unfair advantage, the party was forced to hold a referendum about the selection method 
(Boucek, 2012).  
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membership by conducting post-reform membership surveys. While most of the 
listed studies are not directly concerned with how the development of perceived 
levels of IPD in form of primaries impact on party membership, they 
nevertheless touch or remark on it and thus offer a good starting point. Based 
on this, the next section will present the current debate on the effect of changing 
IPD levels on party membership. The second part of the review goes beyond 
the party organizational literature and discusses how previous studies, mainly 
from political sociology and psychology, can be used to capture changes in the 
individual level conception of party membership. Based on this discussion, it is 
possible to identify a clear gap in the existing literature that the above 
introduced framework addresses, and how it in turn builds on the existing 
literature. 
1.2.2 The Controversy about the Effect of IPD 
The very nature of research into IPD and the democratization of party 
leadership selection methods cuts across a wide variety of literatures. It 
encompasses literature on party organization, political participation and 
democracy. The discussion below provides an overview of the diverse mainly 
theoretical perspectives of the concept, its development and the impact of IPD 
in terms of primaries affecting party membership. What will become clear is that 
there are three distinct views in the party organizational literature regarding the 
effect of IPD on the party and its membership. The first group sees IPD as 
unachievable, the second group as negative or even dangerous and the final 
group as desirable. 
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The two main scholars who saw IPD as unachievable are Ostrogorski 
and Michels. Ostrogorski (1902) states that the strategic manipulation of party 
structures by their elites is the main factor that actually limits the development of 
democracy within parties. Furthermore, the party organization stops being an 
instrument for achieving policy and societal linkage goals but rather becomes a 
goal in itself for the leadership (Avril, 1993: 19). Michels (1911) advanced these 
ideas by formulating his famous ‘iron law of oligarchy’. For him there seems to 
be a trade-off between party organizational inclusiveness and centralization of 
powers. According to his argument, elites use their power to advance the latter. 
Thus, elites strengthen their powers further, make themselves indispensable 
and foster a shift away from a policy-focused to vote- and office-seeking 
organization. To achieve this, the power of the membership is reduced making 
IPD unachievable. Later studies by Epstein (Epstein, 1967: 220 and 225) and 
Obler (Obler, 1974: 184-185) empirically confirm this trend, further supporting 
the claim that IPD is not possible. For Michels (1911) this implied party 
members losing power, but his main conclusion was that when the internal 
functioning of parties cannot be democratic, then democracy as a whole 
becomes untenable at regime level. IPD is therefore seen as positive, even 
necessary yet unattainable. The mentioned studies, however, do not address 
whether primaries could be used to create a certain type of IPD, which balances 
organizational and systemic imperatives with the power of the party base, 
reducing the oligarchic tendency. 
The second group of scholars does not see IPD as unachievable but as 
negative or even dangerous for the power of party membership and the party 
organization. The best examples of the latter are probably found in work by 
Schattschneider claiming that “democracy is not to be found in the parties but 
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between the parties” (1942: 60) or Giovanni Sartori’s (1968: 124) conclusion 
that “democracy on a large scale is not the sum of many little democracies”. 
These arguments’ underlying logic is that parties create the link and space for 
deliberation and interest aggregation within the political system. Thus, party 
leaders provide linkage structures between the state and ordinary citizens. To 
do so effectively, parties need to be united and cohesive. In their view however, 
IPD weakens this pre-conditions by providing internal minorities and factions 
with a tool to challenge the party leadership (Duverger, 1954; Sartori, 1976; 
Panebianco, 1988). Similar to Michels (1911), Duverger (1954) states that the 
practical imperative of efficiency pushes party organizational structures in the 
exact opposite direction of real and meaningful IPD (Duverger, 1954: 204), but 
rather than being a choice by the leaders, it is triggered by the external factor of 
electoral competition. McKenzie (McKenzie, 1982: 195) agrees with the 
negative assessment of IPD formulated by the above authors. He stresses that 
“intra-party democracy [...] is incompatible with democratic government”. For 
him increased IPD implies that the party in central office supersedes the 
legitimately elected party in public office (McKenzie, 1982). The emphasis on 
the impact of IPD on inter-party competiveness and the link of interest 
aggregation and accountability between voters and government leads this 
group of scholars to a negative outlook. Teorell (1999) summaries the above by 
highlighting that the quality of democracy at polity level seems here to be 
considered inversely proportional to the degree of democracy within parties. 
What these studies do not show is how the presence or absence of IPD affect 
party members and, even less, how different forms of IPD could be used to 
strike a balance between membership power and electoral imperatives or even 
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help to provide the linkage structures between the state and ordinary citizens 
they rate so highly.  
In their cartel party thesis Katz and Mair (1994) also warn about the 
negative effects of increased IPD. However, they are less concerned with its 
impact on a party’s electoral competiveness but IPD’s use by the elite as a tool 
to manipulate members and to strengthen their own power. As Mair (1997: 149) 
puts it by referring to membership votes, it is, “[…] not the party congress, or the 
middle-level elite, or the activists, who are being empowered, but rather the 
ordinary members, who are at once more docile and more likely to endorse the 
policies proposed by the party leadership”. The adoption of direct membership 
elections and the subsequent enfranchisement of individual ordinary party 
members decreases the possibility for activists to hold the leadership 
accountable. This point draws from May’s law of ‘curvilinear disparity’ (1973), 
which states that party activists are supposed to be more radical than ordinary 
party members and the electorate. This strategic empowerment of individual 
members and simultaneous marginalization of party activists lead some 
scholars to describe it as a form of ‘new plebiscitarianism’, since it bypasses the 
intermediary representative strata and empowers elites both by simply enlarging 
ordinary members’ privileges and marginalizing middle-rank members (Seyd, 
1999, Scarrow, 2002: 131). In contrast to previous explanations, increased IPD 
is not an obstacle to elite control or a danger to the party as office-seeking and 
vote-maximising actor. On the contrary, it is an instrument to achieve these very 
aims (Hopkin, 2001). Thus increasing IPD can lead to ever-greater autonomy of 
the leadership and immunization from any possible real and significant influence 
of the ‘party on the ground’. Later Katz (2001: 277) also highlights the interplay 
of selectorate and candidate requirements, stating that leaders “democratize 
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candidate selection in form, while centralizing control in practice”. Even though 
he points to the negative impact increased IPD can have on members in 
general, he does not explore empirically and comparatively how the 
constellation of different rules can have diverse effects on party membership or 
might even be able to mediate some of these negative effects. 
The third group to consider are studies that support IPD and see it as 
having a positive impact on party membership by empowering it. Normatively 
speaking, they represent a participatory and deliberative conception of 
democracy rather than a competitive one. Some of these early supporters were 
Miliband (1958), Macpherson (1977) and Ware (1979). For example, Ware 
(1979: 71) states that only when parties provide their members with the 
possibility to influence policy and leaders, they can be viewed as instruments of 
democracy, since the accountability of party leaders towards their members 
indirectly also strengthen the responsibility of the latter towards the electorate. 
More recently, Bille (2001: 2) outlined that “it is hard to understand how a 
regime can be classified as democratic if the political parties have an 
organizational structure that leaves no room for citizens to participate and have 
influence. The decision-making process within the parties, that is, the degree of 
internal party democracy becomes an interesting and even crucial issue for 
analysis”. The above listed scholars recognize the general importance and 
potentially beneficial effect of increased IPD for party members, as it is 
empowering and creates a new direct link between members and the 
leadership, which in turn enhances accountability. But they do not consider the 
specific effects different rules to organize IPD might have on members, and 
whether there is a peak level of IPD that can be achieved through primaries 
before having adverse effects. 
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Reflecting these different positions on IPD, studies have produced 
conflicting empirical results with regard to the effect of primaries on party 
membership. For example, Hopkin (2001) is much more negative about the 
effect of the leadership selection on party membership in the UK Labour Party 
than, for example, Sandri (2011). However, these differences could be partly 
explained by the fact that both look at different indicators. While Hopkin (2001) 
focuses mainly on membership figures and responsiveness based on the 
characteristics of candidates, Sandri relies much more on membership surveys. 
Further, a recent comparative study by Sandri et al. (2015) about the political 
consequences of party primaries did not come to a decisive conclusion. While 
primaries have a positive effect on public opinion and therefore on citizen’s 
perceptions of parties, this seems not to translate into a positive impact on the 
electoral or organizational level (Sandri et al. 2015: 192). Thus, primaries do not 
have the negative electoral effect on parties as claimed by some of its 
opponents, but they neither lead to sustained membership growth as its 
supporters suggest. Further, Sandri et al. clearly outline the limitations of the 
indicators they used as “the impact of primaries on membership size could not 
fully understood by solely focusing on quantitative date…on the contrary they 
may actually be misleading if the increases are due to manipulations by the 
party elites” (Sandri et al. 2015: 192). Overall, this again confirms the need for 
the common research design and framework developed in this thesis. A 
framework that allows to study the effect of primaries on party membership in a 
more nuanced and detailed way and that combines qualitative and quantitative 
indicators for the development of party membership to draw a more 
comprehensive picture. 
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Classifying Leadership Selection Methods 
After having established the current debate about whether IPD is good or 
bad for party membership and the party as a whole—a debate that inevitably 
produced conflicting results—the next step is to discuss current literature that 
classifies leadership selection methods. This is important, because only if we 
merge the different organizational dimensions of primaries under a single 
framework, it becomes possible to evaluate whether the effect of a specific set 
of rule is negative or positive for party membership. The current literature 
suggests four main characteristics of selection processes: candidacy, 
selectorate, decentralization and appointment or voting system. While these 
dimensions are relevant for both candidate and leadership selections, here they 
are only considered in relation to primaries. 
 The first dimension of candidacy outlines the rules of who can run in a 
contest, while the second characteristic, the selectorate, defines who can vote. 
The third characteristic of the degree of centralization is less relevant for 
primaries as the process to select the chief executive candidate is by definition 
a centralized process and thus rarely decentralized. However, an example of 
some decentralization can be found in Canada where several parties use a 
‘point system’ to calculate votes; here each constituency is given the same 
weight, regardless of how many members actually cast a vote. Also in some 
cases, there might be multiple elections before a candidate is selected, but the 
final vote rests with one national selectorate. Thus, Kenig, Rahat and Hazan 
(2015b) see this dimension as irrelevant for leadership selections. The final 
dimension of appointment/ voting system is more important, as it provides 
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insight into the election system used as well as its competiveness. With regard 
to the former, a leadership appointment usually only consists of one candidate 
that is confirmed rather than elected. In such circumstances, it is not possible to 
talk about a leadership contest but a coronation, regardless of the size of the 
selectorate. Such elections are excluded from this study. With regard to the 
selection system, the project only considers cases in which the final and 
decisive vote rests with either party members or a wider selectorate and falls 
within the primary zone (see p. 14-15 for definition).6 
While all these dimensions are prominent in the literature, they are rarely 
combined to study their joint impact on parties more generally and on party 
membership more specifically. While highlighting the importance of the 
interaction between the different characteristics, the large majority of studies 
focuses only on a single one and mainly the selectorate dimensions of 
primaries. Clearly, these dimensions do not operate in isolation but affect each 
other and act together, and hence need to be studied together to capture the full 
effect of primary rules. An initial attempt to consider the interaction between 
multiple characteristics can be found in Rahat and Hazan (2001), and Carty and 
Blake (1999). The paper by Carty and Blake (1999: 214) provides in their words 
a “simple four-fold typology for considering party members’ participation in the 
decision-making process of political parties”. They distinguish between the 
openness of the process, as either restricted or unrestricted participation, and 
mediated or unmediated voting systems in leadership selection processes. In 
addition, they do study the impact of different combinations on membership 
growth and turnout in the Canadian case, but they do not present generally 
                                            
6
 The project includes selection processes that use voting systems with a multi-stage method, 
where members/ voters have the final vote, but not weighted method. 
 37 
 
testable and transferable hypotheses. The authors themselves talk of “map(ing) 
variations within each of the distinctive types in order to discover what leads 
particular parties to adopt particular systems and with what consequence”. 
However, since then little work has been done in this specific regard (Sandri et 
al., 2015), and little attention has been paid to other ways in which primaries 
affect party membership. Rahat and Hazan’s (2001) study focuses on candidate 
selection rather than the primaries themselves. It is only concerned with the 
impact of the interaction for overall democratization and does not present any 
specific effects that distinct combinations of rules have for the party organization 
or members. Again, while this 2010 study outlines various political 
consequences different types of candidate selection methods have, it focuses 
much more on broader implications for democracy and again mainly highlights 
the impact of the selectorate.  
As pointed out above, the recent study by Aylott and Bolin (2016) 
stressed that the selectorate is not the only important factor in deciding who will 
be the leader. Instead, they argue that “leader selection is seldom an unguided 
decision” and that “formal rules and informal practices pertaining to stages prior 
to the involvement of the selectorate should be examined systematically in 
order to assess where real power over leader selection resides” (Aylott and 
Bolin, 2016: 2). They go on to say that “if the greater inclusiveness has been 
offset by the management of an ostensibly democratic process, questions can 
legitimately be asked as to how much parties have really ‘democratized’” (Aylott 
and Bolin, 2016: 1). They identify the significance of a steering agent in the 
leadership selection process, and how formal candidacy requirements can 
either strengthen or restrain its power. While their framework allows classifying 
selection processes according to the steering agent’s role and power, it does 
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not consider its interaction with other dimensions of the leadership selection. 
Thus to fully answer the questions of how much parties have really 
‘democratized‘, it is necessary to combine the power of the steering agent—
here in form of candidacy requirements—with the selectorate dimension of the 
leadership selection process. This would allow studying, on the one hand, the 
party’s real commitment to IPD and, on the other hand, its effect on party 
membership. 
The above shows that overall more studies began to develop 
classifications for primaries and leaderships selections (Kenig 2009) and 
discuss their political and organizational consequences (Sandri et al., 2015), but 
so far no unified framework emerged that would combine the different 
dimension of the selection process and link them to specific consequences for 
democracy and party members. Only then, it becomes possible to see if the 
ostensive increase in IPD is actually positive, negative or makes no difference 
at all to party membership. 
 
So far the review of the existing literature outlined the diversity of views in 
the party organizational literature with regard to how increases in IPD, mainly 
due to the use of OMOV systems, affect the role and power of members within 
the party organization. Secondly, the above discussed different ways of 
classifying different types of primary according to the rules applied. However, 
existing studies do not capture this by studying behavioural changes and the 
attitude of members but mainly by looking at turnout and membership levels. It 
also shows that so far little attention is given to the effect of primaries on the 
individual members’ perception of IPD and whether this varies when different 
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primary rules are used. To do so a framework combining primary rules with 
individual level indicators is required. Here contemporary political sociology and 
psychology provide a useful starting point to explore individual level changes of 
party membership across time. 
1.2.3 IPD and its’ Effect on Membership: Political Sociology and Psychology 
Literature 
One main persisting and frequent puzzle in the current literature on the 
effect of party membership and IPD is how reforms intended to increase IPD 
actually affect the size of party membership, intra-party participation, member 
attitudes and encourage new groups to participate in a party organization and 
politics generally (Cross and Katz, 2013). So far no clear picture emerges, 
because most studies focus only on two individual level aspects, mainly turnout 
and membership size, and do not consider all four in combination. Further, they 
mainly focus on one type of primary but do not compare the effect of different 
primary rules on party membership. Thus some studies point, for example, to a 
short-term positive effect on party membership (Cross and Young, 2004, see 
also UK Labour in 2015) or high levels of turnout (Sandri, 2015; Wauters, 2015). 
Other studies indicate decreasing levels of satisfaction among party members 
(van Haute, 2009b) and a feeling of disempowerment (Lefebvre, 2011). Thus so 
far a very mixed picture of the effect of primaries on party membership 
emerges, partly due to the focus on certain types of primaries and partly due to 
the study of individual level aspects. 
Studies by van Haute (2009b), Kosiara-Pedersen, Scarrow and van 
Haute (2014) or Gauja and van Haute (2014) show that the adoption of open 
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and inclusive membership participation encourages new types of interaction 
with the party. Further work by De Luca (2013) on the French PS primary 
showed that it attracted mainly young, highly educated people and non-
members. To analyse what motivates new members to join, Seyd and 
Whiteley’s (1992) general incentive theory proves highly effective. It has been 
used to study the motivation to join several UK and other European parties7 but 
rarely to compare to what extend motivations differ between members who 
joined since the introduction of primaries or before, and how different primary 
rules affect motivation. Sandri (2011) explores how direct internal elections 
contribute to the internal mobilization of already enrolled party members. More 
importantly Sandri’s study (2011) is one of the first to empirically and 
systematically explore the extent to which reforms in leadership selection 
procedures affect the role of grass-roots members, and how these changes are 
perceived by members themselves. But rather than tracing change in party 
membership, her study provides a snap shot of party membership using post-
reform membership surveys. Hazan and Rahat (2010) outline how IPD can 
affect the representation of members within the party. The question emerges 
whether new internal mechanisms increase party members’ influence over the 
leadership and internal decisions. To capture this on an individual level, the 
efficacy-and-trust model developed by Craig et al. (1990) can be used. It 
analyses how “party members perceive their own political organization and 
whether they are satisfied with its functioning” (Sandri, 2011: 196). The study 
follows Sandri (2011) based on Eldersveld’s (1964) claim that parties can be 
considered as a system of their own and applies the model, originally developed 
                                            
7
 For example, the UK Conservative Party (1994), PS (1998, 2011) and German Parties (1998, 
2009). 
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for electoral research, to party members. Previous research from across the 
world8 shows that members stay and continue to be active within their party 
despite high levels of dissatisfaction about their limited role within the party, 
marginal involvement and limited influence of key decisions. Increasing IPD 
could be seen as response to these criticisms but for now no study compares 
the development of members’ external efficacy and attitude towards the 
leadership pre- and post-primary; and how different selection regulations 
affected both. Studies on IPD and the effect on membership rarely look at 
membership changes over time or the effects the interplay of different primary 
rules have on party membership.  
Further the existing literature often takes a perspective of parties as 
unitary actor and studies the aggregate effect on party membership. However, 
the literature regularly points out that the very measures to recruit new 
members are often not the same or even contradict measures meant to keep 
existing members (Hirschman, 1970). Thus, it is only logical that organizational 
changes in leadership selection methods affect existing and new members 
differently (Sandri, 2010). New members are defined as members who joined 
after, while existing members are defined as members who joined before the 
shift to a more inclusive selection method. When discussing existing members, 
the project mainly refers to active party members, as they will be affected most, 
be aware of the consequences and respond to the reforms (Katz and Mair, 
1995). Kenig, Rahat and Hazan (2015b) recently pointed out that the 
introduction of more inclusive leadership selection methods “might create 
disincentives for loyal long-term membership”. Passive members are most likely 
                                            
8
 See, for example, Canada (Cross and Young, 2006), Germany (von Allemann and Klein, 
2009) or Belgium (van Haute, 2009b). 
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to remain passive and will not spend much time considering the direct 
implications of reforms for them (Sandri, 2010). To test whether the two sub-
groups are really affected differently by the introduction of primaries and 
whether different rules have different effects on the two sub-groups, this thesis 
studies the impact of different leadership selection rules for existing and new 
members separately. 
The above clearly highlights the need for further research into the effect of 
increased IPD on political parties. It also highlights that most scholars focus on 
the shift from no IPD to IPD rather than to look at how different constellations of 
rules governing IPD affect parties. This project aims to fill this very gap in the 
literature by systematically and comparatively studying how different sets of 
rules affect party membership in terms of size, participation and attitude pre and 
post adoption of primaries. Further, in contrast to studies discussed above, it 
does not treat members as a homogenous group but analyses how reform 
differently affects existing and new members. More broadly speaking, the 
project hopes to contribute to the long-standing but still unresolved debate on 
the desirability, necessity or even danger of IPD by introducing the 
membership’s perspective to the debate. Further, what becomes clear from the 
above is that to fully understand how these changes affect members we need to 
compare membership behaviour under different leadership selection rules. To 
do so, we need to go beyond the often used indicators of turnout and 
membership size and use individual level indicators derived from party 
membership surveys. This emphasizes the party membership’s perspective in 
the IPD debate and allows one to identify the optimal combination of rules that 
facilitate more direct leadership selection, on the one hand, and true 
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membership empowerment, on the other hand. Further, only then can we fully 
understand how primaries affect not only IPD but democracy as a whole in 
terms of participation, representation, competition and responsiveness. 
In summary, the literature review identified three aspects in the current 
academic debate that needs to be combined to shed more light on the question 
of how primaries and the consequential changes in the level of IPD affect the 
individual level conception of party membership. The first section of the more 
general party politics literature outlined the possible negative and positive 
effects of increased IPD by stressing the effects on the position, role and power 
of members within the party; but they do not empirically test these claims at the 
individual level. The second group of party organizational literature offers 
various classifications of primaries derived from the procedural features of 
primaries. While they acknowledge that the interaction of these features is 
important, they rarely study them at the same time and even less often link 
them to changes at the individual level. The third and final group of political 
sociology and psychology literature provides the means to study the changes in 
membership characteristics and behaviour triggered by primaries. However, 
existing studies mainly focus on the shift from no primary to primary and rather 
investigate the effect of different types of primaries on party membership once 
adopted. Existing studies also largely analyse only one way of how primaries 
affect membership and not, as suggested here, their effect on multiple aspects. 
As outlined above, this thesis suggests the merging of these elements into one 
unified framework (see p. 22) to gain a more detailed and nuanced 
understanding of the effect primaries have on the perceived level of IPD, and of 
how this is reflected in changes at the individual level conception of party 
membership. 
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1.3 Organization of the Study 
So far, the study outlined why it is important to study the consequences of 
primaries for the individual level conception of party membership. It unpacked 
the central research question that aims to address a gap in current literature 
and provided an overview of the thesis’ original contribution to the field. Building 
on this, the rest of the thesis unfolds in the following way. 
 Chapter two introduces in detail the conceptual framework used to study 
the consequences of primaries for the individual level conception of party 
membership. As presented above, the framework consists of two dimensions to 
address the two main identifying regulatory features of primaries: primary 
selectorate (open/ close) and candidacy requirements (permissive/ strict). The 
chapter then presents and discusses the theoretical justifications for the four 
indicators used in the thesis to capture the complex and extensive impact of 
different primary rules on party membership (membership level, turnout, quality 
and attitude of membership). The last section of chapter two brings together the 
four indicators and two regulatory dimensions of primaries. It explores in 
detailed the theoretically expected consequences of the interplay between the 
independent variables—electorate and candidate requirements—along the four 
discussed indicators (DV) for the individual level conception of party 
membership in each type of primary. 
The third chapter of the thesis presents the case selection, method, 
data used and operationalization of the dimensions in the conceptual framework 
for the three chosen cases studies. To capture the effect of different types of 
selection procedures on membership, the thesis uses mainly new and existing 
pre- and post-reform membership survey data complemented by in-depth 
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qualitative membership interviews. Overall, 24 interviews were conducted with 
both party members and elites. With regard to the survey, the study collected 
data from six pre- and post-reform membership surveys (Whiteley et al., 1994a, 
Dargent and Rey, 2014, Rey and Subileau, 1991, Subileau et al., 1999, Spier et 
al., 2011, YouGov, 2009) and conducted one post-reform survey. To assess 
procedural changes, turnout and membership figures, the project uses a large 
variety of primary documents, such as party statutes, internal regulations, 
reports, party self-reported information and secondary documents, such as 
newspaper articles, independent expert reports and the MAPP project 
database. The survey data is mainly analysed using descriptive statistics, such 
as frequency distributions and cross tabulations. 
Regarding case selection, the project follows Seawright and Gerring 
(2008: 297) by using a typical case study design. The German Greens, UK 
Conservative Party and French PS are taken as cases, since they stand 
representative for a wider group of cases that can be placed in the quadrants 
combining candidate requirements and selectorate. As such they allow to 
confirm or disconfirm the theoretical expectations about a specific relationship 
between primary rules and effects on party membership for each of the three 
types of IPD. The study only includes European mainstream parties, here 
defined as parties that either are or were in government or have government 
potential (Sartori, 1976). Chapter three further introduces the operationalization 
of the four indicators. 
 Chapters four to six form the empirical part of the thesis. All three 
chapters follow the same structure. They first discuss the background of the 
case and why and how leadership selection methods were reformed. It then 
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provides a discussion of the theoretically expected consequences for the 
individual level conception of party membership along the four indicators of 
turnout, membership level, quality and attitude of membership. Chapter four 
analyses the case of the UK Conservative Party as an example of controlled 
democratization, followed by a discussion of the case of the German Greens in 
the category of protected democratization in chapter five. The next chapter 
(six) studies the case of the French Parti Socialiste (PS), which was an 
example for controlled democratization in 1995 and 2006 and underwent a 
second reform in 2011; nowadays it falls into the category of disempowering 
democratization. 
 Chapter seven first compares and contrasts the findings of the 
three case studies. It then provides a brief discussion of the validity of the 
framework when applied to other cases. The chapter also highlights how the 
project can facilitate future research by studying further cases over time, and 
how it can inspire new avenues of research. The chapter ends with the overall 
conclusion discussing the three main contributions the thesis makes. First, 
conceptually, it provides a new framework combing selectorate and candidacy 
regulation aspects to study the impact of primaries in a more nuanced fashion; 
by doing so it strengths the membership perspective in the debate. Empirically, 
the thesis uses new data and brings together existing data to demonstrate that 
the framework is useful in identifying the combined effect of primary rules on 
party membership and its relevance for other cases. Thirdly, it challenges the 
normative assumption that the interests of party membership and elites are 
often at odds but instead argues that carefully designed rules can lead to 
positive outcomes for both. The thesis ends with a discussion of the link 
between IPD and democracy at the state level.  
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1.4 Conclusion 
The chapter started by stating the motivation for this study. It highlighted 
the increasing academic interest in party leadership selections for central and 
public office and the election of leaders. It also pointed to the increased use of 
primaries outside of the US and especially in Europe to selected not only party 
leaders but also candidates for public offices at all levels (regional, national and 
European). This development is often framed as an attempt by parties to 
increase IPD to counteract the current trend of declining membership and trust. 
In short, parties and some scholars see IPD as a remedy to fight the crisis of 
the ‘party on the ground’. This triggered a renewed academic interest into the 
subject of primaries and their consequences in the field of party organizational 
literature. This trend began with Scarrow in 1999 and became more prominent 
in more recent works by Hazan and Rahat (2010), Cross and Katz (2013) or 
Pilet and Cross (2014), Sandri et al. (2015). However, despite this increase in 
studies on the consequences of primaries, their effects on membership are 
hardly studied at all, and if so studies mainly adopt a theoretical and normative 
perspective and look only at a few cases. There is a clear lacuna in empirical 
and comparative studies that focus on the effect of changes in the level of IPD 
on part membership caused by primaries. Such studies would provide insight 
into whether or not parties ought to increase IPD in general, whether primaries 
are affective tool to increase IPD, and how the new level of IPD, brought about 
by the adoption of the primary, effects party membership. This is the point from 
which this thesis departs. The chapter then outlined the current controversies in 
the debate about the effect of IPD on parties in general and membership in 
particular. It identified three main arguments presented in the literature: 
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Scholars see IPD as (1) unachievable, (2) as negative or even dangerous for 
party membership or (3) are supportive of IPD. The chapter then briefly 
discussed previous classifications of leadership selection methods, and how 
they have been used to study the effect of IPD on party membership. The 
section stressed the fact that previous studies do identify multiple aspects of 
primaries that can be regulated differently; however, they rarely combine them 
into one framework or study their interaction. Further, most studies that look at 
the impact of primaries on party membership only consider the selectorate-who 
can vote-dimension. The last section of the literature review turned from the 
organizational literature towards the political sociology and psychology 
literature. This provided the theories and approaches to study individual level 
membership changes and demonstrated how little the link between 
organizational reform and individual level membership changes is studied in a 
comparative and comprehensive manner. It showed how increased IPD, which 
offers new participatory opportunities for members and even non-members in 
various intra-party areas, can affect internal mobilization, motivations to join, the 
profile and type of party members. Further, it was argued that these new 
participatory possibilities influence the perceived influence, representation and 
responsiveness of members vis-a-vis the party elite, either positively or 
negatively. The literature also argues that different sub-groups within party 
memberships—new vs. existing, active vs. passive—should perceive 
organizational reforms differently and thus are differently affected by them. 
However, to date there are few studies that would test these theoretical claims 
empirically. 
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Based on the literature review, the study identifies a clear gap in the 
current research on IPD, primaries and party membership: a new unified 
conceptual framework to study the combined effect of different leadership 
selection rules—selectorate and candidacy regulation—on the individual level 
conception of party membership affected by the perceived level of IPD. It not 
only allows for studying the impact on overall membership but also on the two 
different sub-groups of new and existing members simultaneously. Thus, it 
strengthens members’ perspectives in the debate about the effect of changing 
levels of IPD. The chapter ended by outlining the overall structure of the thesis 
and provided a first overview of each chapter. 
While the empirical section of the thesis focuses on primaries that select 
the top-executive candidates of parties, its findings can be applied more broadly 
to other types of intra-party personnel decisions, such as the selection of 
parliamentary or mayoral candidates and party general secretary. In all these 
instances, members’ roles and power within the party organization are affected. 
This can therefore result in either a negative or positive evaluation of the new 
level of IPD from their view as well as a change in their conception of 
membership. More generally, the framework introduced here can be a tool both 
for parties to evaluate intended changes in their organizational design and for 
members to gain better insight into the potential impact of such reforms on 
them. More broadly speaking, the thesis further contributes to the question of 
whether a particular intra-party selection method can serve IPD and democracy 
at state-level (Hazan and Rahat, 2010: 166). To answer this question the thesis 
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returns to the following three guiding questions listed by Hazan and Rahat 
(2010: 166) in their conclusion:9 
“1. Does the [leadership] selection method enable the expression of democratic 
norms (participation and competition), and does it produce democratic outputs 
(representation and responsiveness)? 
2. Does the [leadership] selection method serve the liberal norm of power 
diffusion? 
3. Does the [leadership] selection method enhance the general health of the 
party as a crucial organization for the functioning of democracy?” 
 
While the first two questions are based on contemporary held views on the 
norms, procedures and output of democracy, the third links the organizational 
level of democracy, hence IPD, to state-level democracy. Thus, if parties are 
vital institutions of democracy and their wellbeing is vital for the health of 
democracy (Hazan and Rahat, 2010: 168), then parties have to be careful of 
how a leadership selection method effects one of the vital corner stones of party 
organization, membership; otherwise they might face unintended consequences 
for both the party as an organization and democracy in general. The next 
chapter develops the already mentioned new conceptual framework and 
discusses its theoretical expectations for the nature of party membership. 
Chapter three introduces the case selection, method, data and 
operationalization, before it empirically tests the framework in the subsequent 
chapters four to six. 
 
 
 
                                            
9
 These questions were originally used to study the link between candidate selection and 
democracy. However, executive top candidate selection is a specific type of candidate selection 
and, hence, the very same questions are relevant as well as applicable. 
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2 Conceptual and Theoretical Framework 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter starts by outlining and defining the two dimensions which 
can be used to distinguish between different types of primaries: (1) who can 
vote in the primary, how the selectorate is specified; and (2) who is allowed to 
run in the primary, the candidacy requirements. The chapter first outlines how 
both these dimensions are constructed. In a second step, it combines them 
under a single analytical framework. The chapter then continues to outline how 
the interaction of the two dimensions leads to four distinct perceptions of intra-
party democracy (IPD) among party members that in turn affect the individual 
level conception of party membership. It then discusses the four ideal cases of 
IPD and their effect on the four indicators: party membership level, turnout in 
primaries, quality of membership and membership’s attitude towards the 
leadership. This provides the foundations for the detailed comparative case 
study analysis that engages with the three chosen cases, the UK Conservative 
Party, the German Green Party and French Socialist Party (PS). 
2.2 Defining and Differentiating the Two Dimensions of the Framework 
Selectorate 
The selectorate, constituting the first dimension, is considered the most 
important characteristic of any selection process. It is defined as the group of 
people that is allowed to vote in intra-party leadership selections. The criteria 
that determine who and how many can participate in the primary directly affects 
the intra-party balance of power. Hazan and Rahat (2010) and others (Kenig 
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2009a) suggest five different types of electorate with different degrees of 
inclusiveness, reaching from fully inclusive with all voters allowed to participate 
to fully exclusive, where a single leader nominates his/ her successor. This can 
be depicted with the help of the following continuous scale: 
Figure 2.1 Inclusiveness of Selectorate 
(Kenig, 2009a, Hazan and Rahat, 2010) 
 
 
 
As the project is only interested in the more inclusive forms of selections, 
it divided the scale into two parts. On the left of the vertical line are the cases 
considered as democratized as their electorate extends beyond the 
parliamentary group and a small group of party delegates, and falls within the 
primary zone (Kenig et al. 2015). In the given context, all selections are 
considered to be a primary where the final and decisive vote lies in the hand of 
a selectorate in the primary zone. However, it is necessary to distinguish 
between two distinct selectorates in the primary zone: (1) voters (open primary) 
and (2) party members/ registered supporters (closed primary).10 The central 
difference between the two selectorates is whether voting is restricted to voters 
with a formal and financial link to the party and requires pre-registration, or 
whether it is open to everyone who even wants to participate spontaneously. So 
                                            
10
 A more detailed outline of what kind of selectorate are considered closed and open can be 
found in Appendix VII 
 
The primary ‘zone’ 
(Kenig et al., 2015a) 
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if light members can register on the day and vote, the primary would be 
considered open but if pre-registration of light members with a fixed deadline is 
required, it is a close primary. The constitution of the selectorate has various 
political consequences. It affects participation by defining who can vote as well 
as responsiveness, since “leaders who are selected by a more inclusive 
electorate may claim direct mandate given to them by voter or members” (Kenig 
et al., 2016: 38). This further contributes to the ostensive presidentialization of 
party politics (Poguntke and Webb, 2005) by empowering the party leader and 
making him/ her less responsive to certain actors and committed to other actors 
in or even outside the party. Thus, the type of selectorate should have an 
impact on party membership. Hence, the selectorate as the first dimension of 
the conceptual framework is vital for studying the effect of different types of 
primaries on party members. The next section outlines the less discussed—
especial its interaction with the selectorate—second dimension of candidacy 
requirements. 
 
Candidacy requirements 
The second dimension of candidacy requirements allows a comparison of the 
different rules that determine who can run in intra-party primary selections. 
Again, similar to the selectorate, candidacy requirements can be placed on a 
continuous scale reaching from fully inclusive to fully exclusive. On the most 
inclusive end, all citizens can run if they wish to do so; while on the most 
exclusive end, the part leadership imposes a wide range of additional 
requirements that need to be met to be eligible as candidate in the selection 
process. 
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Figure 2.2 Inclusiveness of Candidacy Requirements 
(adopted from Hazan and Rahat, 2010, Kenig, 2009a) 
 
 
 
 
It is important to highlight that the right side of the scale is open-ended as 
party elites usually can freely increase the level of requirements, giving the elite 
effectively total control over candidacy and more importantly the entire selection 
process. Therefore, in the most extreme cases the elite can decide who can run 
and nominate only their desired candidate. This highlights the analytical 
problem when one only looks at either selectorate or candidate requirements, 
since parties might have a very inclusive selectorate but very strict or even 
closed candidacy requirements. The vertical line in the figure signifies the 
distinction between permissive and strict candidate requirements. While 
permissive requirements would, for example, encompass all citizens, party 
members or all list candidates, strict requirements would limit candidacies to 
MPs or be bound to the pre-approval by various party bodies.11 A further key 
difference between permissive and strict candidate selection rules is the 
presence or absence of a veto power from another intra party organ(s) or 
actor(s). Thus even if requirements are otherwise low, the presence of veto 
power from another intra party organ(s) or actor(s) that can stop candidates to 
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 A more detailed outline of what kind of candidacy requirements are considered permissive 
and strict can be found in Appendix VII 
Candidacy Requirements  
Party 
Members 
Exclusive 
All 
Citizens 
Inclusive 
Permissive 
Requirements 
Strict 
Requirements 
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run makes it strict candidate requirements. Of course, the overall size of the 
effect of this dimension depends on how strict the rules are and can vary within 
both broad categories of permissive and strict candidacy requirements. This 
characteristic of primaries has a strong impact on competition (Kenig, 2009a) 
and allows the party elite to manage and control it via the candidacy rules. They 
do not only determine who and how many candidates can actually run for the 
position of party leader, but whether there is a credible challenger to the 
incumbent leader. If there is only one candidate, it is meaningless to talk about 
a primary contest we are rather confronted with a coronation, regardless of the 
size of the selectorate. Thus, it seems that this second dimension mainly 
decides whether a reform of a chief executive selection method is only 
democratising in form, due to its formal rules, or both in form and substance, 
leading to an increased influence and power of party members (Katz, 2001). 
Consequently, this constitutes the second dimension of the conceptual 
framework intend to study the effect of different types of primaries on party 
members.  
Overall, candidacy requirements and selectorate provide the two 
dimensions of the conceptual framework to study the impact of the different 
primary rules on party members. This framework unpacks the consequences of 
different types of primaries on party membership. The importance of the 
interplay of the two dimensions is also highlighted by Musil (2011: 15) who 
argues that “no matter how inclusive the candidacy requirements are, the 
limited selectorate will have the full control over the final results”. Of course, the 
reverse can also be argued: No matter how inclusive the selectorate, the limited 
and restrictive candidate requirements will provide a small group, the party elite, 
with full control over the final results. Therefore, it is not possible to speak of a 
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substantial degree of democratization, if not both selectorate and candidacy 
become more inclusive. Subsequently, any consequences on membership will 
depend on the combination between candidate requirements and the 
inclusiveness of the selectorate. Combining the two dimensions and different 
aspects of primary rules into one single unified framework is an effective way of 
studying the effect of different types of primaries on party membership. After 
having outlined the two relevant dimensions of the framework, the next step is 
to outline the four dimensions that form individual level membership 
conceptions and then to unite candidacy requirements and selectorate in a 
single analytical framework to capture the effect of different primary rules on 
party membership. 
2.3 Differentiating Consequences of Increased IPD on Party Membership 
The party organizational, sociological and physiological literature suggests 
various dimensions that can be used to study the development and changes 
within political parties and their membership over time. However, not all of them 
have be directly and simultaneously applied to party membership development 
in general and to changes in leadership selection rules in particular. Further, 
these dimensions need be slightly amended for their use in the specific context 
of primaries. For example, turnout is not a typical dimension of the conception 
of party membership, but since we are here concerned with party internal 
selections, turnout is an intrinsic feature and can shed light on the participation 
rate and share of members (in open primaries). It provides thus indications for 
the acceptance of primaries as a new participatory tool or not. The project uses 
the following four analytical dimensions—dependant variables—to capture the 
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complex and extensive impact of different primary rules—independent 
variable—on the individual level concept of party membership (outcome): 
Table 2.1 The Four Dependant Variables 
Dimension Short Description 
Quantitative 
Membership level increase/ decline of membership 
Turnout in primary rate and share of participation of members in primary 
Qualitative 
Quality of 
Membership 
increase/ decrease in intra-party participation 
Membership attitude membership view and relation with the party leadership 
 
The section first discusses the theoretical rationale and justifications underlying 
the selection of the four dimensions to study the change in membership 
conception triggered by the use of primaries. Having done so, the next section 
outlines the theoretical expectations for the general, existing and new 
membership separately due to different primary rules along the introduced four 
dimensions. 
 
The Quantity and Quality of Party Membership 
Membership Size 
The development in membership levels is an admittedly crude, yet 
effective dimension to capture the impact of reforms in general (Mair and van 
Biezen, 2001, Van Biezen et al., 2012) and of increased IPD in particular (Rahat 
and Hazan, 2001). It outlines whether or not, and, if, how the quantitative level 
of membership differs before and after the reform. Thus, it sheds light on 
whether the concept of party membership at an individual level is now seen 
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more positive or negative, by attracting new members or causing membership 
decline. By dividing the membership into existing and new members, we can 
observe whether there is a different quantitative impact at the level of 
membership in both groups. It is important to bear in mind that existing 
membership cannot increase but only decline. However, in some cases former 
disillusioned members might return to the party, which could be labelled as an 
increase in ‘existing members’. With regard to ensuring the inflow of new 
members, reforms in intra-party democracy are often linked to active 
recruitment drives or the introduction of new membership categories (often with 
limited rights and reduced fees).12 Thus, when studying the impact of IPD 
changes on membership size, it is important to be aware of the potential short-
term inflow of ‘instant’ members (Rahat and Hazan, 2007) that can cause and 
produce temporary, artificially high membership levels. To avoid this issue, the 
project looks at membership levels just before primaries, during and 
approximately one year later, when new members are asked to renew their 
commitment. This dimension of the concept of party membership reveals that 
individuals are more likely to see membership as a long-term engagement, 
short-term political support or more and more irrelevant depending on the 
applicable primary rules. 
 
Turnout 
The second dimension to consider is turnout. This again is a more quantitative 
indicator, but it also provides insight into who participates in the new party 
activity. Thus, it is necessary to distinguish between overall turnout and the 
                                            
12
 See, for example, the 2015 UK Labour leadership selection (£3 support membership). 
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share of the two groups of party members (new and existing) participating in 
leadership selections (Sandri 2011). The former measures the overall 
acceptance of the new participatory tool by voters, and whether they see it as 
an effective way to influence internal decision-making (Norris, 2000, Wauters, 
2009). A more detailed analysis of the different shares of turnout between 
existing, new members and non-members, in case of an open primary, provides 
an insight into the relative strength of the different groups and their influence in 
the decision-making process. Thus, it offers the possibility to see the extent to 
which the vote by existing members and activist is diluted, and whether the 
groups vote differently (Seddone and Venturino, 2013). It helps to understand 
whether intra-party democratization is actually disempowering active and 
organized membership in favour of a more ad hoc, individualized and more 
docile intra-party selectorate (Hopkin, 2001; Katz and Mair; 1994). From an 
individual member’s perspective, it also reveals whether they are empowered 
as they can make up the majority or entry primary selectorate, or if they are 
effectively disempowered by being crowded out by a large inflow of new 
members or even an external selectorate. This should either positively or 
negatively contribute to the individual level conception of party membership. 
 
Quality of membership 
The limitation of a mere focus on the dimension of membership levels or 
turnout is that it does not capture members that stay in the party and/ or vote in 
primaries but might have altered their behaviour in another way in response to 
the new perceived level of IPD. The dimension of the quality of membership 
allows distinguishing between the effect of primaries on active and passive 
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members in the party; it also helps to establish how membership participation 
might vary with changing levels of IPD as well as differ between new and 
existing members (Scarrow, 2005; Seddone and Venturino, 2013). It is difficult 
to define membership quality, but following Whiteley et al. (1994b), the 
dimension of membership quality can be further broken down into (a) the 
reason for why members join the party, and (b) what they do once in the party. 
The project looks at whether the reform led to an increase or decline in certain 
motivations to join the party and studies changes in behaviour of party members 
in terms of the type and intensity of their activities. Further, as argued by Seyd 
et al. (1994) as well as Seyd and Whiteley (1996, 1994a), the two aspects are 
linked as the motivation to join a party is a good predictor of how active (both in 
terms of time and type) members will become. However, it has to be noted that 
the quality of membership is a purely quantitative measure and looks at the 
increase or decrease in quality due to changes in how members behave; this 
does in no way imply any normative judgments about the positive or negative 
nature of such an increase or decrease for the party. Nevertheless, these 
changes reflect how the new primary rules affected the perceived level of IPD 
among members and their conception of party membership. Different 
conceptions of party membership at the individual level lead to different people 
joining the party with specific motivations which in turn can lead to a more active 
or passive role of members in the party organization. 
 To study the effect of primaries on the motivation to join a party, the 
thesis applies a widely used general-incentive-model originally developed by 
Seyd and Whiteley (1992). The model itself distinguishes between seven 
different categories of incentives for people to join parties, reflecting different 
basic individual level conceptions of party membership and their role and power 
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within the party organization. The following section discusses these seven 
motivations and highlights those that can be expected to become more 
prominent due to the use of different primaries rules. 
 
The first three categories of individual selective-outcome incentives, individual 
selective-process incentives and ideological incentives emphasize a direct 
personal benefit to the new party member. They not only play a vital role in 
explaining why individuals join a party but most importantly provide an insight 
into the factors that motivate members to become active within the party. 
 
1. Outcome incentives are personal aims, such as working towards an intra-
party or elected office. Further, by joining the party, new members expect 
advantages in their professional life. Thus, benefits are mainly personal and not 
collective. Following a rational choice logic, the fact that under the new selection 
regimen every member can vote and more importantly that it is easier to be a 
candidate should increase selective-outcome incentives (Olson, 1965). This 
development should be more pronounced among new members, but usually 
applies only to a very small career-oriented group; and we do not expect this 
group to increase extensively. One reason for this is that we look at the 
selection of the top position in the party, and, further, in many parties the 
selection of local officers and candidates is already mostly decentralized for a 
longer period of time, providing many opportunities for career-oriented 
members. Nevertheless, an increase in this incentive can be expected. 
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2. Individual selective-process incentives refer to benefits stemming from 
participation in the party. This category mainly encompasses members who 
joined the party, because they enjoy political work, want to be better informed 
about politics and want to socialize. Such motives can often be found among a 
large group of members, which it can be expected to grow over time, as it does 
not require a high level of activity to gain the benefits people joined for. For 
many members of this category, party membership is also part of their self-
expression. From an elite perspective, these are the ideal members as they are 
interested in the party’s social aspects but show only very limited interest in 
partaking in policy-making and influencing the overall direction of the party 
(Maor, 1997). However, they create an image of a party rooted in society, 
ultimately providing legitimacy and a secure electorate (Katz and Mair, 1994). 
 
3. The category of ideological incentives is based on the idea that party 
members are more radical than both the party leadership and voters, which in 
turn motivates them to be active in the party. It is hard to capture this last 
incentive. Thus, following Whiteley et al. (1994), the thesis also assumes that 
higher scores in the two above incentives reflect higher scores in this, third, 
one. More radical members should gain more benefit from the process, as he/ 
she is more likely to be among like-minded people and also be more willing to 
run for office to change the direction of the party. They often support a specific 
ideological principle or current within the party and want to influence the course 
of the party. In a more recent revised version of the model by Klein (2006), 
survey items are included to capture ideological incentives and are used where 
available in this study. 
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4. Collective group based incentives. Members in this category join to push for 
specific policies and political actions. They are active to advance the goals of 
the party and to strengthen its influence. Further, they want to campaign for 
specific party ideological objectives (for example, social justice, liberal economy 
or ecological policies). Thus, they represent the classical party activist. 
Collective group incentives can be both positive and negative. In the former 
case, people join to support the ideas and policies of the party, while in the 
latter case they join to express their opposition to another group’s ideas and 
polices. Thus, they either work for a collective good or work to oppose 
objectives pursued by other (internal or external) groups and parties and see 
their party as an effect avenue to do so (Whiteley et al., 1994: 86-87). 
 
5. Normative incentives can be found among people who join a party to fulfil 
certain normative expectations in their social environment. They join due to 
pressure or influence from family and friends. This category is already relatively 
small, and it can be expected to shrink further with the continued increase in 
individualism and party de-alignment (Dalton and Wattenberg, 2002). On the 
positive side, a decline in this incentive means that members do not only join 
because of tradition, but because they want to and see it as important and thus 
should be more active in the party. However, on the negative side, the party 
cannot rely on a save supply of members fed by individual socialization 
processes, who are then trained by the party while making party careers and 
present the party’s future elite (Van Liefferinge and Wauters, 2014). Overall, this 
renders the party membership more divers and volatile. 
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6. Altruistic incentives are important to members whose motivation for joining 
the party is to contribute to the functioning of democracy, i.e. people join to fulfil 
their duty as citizen. This is usually a large group and the use of primaries—
both open and closed—should further increase its size, as members might feel 
that it is easier to do one’s democratic duty by just voting in the primary. 
 
7. Expressive attachment incentives make members join to express their 
support for a specific intra-party fraction or an impressive person within the 
party and to communicate their perceived emotional attachment to a party. In 
general, the use of primaries should increase the size of this group, especially 
members who state that their main motivation for joining was to support a 
specific party leader. However, it can be argued that if a primary truly empowers 
members and increase their power, this incentive might actually decrease as 
people join as activist rather than as followers of a leader.  
 
The short discussion above shows that it can be expected that specific 
organizational rules can mobilize different types of members, due to the altered 
individual conception of party membership resulting from the level of IPD. Thus 
changes in party rules, here the leadership selection method, might—
intentionally or not—lead to a shift in the incentives for members to join the 
party. This consequently affects the quality of party membership, as different 
incentives lead to different levels of activity within the party. Thus the next 
section discusses the second aspect of the membership quality dimension, 
namely, how the adoption of different primary rules theoretically changes the 
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type and intensity of active members’ engagement in the party caused by the 
changed conception of party membership and its role. 
The second aspect captures the kind and intensity of activities members 
participate in to support the party organization and its electoral campaigns. In 
short, higher levels of participation in general and of resource-intensive 
activities (time and money) in particular point to a positive evolution of an 
individual’s concept of party membership. The spectrum of membership activity 
reaches from inactivity or passive member to the highly active member (van 
Haute, 2009a). On the lower end of the scale, members might take part in 
activities that require a low investment of time and money. Voting in internal or 
primary election is surely one of the low investment activities, as it usually 
requires relatively little cost and time. Here, the question emerges of whether 
new members who join after the introduction of such measure have lower 
quality, as they only join to vote rather than to take an active role in the party 
(Rahat and Hazan, 2003). Thus, do they conceive themselves as party 
members or rather supporters in the shape of primary voters? In addition, 
existing members might feel discouraged in maintaining their high investment 
activity, if their influence is diluted and diminished by a large passive 
membership holding equal voting rights (Scarrow, 2002). It can be argued that, 
if on the one side, the introduction of primaries is perceived as empowering by 
members, this should lead to an overall increase in activism and higher 
engagement in time- and money-intensive activities. On the other side, the 
introduction of primaries could lead to a decrease in time-intensive work for the 
party and an increase in low time and money-intensive activities, if the primaries 
are seen as disempowering. In short, primaries can lead to a revitalization or 
further weakening of party activism depending on what conception of party 
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membership they foster. Thus, this dimension is vital in understanding of how 
reforms affect active party members, especially under what conditions they 
remain active. It is important to look at how the pattern and intensity of 
participation differ before and after the reform, and between existing and new 
members (Sandri, 2011). This allows for analysis of how different types of 
primaries affect party members differently and to assess the positive and 
negative implications of the changed level of IPD. 
Overall studying changes in members’ motives for joining, measuring the 
variations in how much time and what type of activities members engage in 
under different rules and before and after the reform provides insight into how 
the reform affects membership quality, and whether the new rules advance a 
new individual level conception of party membership or reinforce the existing 
one. 
 
Membership Attitude towards Party Leadership 
The next section outlines the theoretical rationale underlying the 
dimension of attitude towards party leadership and how it is expected that 
different leadership selection rules affect them. This dimension is included here, 
as the literature on party politics frequently refers to the changing and conflictual 
relationship between the party on the ground and the party in central and public 
office (Katz and Mair, 1995). The majority of the reforms discussed here were 
triggered by the party leadership and designed to bring back, if not empower, 
rank and file members (Cross and Blais, 2012b; Kittilson and Scarrow, 2003). 
Therefore, such reforms also aim to improve the relationship and strengthen the 
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ties between the three faces of party organization.13 The question that emerges 
is whether different groups of members and activists perceive the changes in 
the same way as the leadership, and, thus, how their attitude towards the 
leadership is affected by the reforms. The project uses parts of the efficacy-and-
trust model developed by Craig et al. (1990) to capture changes in attitude at 
the individual member level. 
In general, the efficacy-and-trust model analyses how “party members 
perceive their own political organization and whether they are satisfied with its 
functioning” (Sandri, 2011: 196). In addition to the more widely studied areas of 
intra-party conflict (Bolleyer et al., 2016, Boucek, 2009) and internal discontent 
(van Haute, 2009b), this is an additional vital area to better understand the 
dynamics and perceived role of party members within the party. The model 
marks a turn away from the rational choice tradition that dominated party 
membership research towards a socio-psychological approach; after all, in a 
traditional rational choice approach unsatisfied members would not stay within 
their party but simply leave. However, as multiple membership surveys from 
across the world14 show members do stay and are even active within their party 
organization despite high levels of criticism and dissatisfaction. Their main 
criticisms are their limited role within the party as well as marginal involvement 
and influence in key decision-making areas. Thus, the move to a higher level of 
IPD could be seen as responding to such criticism and result in an improved 
individual conception of party membership. However, as mentioned more critical 
scholars see increases IPD as a pretext to further disempower the membership 
                                            
13
 Katz and Mair (1994) distinguish between three faces of party organisation: the party on the 
ground, the party in central office and the party in public office. 
14
 See, for example, Canada (Cross and Young, 2004), Germany (von Allemann and Klein, 
2009) or Belgium (van Haute, 2009). 
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and reduce its role in the party organization (Lefebvre, 2011) in favour of a new 
conception of individual party members as supporters and primary voters. Thus, 
the question remains whether members’ attitude towards its party organization 
and leadership improve due to increased IPD brought about in the form of 
primaries, and whether this has a positive impact on the individual level 
conception of party membership. 
The efficacy-and-trust model underwent many developments since it was 
first used in the 1950s. This project will use the latest version developed by 
Craig et al. in 1990. It was originally developed to study voting behaviour but is 
applied here to party members, based on Eldersveld’s (1964) claim that parties 
are a closed system of their own. The main underlying idea is that both trust 
and efficacy affect individual behaviour within organizations. Broadly speaking, 
efficacy is defined as the way in which individuals perceive their role within party 
organizations, and how effectively they use the opportunity structure provided 
by party organizations. Thus, political efficacy provides an indication of 
individually perceived powerlessness (Campbell, 1954). In the following, we 
only focus on efficacy and leave trust aside; overall, capturing perceived 
efficacy gives an insight into the level of satisfaction and the attitude of party 
members towards the party organization and its leaders. Thus, the level of 
satisfaction and attitude of party members offers a better understanding of the 
individual level conception and perceived role of party membership. 
Overall, the model by Craig et al. (1990) consists of four components: (1) 
external political efficacy, (2) internal political efficacy, (3) incumbent-based trust 
and (4) regime-based trust. This project only focuses on the first aspect, as it is 
interested in party members’ perspective on their role within the party, and how 
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the introduction of different types of primaries affect the power of members 
within the party.15 The next paragraph outlines the concept of external political 
efficacy. 
External political efficacy is defined as an individual’s political influence over the 
organization she or he is part of. Thus, rephrasing Craig et al. (1990) to fit to 
party members, the category captures the members’ believe about the 
responsiveness of the party leaderships and bodies to their demands as well as 
the extent to which they feel that their participation matters. The category can 
be divided into two aspects of political efficacy. 
The first aspect of regime-based external efficacy measures how 
members perceive the opportunities, established via formal rules and 
procedures (here primaries), to influence political process or its outcome 
provided by the political organization (Craig et al., 1990: 291). Here we focus on 
how much influence members feel they have over the party in general, its 
candidate and leadership selection processes. This perceived power distribution 
and influence in key decision-making areas affects the overall satisfaction with 
party membership and the membership conception at the individual level. 
Second, incumbent-based external efficacy captures the responsiveness 
of the party leaders themselves rather than the ability of the individual to 
                                            
15
 Incumbent-based trust: This is defined as the expression of (dis-)satisfaction with party 
organisational performances (Craig et al., 1990) and measures beliefs about whether or not the 
party is “functioning and producing outputs in accord with individual expectations” (Craig et al. 
1990: 291). 
Regime-based trust: The last component measures more general and broad feelings of 
attachment or loyalty to the political system and constitutional order (Craig et al. 1990: 291). 
Internal political efficacy refers to the individual self-perception that members “are capable of 
understanding politics and competent enough to participate in political acts” and in the political 
process (Miller et al, 1980, 253). The project is not interested in how such reforms change their 
perceived ability to understand politics. Consequently, all these categories are not covered 
here. 
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influence the party as a whole. Thus, it focuses on how members see the ability 
and motivation of the party leaders to respond to members’ demands (Shingles, 
1988, Craig et al., 1990: 291), or whether it is necessary to be a party official or 
public office holder to achieve anything. Further, it is concerned with what 
members would like to reform in order to increase their influence. 
Overall, an increase in external efficacy is clearly a positive effect for 
party members and is most likely in cases where they have influence on both 
aspects of the primary. While in cases where members’ influence is reduced 
due to very strict candidacy requirements and open primaries, external efficacy 
is likely to decline and this affects membership negatively. Thus, external 
efficacy is an effective dimension to capture the effect of different primary rules 
on the individual conception of party membership, and how its role is affected 
by the reform. Looking at the two sub-groups of new and existing members 
separately, on the one hand, existing members’ and activists’ attitudes could 
improve when they perceive changes to bring them more influence, hence this 
would improve the members’ attitude towards the party leadership (Young and 
Cross, 2002). On the other hand, they could also see it as an attempt by the 
leadership to atomize decision-making and disempower activists to strengthen 
their own power (Katz and Mair, 1994). It is probably right to assume that new 
members who join after the reform generally have a positive image of the 
leadership, as they join to either run or vote in the intra-party election. 
Individuals would not join a political party in the first place, if they had negative 
attitudes towards its leadership or potential candidates for the leadership 
position (Whiteley et al., 1994). Although it is possible that new members might 
join to challenge the existing party leadership (Barnea and Rahat, 2007), such 
events are probably rare and would require large resources, mainly financial, on 
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the side of the challenger to recruit enough voters and/ or members to topple 
the leadership. The attitude towards the party leadership is in itself an important 
factor to study the effect of the individual level conception of party membership 
brought about by different primary selection rules and the new level of IPD but 
also in relation to other aspects, as it affects the level and types of intra-party 
activity, voting behaviour and party loyalty. 
In summary, the above discussion of the four dimensions that together 
form the individual level party membership outlined the theoretical justification of 
why these dimensions matter. It also showed how different primary rules are 
expected to affect these dimensions and lead to a new perceived level of IPD 
among party members and thus affects the conception and role of their 
membership within the party organization.  
2.4 The Four Types of Primary Selection and their Impact on Party 
Membership 
Based on the above discussion, the next section outlines the theoretically 
expected effects of the interplay between the two dimensions—electorate and 
candidate requirements—along the four discussed dimensions on party 
membership (figure 2.3). It is necessary to study the impact of the rules on all 
four dimensions simultaneously to capture the full impact of the four different 
types of party primaries on party membership. Further, following the literature 
(Kenig et al., 2015b; Hirschman, 1970), the project not only investigates the 
overall effect on party members but on existing and new members separately. 
This leads to a rather complex theoretical framework consisting of four distinct 
types of IPD with overall and separate theoretical expectations for new and 
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existing members introducing members’ perceptions for all four dimensions (see 
p. 57, figure 2.1). It has to be stressed that the descriptions below are the ideal-
type conceptions of the effect of primaries on the new individual level 
conception of party membership brought about by the IPD, which in turn is 
achieved by the primary selection rules. 
Figure 2.3 Four Types of IPD 
Open 
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As previously mentioned the categories of IPD refer to the perceived 
democratization through primaries seen from party members’ point of view, and 
how this in turn affect the individual level conception of party membership 
expressed in changes along the four dimensions. The next section outlines the 
theoretically expected changes in the individual level conception of party 
membership brought about by the new level of IPD, in the perception of 
members, along the four dimensions. 
In the first case of Atomized Democratization (permissive candidacy/ 
open primary), the party membership loses any control over the outcome of 
leadership contests, as the selectorate and candidacy are completely opened 
up. In this case, organizational boundaries are highly blurred or even vanish, 
and the party ceases to be a clearly defined organizational entity of members 
and becomes a loose collection of atomized individuals. Thus, the classical 
conception of party membership is replaced, leading Berdahl (1942: 16) to 
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argued that in such cases “party membership is generally not distinguished from 
mere voting affiliation”. It is unsurprising that this leads to a decline in existing 
membership; incentives to actively participate in the party are reduced and 
overall membership quality declines (Berdahl, 1942). The open candidate 
requirements transform the organization into a vehicle for ambitious individuals 
to run for office and to fulfil personal as well as professional goals rather than to 
serve the party and its ideology. Thus, traditional mass or catch-all party 
organizational models are demolished in favour of professional campaign 
organizations (see Panebianco, 1988). 
This constellation of primary rules probably leads to a decline in existing 
membership as their power to influence leadership selection is substantially 
diminished (Cohen et al., 2008). Further, the open candidate requirements 
reduce the incentive to invest time and effort into the party so that conditions to 
run are met more easily (Berdahl, 1942). Consequently, the quality of the 
membership will decline. There are fewer incentives to become an activist but 
rather more incentives to attract professional opportunists (Panebianco, 1988). 
Thus, overall loyalty also decreases. The existing members’ attitude towards 
the leadership declines, as they fell disempowered. Their share of the turnout 
should be low as many feel their voice is crowded out by external voters.  
There will only be few new members, as there is no need to join the party to 
vote. The quality of the new members is relatively low as they probably join to 
become a candidate and pursue their personal and professional ambitions 
rather than to be a party activist (Snyder and Ting, 2002). Therefore, their 
loyalty to the party is low; they leave it, if they fail to meet their professional 
goals, and they only become active members, if this furthers their aim of 
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becoming a candidate or winning the contests. Their attitude towards leadership 
should increase, as they provide the resources and support needed to run an 
effective campaign (Panebianco, 1988). As mentioned, only few new members 
are expected to join, however, they should be highly active during the 
leadership contest, thus increasing the level of overall turnout among members 
and accounting for a high share of the turnout. After all, their main motivation to 
join in the first place was the open selection regulations. Schattschneider (1942: 
59) argued that in this view, parties are alliances of leaders, between which 
voters choose and not organizations of the citizens themselves. Thus, apart 
from professional staff, candidates and electoral campaign helpers, 
membership becomes mainly redundant. Observations about US parties would 
confirm the consequences for party members outlined above. 
In the next case of Disempowering Democratization (strict candidacy/ 
open primary), members feel truly disempowered, atomized and their voice is 
crowded out by a large external selectorate, while the process itself is tidily 
controlled by the elite (Katz and Mair, 1994). However, the party continues to 
exist as defined organizational entity of member but with a reduced role. 
Overall, members lose the exclusive right to participate in leadership selections 
but do not gain the right to run as candidates. Thus, they are further 
disempowered, atomized and their voice is crowded out by a large party 
external primary selectorate. Further, due to this disempowerment of members 
and a lack of incentives to join to participate in leadership elections, few new 
members join. Overall, this combination provides the elite with a high level of 
control over the primary and substantially reduces membership power and 
influence (Michels 1911; Katz and Mair 1994). 
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This constellation of rules is most likely to lead to a decline in existing 
membership, as members’ power to influence the outcome of membership 
selection is substantially reduced (Katz and Mair 1994). In addition, the very 
strict candidacy requirements reduce the members’ possibility to run in the 
contest, overall leaving them with a feeling of disempowerment. Consequently, 
the incentive to invest time or other resources into the party declines, leading to 
a drop in the quality of party membership (Rahat and Hazan, 2007). Thus, fewer 
members will be willing to participate in any high-intensity party activities. 
Further, the loyalty towards the leadership decreases as existing members feel 
they are not truly represented. Hence, negative attitudes towards the leadership 
increase. Overall, existing party members’ participation rate is low and amounts 
only to a small share of the turnout, as they feel that they have no real choice 
and that their voice is crowded out by a larger external selectorate (Lefebvre, 
2011). 
In general, the inflow of new members should be small, as there is no 
need to join the party to vote (Knapp, 2002). The closed candidate requirements 
reduce the possibility to be a candidate in future and reduce the incentive for 
the membership further. However, often reforms that widen the leadership 
selection methods are combined with large-scale member recruitment drives 
(Haegel, 2012, Haegel, 2009). The most common method is to create new 
membership category with lower fees and limited rights vis-a-vis full party 
membership (Kosiara-Pedersen et al., 2014, Sandri and von Nostitz, 2015). 
This low cost support or friendship membership often only provides the right to 
vote in primaries and to attend party meetings but without voting rights. Often, 
these memberships are not renewed in years without leadership contest or 
restricted to one year only (Bachelot, 2008). Thus, they can artificially increase 
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membership levels for a short period of time. The quality of the new members is 
also lower, since they join mainly as ‘voters’ and not as party activists. The 
turnout in the first contest is probably high due to its novelty factor, but it should 
drop and remain relatively low in consecutive contests (Gans, 2010). However, 
newly acquired party members provide a high share of the turnout, if the 
recruitment drive was successful but remains still lower than the share of non-
party members. 
The third category is Protected Democratization (permissive candidacy/ 
closed primary). From a members’ perspective, members are empowered as 
they now hold the deciding vote on who leads the party, and their voice is not 
crowded out by a large external selectorate. Further, they can run in leadership 
selection contests, if they wish to do so. Thus, members feel that their interests 
and organizational role is protected. There should be no decline in membership 
levels, as the powers of members increase giving them the right to vote and, 
more importantly, to become candidates in the leadership race. Additional, 
members’ empowerment should also lead to more intra-party participation and 
an improved attitude towards the leadership (Scarrow, 2005). The party elite 
loses its control over the candidacy requirements, and, thus, new candidate 
gain the opportunity to enter the contest. In the long run, this will contribute to 
party survival, renewal and facilitate generational turnover (Scarrow, 2005). 
Overall, the power of members is protected from external voters and elite 
control, and, hence, the overall turnout should be high. The impact on the 
quality of membership should be positive with new members having a positive 
attitude towards the leadership. This seems to be the optimal form of intra-party 
democracy, as it sustains the organizational structure and strengthens the 
power and role of the membership without providing excessive control and 
 77 
 
power to the party elite. Thus, it protects both party members and the party 
organization (Young and Cross, 2002). 
 There should be no decline in the membership level of existing members. 
Some former disillusioned members might even return, as the new regulations 
provide more power and a new incentive to join. The power of members is 
enlarged, and they are free to become candidates in the leadership race, if they 
want to do so. The quality of membership is likely to increase. Activists are 
motivated to participate, as they feel they have more influence over the party 
leadership (Spier et al., 2011). Further, the empowerment for members should 
also lead to higher party loyalty. Consequently, the attitude towards the 
leadership should improve. Overall turnout should be high, and existing 
members should provide a high share of it (Wauters, 2015). However, some 
activists might abstain due to a feeling of disempowerment, as they lost the 
exclusive right to vote for the leadership in delegate conferences. 
 Given this regulatory constellation, an increase in new members joining 
the party should be observable. It does not only give them the right to vote in 
leadership contests but also to run without the need to overcome high hurdles. 
Thus, the incentives to join increase. Again, the impact on the quality of 
membership depends on whether the leadership introduces new membership 
categories or not (Kosiara-Pedersen et al, 2014). If there is a new ‘primary 
voter/ supporter’ category the new members’ quality is most likely to be lower, 
as they just join as primary voters rather than with the aim to become party 
activists; they invest little in the party and soon leave again. Of course, some 
join to become candidates, and their level of activism can be expected to the 
very high. If no new membership category is introduced, the membership quality 
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is likely to improve. New members who pay a higher membership fee—than 
supporter, which for them is often free or very cheap (Sandri and von Nostitz, 
2015)—will invest more time and resources to get a return on their initial 
investment (Scarrow, 1995). This is practically true for new members who want 
to run as candidates in the leadership contest. Overall, new members should 
have a positive attitude towards the leadership. Their participation rate and 
share of the overall turnout should be high, as one of the main reasons to join 
the party was to vote in the leadership selection contest (Young and Cross, 
2002). 
In the last combination of Controlled Democratization (strict candidacy/ 
closed primary), members also perceive that they hold the deciding vote on who 
will lead the party, and their voice is not crowded out by a large external 
selectorate; however, candidacy is more limited and controlled by the party 
leadership. Thus, in contrast to the above, they feel their interests and 
organizational role is not only protected but also controlled by the elite so that 
they do not interfere with the latter’s aims. The elite can still limit the list of 
candidates and in this way contain unwanted outcomes. This combination leads 
to a clearly defined and distinct selectorate and provides the elite with extensive 
control over the process. Hence, even though this is a more democratic method 
in comparison to others, such as delegate meetings, it overall remains highly 
controlled by the elite (Indriðason and Kristinsson, 2013). 
In this combination, the power of existing party members to determine 
the leadership increases, but their ability to run is still very limited. Often 
increasing the size of the selectorate is combined with the introduction of more 
exclusive candidate requirements further reducing the possibilities of members 
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to run (Katz, 2001). Thus, this should lead to a moderate decline in membership 
as activists lose their exclusive voting rights to ordinary members. Further, the 
quality of membership should also decrease, as many middle-level activists 
invest less resources into the party because the former reward for attending the 
delegate meeting to select the next party leaders is removed (Sandri, 2011; 
Amjahad, 2013). The overall level of mobilization in terms of turnout should 
decrease but be still relatively high, as existing members’ voices are still 
protected. Further, the attitude towards the leadership will worsen as activists 
feel they have less influence over it. However, these effects should be less 
profound than in the case of a move to an open primary. The overall share and 
level of turnout should be high (Wauters, 2015).  
New Members are likely to join to gain the right to vote in the leadership 
selection contest. As previously outlined, such reforms are often linked with 
membership recruitment drives (Haegel, 2009). This should further increase the 
number of new members joining the party. The incentive to gain voting rights 
should lead to a higher inflow than under open primaries. The quality of the new 
members depends on whether or not the party introduces new membership 
categories with lower fees (Kosiara-Pedersen, et al. 2014). In the case of a new 
‘primary voter/ supporter’ category, the quality should decline as new members 
join only to vote rather than to become party activists. In this case, loyalty 
should be low, and a large amount of members only becomes active during 
leadership contests (Young and Cross, 2002). If no new categories are 
introduced, the quality is most likely to improve as new members are prepared 
to pay high membership fees and should invest time into the party to benefit 
from their investment (Scarrow, 1995). This should lead to a more loyal and 
active membership. But overall, in both cases a more positive impact on the 
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quality of membership can be expected, as some of the new members will 
become activists. The attitude towards the leadership should be positive, as 
members join to vote for it. New members provide a large share of the overall 
high turnout, as their main motivation to join is to vote in the leadership 
selection.  
After discussing the theoretical expectations for all, existing as well as new 
members along the four dimensions under four different primary regimes, the 
next section offers a summary and turns them into individual, testable 
hypotheses. 
 
6. From Concept and Dimensions to Hypotheses 
The next section turns the above outlined expectations in the discussion 
of ideal cases into testable hypotheses. The following outline is based on the 
assumption that party members and primary voters are aware of who can run 
and what set of rules apply in the elections. As a reminder, candidate 
requirements, who can run, are seen as either permissive or strict. Further, 
open primaries are those in which non-members may vote in the selection, 
while closed primaries are those in which only party members can vote. As 
previously discussed, the effect of the four types of primaries along the four 
indicators is discussed separately for existing and new members.  
The following two pages outline the above-discussed relationships in a 
graphical manner. The first figure outlines the consequence for both new and 
existing members under conditions of strict candidacy requirement and open/ 
closed primaries. The second figure outlines the impact under permissive 
candidacy requirements and open/ closed primaries. The general direction of 
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membership development in each dimension and in all combinations is 
indicated by plus and minus signs or an o in case of no change. 
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Figure 2.4 Restrictive Candidate Nomination Arrow Diagram 
 
 
        Existing members 
Disempowering Democratization: 
 
Open primary (OP)  Impact on membership  
 
 
             New members 
 
 
 
 
 
        Existing members 
Controlled Democratization: 
 
Closed primary (CP)    Impact on membership  
 
 
         New members  
 
- Membership decline 
- Decrease in membership quality 
- Negative attitude towards leadership  
- Low share of turnout 
- Little membership increase (if no recruitment drive) 
- Decrease in quality 
- Positive attitude towards leadership 
- High share of turnout  
(often combined with 
recruitment drive as primary 
new incentive to join) 
- Moderate decline in membership 
- Decrease in quality 
- Decreasing attitude towards leadership 
- High share of turnout 
- Membership increase 
- Quality depends on membership categories available 
- Attitude to leadership positive  
- Turnout high and high share of it  
(- or no change) 
(+) 
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(++) 
Figure 2.5 Permissive Candidate Nomination Arrow Diagram 
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Figure 2.4 below presents in a table the above outlined effects on new and 
existing members in each of the four combinations of leadership rules as 
individual, testable hypotheses.  
Figure 2.6 Four Types of IPD with Indicators and Expected Effects 
Open 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Selectorate – 
Primary Zone 
Atomized  
Democratization 
Overall effect: -- 
Membership level  
Existing: - New: + 
Quality of membership 
Existing: -New: - 
 Attitude towards leadership 
Existing: - New: + 
Turnout in primary 
Existing: low New: high 
Disempowering 
Democratization 
Overall effect: - 
Membership level  
Existing: - New: + 
Quality of membership 
Existing: - New: - 
 Attitude towards leadership 
Existing: - New: +  
Turnout in primary 
Existing: low New: high 
Protected  
Democratization 
Overall effect: ++ 
Membership level 
Existing: o New: + 
Quality of membership 
Existing: + New: + 
 Attitude towards leadership 
Existing: + New: + 
Turnout in primary 
Existing: high New: high 
Controlled 
Democratization 
Overall effect: + 
Membership level  
Existing: - New: + 
Quality of membership 
Existing: -New: + 
 Attitude towards leadership 
Existing: - New: + 
Turnout in primary 
Existing: high New: high 
Closed Permissive             Candidate Requirements              Strict 
Explanation: (-): decrease ;(o): stays the same ;(+): increase 
 
Due to different consequences of the types of primaries for both existing and 
new memberships, each of the above outlined types of IPD can be divided into 
testable hypotheses for both sub-groups along the four dimensions. To illustrate 
this, the following section does so for the case of turnout in primary selections. 
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The four types of IPD differently affect the relative participation of existing, new 
and non-members in the primary. 
 
Disempowering Democratization:  
H(a) Leadership selection methods with permissive selectorate but closed 
candidacy requirements lead to a low turnout of existing members. 
H(b) Leadership selection methods with permissive selectorate but closed 
candidacy requirements lead to a high turnout of new members and non-
members. 
 
Atomized Democratization 
H(a) Leadership selection methods with permissive selectorate and open 
candidacy requirements lead to a low turnout of existing members. 
H(b) Leadership selection methods with permissive selectorate and open 
candidacy requirements lead to a high turnout of new members and non-
members. 
 
Controlled Democratization 
H(a) Leadership selection methods with strict selectorate and closed candidacy 
requirements lead to a high turnout of existing members and high share of it. 
H(b) Leadership selection methods with strict selectorate and closed candidacy 
requirements lead to a high turnout of new members and high share of it. 
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Protected Democratization 
H(a) Leadership selection methods with strict selectorate but open candidacy 
requirements lead to a high turnout of existing members and high share of it. 
H(b) Leadership selection methods with strict selectorate but open candidacy 
requirements lead to a high turnout of new members and high share of it 
 
The analysis of the different types of primaries using the four indicators of (1) 
party membership level, (2) turnout, (3) membership quality and attitude 
towards the membership will prove the overall effect of each type of primary on 
party members. 
 
2.5 Conclusion 
The chapter first developed the conceptual framework and in a second step 
provided a discussion of the indicators used to study the impact of different 
primary rules on the individual conception of party membership. It ended by 
combining all relevant aspects in a unified framework and discussed the effect 
of the four distinct types of IPD from the members’ perspective.  
 The first dimension of the framework is the selectorate of the primary, i.e. 
who can vote. Hazan and Rahat (2010) and others suggest five different types, 
reaching from fully inclusive (voters) to fully restricted (singe leader), in which 
case the leader is appointed rather than voted. The project is only interested in 
the inclusive end of the scale and, thus, selection that lies within the primary 
zone, which is defined as cases where the decisive and final vote either rests 
with party members or voters. Conceptually, the former is defined as a closed 
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while the latter is defined as an open primary. This constitutes the first 
dimension of open vs. closed selectorate. 
 The second dimension is candidacy requirements, which defines who 
can run in a primary. Again, they can be either fully inclusive with no rules to 
highly restrictive with candidates having to meet a long list of requirements. The 
entire continuous scale is divided into two conceptual categories: permissive 
and restrictive candidacy requirements. While, for example, requirements of 
being a sitting MP or high numbers of signatures from different party bodies and 
regions are considered as strict, party membership or a small percentage of 
signatures from party members are categorized as permissive. This constitutes 
the second dimension of permissive vs. strict candidacy requirements. 
 To fully understand and analyse the effect of different primary rules on 
the nature of party membership, we need to study the interaction between the 
two dimensions outlined above. The chapter discusses the theoretical 
justifications for the four indicators suggested by the project to do so. The first 
indicator is changes in membership levels. The increase or decline of 
membership provides an insight into whether reforms are able to attract new 
members and retain existing ones. Second, turnout in primary selection 
provides insights into the mobilization of party membership or the electorate at 
large. It further allows seeing whether all sub-groupings within the party or 
among members and voters participate equally and have proportional influence 
over the outcome, or whether one group dominates the process. The third 
indicator is the quality of party membership. It provides insight into whether the 
new selection system affects the motivation and thus type of members that join 
the party. The main question is whether different combinations of primary rules 
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attract different types of members and lead to a more active or passive 
membership. The last indicator is the membership attitude towards the party 
leadership. Here, the question is whether members feel they have more or less 
influence and voice in the party (external efficacy) under different primary rules. 
As highlighted throughout the chapter, the effect of different rules along the four 
indicators are not only discussed for the membership as a whole but also 
separately for the two sub-groups of new and existing members.  
 The next section of the chapter merges the two dimensions and four 
indicators into one unified framework and discusses the four conceptual 
categories. The framework distinguishes between four ideal types of IPD based 
on the members’ perception of different primary rules. Open primaries with strict 
candidacy requirements are seen as Disempowering Democratization, since 
members lose their exclusive voting right to the larger external electorate. 
Closed Primaries with strict candidacy requirements are classified as 
Controlled Democratization as both the party elite and party members retain 
control over both aspects of the selection process. The third category is 
Atomized Democratization with permissive candidacy requirements in an 
open primary as both members and elite lose any control over the selection 
process. The final category of Protected Democratization with permissive 
candidacy requirements in a closed primary is so called like this, as it protects 
the power of members by giving them not only the exclusive right to vote but 
also to run and challenge the party leadership, if they wish to do so. 
 The chapter ends by presenting as individual, testable hypotheses in a 
table and graph the discussion of the effects of the interplay between the 
primary rules on the four indicators. As an example, the section also outlines a 
 89 
 
full list of hypotheses—for all, new and existing members—for turnout as one of 
the indicators. It is now possible to test the effect of different types of primaries 
on party membership in a comparative and systematic way, based on the four 
indicators of membership level, membership quality, membership attitude 
toward the leadership and turnout. 
 Before exploring the merit of the hypotheses in form of an in-depth and 
detailed case study analysis, the next chapter justifies the project’s case 
selection, introduces the method chosen here, provides an overview of the data 
used and presents an operationalization of all variables, before applying the 
above developed conceptual framework to the cases of the UK Conservative 
Party, the German Greens and French PS. 
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3 Case Selection, Methods and Data 
3.1 Introduction 
The aim of this chapter is threefold. It first discusses the cases selection; 
second it outlines the method and data used. It shows that the project uses a 
mixed-method case study approach based on a combination of new and 
existing primary and secondary document and data analysis. This enables the 
project to study the effects of the four types of primaries on party members 
along the four indicators of (1) membership level, (2) turnout in primary, (3) 
membership quality and (4) membership attitude towards the party leadership. 
Overall, this allows the project examining the theoretical claim that different 
types of primaries can be perceived by party members as either 
disempowering, atomizing, controlling or protective. The third section provides 
an overview of survey questions in existing membership surveys that are used 
to operationalize and measure both theoretical concepts of membership quality 
and attitude. In the case of party quality, the project uses a mix of survey items 
used in previous surveys to capture intra-party participation (Haegel, 2012; 
Dargent and Rey, 2014; Rey and Subileau, 1991; Subileau et al., 1999; Spier et 
al., 2011; Whiteley et al., 1994) as well as items developed as part of the 
general-incentive model by Seyd and Whiteley (1992). Together they can 
demonstrate how the quality of membership varies due to the different types of 
primaries in operation. To measure differences in membership attitudes towards 
the party leadership due to the four types of primaries, the study will use survey 
items developed as part of the political-efficacy model by Niemi et al. (1991). 
Further, the section also uses items measuring satisfaction with membership. 
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To triangulate the findings, the project also uses party member and elite 
interviews. The final part of the chapter discusses the research method of using 
interviews, the structure of the interviews and its utility for verifying survey data 
and also provides further background information. In summary, the chapter 
justifies the case selection, the methodology used, operationalizes the theories 
and concepts to enable the subsequent chapters to empirically examine the 
effect of different types of primaries on party membership.  
3.2 Case Selection 
Following Seawright and Gerring (2008: 297), the project uses a typical case 
study method. The case of the German Greens, the UK Conservative Party and 
the French PS are chosen, as they are a representative example for a wider 
population of cases that can be placed in the quadrats combining candidate 
requirements and selectorate. As such, they allow confirming or disconfirming 
the theoretical expectations of the specified relationship between primary rules 
and effect on party membership for each of the three types of intra-party 
democracy (IPD). In all cases chosen, the adoption of primaries constitutes a 
structural change towards a higher level of IPD in the shape of a shift from a 
delegate meeting system to an open or closed primary selection. All cases also 
meet the competitiveness requirement; selection takes place with more than 
one candidate—reaching from two to 15 candidates—and can thus be 
considered a contest rather than a coronation. The following typical cases are 
selected here: 
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Figure 3.1 Four Types of IPD with Case Studies 
Open 
 
 
Selectorate – 
Primary Zone 
Atomized  
Democratization 
 
Disempowering 
Democratization 
French Parti Socialist 
(2011) 
Protected 
Democratization 
German Greens 
Controlled 
Democratization 
UK Conservative Party, 
French Parti Socialist 
(1995,2006) 
Closed Permissive             Candidate Requirements              Strict 
 
Based on the two dimensions, the case selection consists of a total of 
three parties but four cases. The French PS constitutes two cases, as it 
considerably changed its leadership selection method twice over the past 
decades (in 1995 and 2009). This allows tracing the changes in the party 
membership’s attitude and behaviour within the same organization but under 
two different selection methods. The effect on party members is the same 
regardless of the party adopting an open primary directly or first a closed and 
moves then to an open primary. 
Further, for unit homogeneity to hold, the project only looks at advanced 
long-lived democracies and the use of different types of primaries to select the 
party leader at the national level. The study only includes mainstream parties, 
here defined as parties, which either are or were in government or have 
government potential (Sartori, 1976). Another constrain on the case selection is 
that parties voluntarily adopted primaries rather than they being state imposed. 
This leads to the exclusion of the US as a potential case. After all many 
scholars point out that the concept of party membership in the US is substantial 
different from the one in the European context (Stone et al., 2004, Heidar, 
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2006). This further restricts the case selection to European parties, leading the 
top right box of the above figure to be empty. The absence of such a case in 
Europe is logical, as most reforms were adopted by the party elite and no party 
elite would voluntarily adopt a selection system that would lead to total loss of 
their power and control. As the project focuses on intra-organizational changes 
and intra-party elections, external and systemic factors, such as the electoral 
system or party system, should have no significant impact on the effect of 
different types of primaries on party members.  
3.3 Method and Data 
The project follows a mixed-method approach applied to three case studies. 
The project mainly uses quantitative membership survey data complemented by 
in-depth qualitative membership interviews. It further uses a combination of 
primary and secondary sources that will be analysed in a qualitatively (party 
statutes) and quantitatively manner (membership figures and turnout). Survey 
data is mainly analysed using descriptive statistics, such as frequency 
distributions and cross tabulations. 
As the project aims to compare the development of the four above-
mentioned indicators (membership level, turnout in primary, quality of 
membership and membership attitude towards the leadership) before and after 
the introduction of more inclusive leadership selection methods, each indicator 
will be measured twice, before and after the reform.  
 The main benefit of the mixed-method approach is that it profits from the 
advantages of both methods and offsets their weaknesses. Following Morgan’s 
(1998) two criteria for mixed-method research, here the quantitative method in 
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form of membership surveys constitutes the principal tool of data-gathering 
(priority decision), and it precedes the qualitative method in form of semi-
structured interviews (sequence decision). Based on Creswell and Plano Clark’s 
(2011) classification of different mixed-methods designs, the project opted for 
an explanatory sequel design. The findings of the quantitative survey data 
collection inform the design of the subsequent qualitative semi-structured 
interview guide. The interviews allow for elaboration and detailed explanation of 
the survey findings. Further, the interviews provide insight into contexts in which 
the survey data was gathered and thus contributes substantially to a more 
comprehensive account of the effect of different primary rules on party 
membership. In addition, the interviews allow for triangulation of the survey 
findings to produce greater validity of the findings. 
 Generally, there are two main criticisms in the literature with regard to the 
use of a mixed-method research approach. The first states that quantitative and 
qualitative research carries distinct and fixed epistemological and ontological 
commitments, and, thus, to mix them is impossible and undesirable (Hughes, 
1990: 11, Smith, 1983: 12 f). The second criticism is that quantitative and 
qualitative research is a separate paradigms (Bryman, 2016: 636). While this 
discussion is beyond the scope of this project, in defence of the methodological 
choice made, it has to be stressed that the project adopts a technical version of 
the nature of qualitative and quantitative research rather than an 
epistemological one. This implies a “greater prominence to the strengths of the 
data-collection and data-analysis techniques with which each quantitative and 
qualitative research are each associated and sees these as capable of being 
fused” (Bryman, 2016: 637). This version acknowledges that both types of 
research have distinct epistemological and ontological assumptions, however, it 
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does not see them as fixed and inevitable. Thus, the research methods are 
seen as autonomous. The next section outlines the data collection and data 
analysis for both methods. 
 
Data 
To assess the procedural changes political parties enact, the project uses a 
large variety of primary documents, such as party statutes, internal regulations, 
reports and party self-reported information. In addition, especially for the two 
quantitative indicators turnout and membership figures, it uses secondary 
documents, such as newspaper articles, independent expert reports and the 
MAPP project data base. This allows for the triangulation of the membership 
and turnout figures stated by the parties, as self-reported membership figures 
and turnout rates are often artificially inflated. In the cases under study, the 
primary and secondary documents listed above are widely and generally 
available and accessible. 
For the two indicators aiming to capture changes in membership quality 
and attitude towards the party leadership, the project will use party membership 
surveys. To measure the impact of the primaries on party membership, the 
project collects membership survey data from before and after the shift from 
delegate meeting to either open or closed primary. The table (2) below outlines 
the availability of party membership surveys for the cases under study. A 
detailed discussion of the data used in each case can be found in the next 
section. 
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Table 3.1 Date of Party Membership Surveys and Leadership Reform 
Party Membership Surveys and Reform 
Dates 
 Pre-Reform Reform Post-Reform 
Conservatives 
(UK) 
1992 1998 200916 
PS I (France) 1985 1995 1998 
PS II (France)17 1998 2009 2011 
Greens (GER) 2009 2012 2015 
 
One general disadvantage is that individual level data relies on self-reported 
information, which is not objective, and might lead to an overstatement of the 
level of activity or underreport party internal undesirable events. However, the 
careful survey design and large sample size cancels out some of these effects 
(Podsakoff and Organ, 1986). Further, the interviews provide for more 
contextual information and triangulation of the survey findings.  
The analysis of the existing pre- and post-reform surveys is a form of secondary 
survey analysis, as it re-analyses the existing survey responses with the aim of 
examining research questions that differ from those of the original research 
(Nathan, 2004). In most cases, the existing surveys are either publicly available 
through national data services or access has been provided by contacting the 
organizer of the original survey. This is a very cost- and time-saving method of 
data collection. The original survey might have been designed with a different 
analytical purpose in mind, but the scope of the questions in the membership 
survey is also somewhat limited, which reduces the potential variety of concepts 
and questions. However, as will be seen later in this chapter, 
                                            
16
 There is a further small survey by Bale and Webb from 2013. 
17
 The table shows the cases of the PS twice as the party first moved from a delegate model to 
a closed selectorate and later to an open selectorate. However, in both cases it maintained very 
strict and closed candidacy requirements.  
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operationalizations and measurements can vary, but as Kiecolt and Nathan 
(1985) point out, secondary survey analysis always requires some creative 
analytical techniques, when it comes to applying pre-collected data to new 
research questions. Common methods are harmonization (Office of Natinal 
Statistics, 1996) or establishing equivalence (van de Vijver and Leung, 1997: 
144). However, the general problem with the same concepts being 
operationalized and measured differently remains. In many cases, it is the only 
source of information we have available, if we want to study the changes 
caused by a certain phenomenon. Thus, overall, the advantages of a secondary 
survey analysis clearly outweigh its disadvantages, as it is better to have 
debatable research than no research at all (van Deth, 2003). 
The Green post-reforms survey (bolt in table 3.1 above) is conducted 
specifically for this project. In order to save money and time, the project opted 
for an online survey. In order to gain access to the population, the project 
contacted the party headquarters (gatekeepers) with the hope to use their 
internal mailing list to distribute the survey among party members. The 
Germany Green party survey was completed in autumn 2015. 
The survey design is partly based on pre-existing question batteries 
constructed for the general-incentive model developed by Seyd and Whiteley 
(1992) and the political-efficacy model developed by Niemi et al. (1991). The 
survey also used behavioural and attitudinal indicators outlined and extensively 
tested in previous membership surveys (Rey et al. 1991; Whiteley et al. 1994; 
Rey et al. 2001; Spier et al. 2011; Haegel 2012, Dargent and Rey 2014). Here 
the project relied heavily on the Members and Activists of Political Parties 
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(MAPP) working group18 database. Further, the survey uses standard control 
variables, such as age, gender and occupation status. The survey is designed 
to provide anonymity to all respondents. The large majority of questions in the 
survey are closed questions; they are formulated in a precise and simple 
manner, and the survey is kept short. Further, it was tested among a small 
group of party members who provided feedback on its clarity and the time it 
took to complete. All this should have increased the response rate. 
Overall, the survey design stresses within-case comparison rather the 
cross-case comparison. It thus prioritises the same way of operationalizing and 
measuring constructs within cases over using them across cases. This is done, 
as the main aim is to capture change in membership due to primaries within the 
same party organization over time. The collected data are mainly analysed 
using descriptive statistics, such as frequency distributions and cross 
tabulations.  
 
Data for the Three Case Studies 
After this general discussion of the method and survey design’s suitability, the 
next section outlines the details of survey data collection and of interview 
structures for each of the three case studies. 
 
In the case of the UK Conservative Party, the study relies on two pre-existing 
surveys. The pre-reform survey was conducted by Whiteley, Seyd and 
Richardson (1994) in 1992 and was accessible via the UK data service 
                                            
18
 (van Haute, ongoing-http://www.projectmapp.eu/). 
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website19; the post-reform survey was conducted by YouGov in 2009 and 
accessed via the MAPP project website20. A further small survey conducted by 
YouGov for Bale and Webb in 2013 is also used21. The 1992 postal survey ran 
for four months and was sent to 3,919 Conservative party members. The 
participants were sampled from unpublished membership lists of a sample of 
parliamentary constituencies in Great Britain (multi-stage stratified random 
sample). The survey obtained 2,467 responses resulting in a response rate of 
63 per cent. The study applied interlocked weights to adjust for under 
representation of respondents with weak partisanship and being male. The 
majority of questions were closed-ended (for further details, see Appendix I in 
Whiteley et al. 1994). The 2009 survey was conducted online and used an 
internet panel of party members. The survey was sent to a sample of 1,690 
respondents and all targeted members responded. There were no weights 
applied. The survey included serval questions asked in 1992 and most question 
were closed-ended. In 2013, the survey was again sent to an internet panel of 
party members costing of 852 participants. The overall survey was much 
shorter but included questions already used in 1992 and 2009. Thus, it allowed 
to trace tends in certain membership developments over a longer period of time. 
The sample is again unweighted. 
 
In the case of the German Greens, the study uses both existing and new survey 
data (see table 3.1 above). In the case of existing survey data, the thesis uses 
the data produced by the 2009 Party Membership Survey under the direction of 
                                            
19
 https://discover.ukdataservice.ac.uk/catalogue/?sn=3286&type=Data%20catalogue Whiteley, 
P.F., Seyd, P., Richardson, J. (1995). Survey of Conservative Party Members, 1992. [data 
collection]. UK Data Service. SN: 3286, http://dx.doi.org/10.5255/UKDA-SN-3286-1. 
20
 http://www.projectmapp.eu/databases/. 
21
 https://yougov.co.uk/news/2013/07/08/conservative-member-survey-paints-rather-gloomy-pi/ 
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Professor von Alemann (Spier et al., 2011). The postal survey was sent to a 
representative sample of 3,000 members out of the 45,405 Green party 
members, overall producing 1,835 valid responses and a response rate of 61.2 
per cent. The 2009 survey also provided the template for the survey design and 
operationalization of the qualitative indicators in the 2015 survey. This ensures 
comparability across the two surveys. In 2015, further questions were added to 
evaluate the impact of the new leadership selection method on party members. 
Further, the 2015 survey added items to capture external political efficacy, to 
measure the self-perceived influence of members on intra-party decision-
making and the party leadership. Standard control variables, such as age, 
gender and occupation status were also included, and the survey was totally 
anonymous. As in 2009, the large majority of questions in the survey are closed 
questions and were formulated precise and simple, and the survey was kept 
short. Before the distribution to ca. 41,00022 party members via the electronic 
newsletter of the party23, it was tested among a small group of party members 
for some feedback. The survey ran from June to September 2015 attracting 391 
responses.24 
 
To study the membership development for the French PS, the study uses three 
independently conducted membership surveys from 1985, 1998 and 2011. In 
addition, it also uses a small survey conducted by the party itself in 2006 meant 
to study the profile of the members that joined as part of the recruitment drive 
conducted in the primary and pre-election year. The 1985 survey was 
                                            
22
 The exact number varies slightly with each reminder as the size mailing list changed over 
time. 
23
 In order to save money and time, the project opted for an online survey 
24
 At 95 per cent confident level the survey has a 5 per cent margin of error 
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conducted by Rey and Subileau (1991). The survey was distributed during 
regional party meetings and in the regional party newspapers to 43,190 
members in 30 representative regions. Together this encompassed 40 per cent 
of all party members. In total 4,319 responded, leading to a 10 per cent 
response rate. The survey data was not weighted (for further details, see 
Appendix 1 in Rey and Subileau (1991). The second survey conducted in 1998 
was directed by Subileau, Ysmal and Rey (1999). The survey was distributed 
via the national party newspaper (l'Hebdomadaire des socialistes) to all 148,795 
members. Overall 12,291 members replied resulting in a response rate of 8.3 
per cent. This figure is based on the author’s own calculation based on the 1998 
membership figures, as the original report does not contain this information. The 
1998 survey contains all relevant question of the 1985/6 survey to study the 
development of party membership and the impact of the closed primary in 1995. 
Unfortunately, there is no electronic data set of this survey, and due to the large 
response rate, it was not possible to re-code all responses. Thus, the author 
drew a random sample, using R random number generator, of 2,000 
questionnaires from all available survey questionnaires.25 The party internal 
2006 survey was send to a sample of 18,000 out of the 40,000 new members 
that joined under the 20-Euro-for-One-Year-Membership recruitment drive to 
the date the survey was sent out (45 per cent of all new members). It attracted 
8,000 responses, hence, a response rate of 44.4 per cent. The survey was 
distributed online. While it was much shorter than the two previous surveys, it 
still contained the key questions of why members joined the party under the 
new membership category and socio-demographic questions. The final survey 
                                            
25
 Here I would like to thank Emilie van Haute and the MAPP project for providing the financial 
means to re-code the surveys. I also would like to thank Giulia Sandri and the staff of the PS 
archive for all their help, advice and support during this process. 
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used in this project by Dargent and Rey (2014) dates to 2011. The survey was 
distributed online to all party members using the newly created central party 
membership register (Rosam) and a small sample was done by telephone. In 
total 11,000 members responded resulting in a response rate of 6.3 per cent. 
Again, this is the author’s own calculation based on the 2011 membership 
figures, as the original report does not include this information. 
 
The survey data is complemented by qualitative in-depth semi-structured 
interviews with party elites (high public and party office holders), middle-level 
elites, activists and ordinary members in all three parties. In total, the project 
conducted 24 interviews between September 2015 and July 2016 with each 
interview lasting between 20 and 60 minutes. The author conducted eight 
interviews with members of the French PS, nine with members of the German 
Greens and six with members of the UK Conservative Party. For all three 
parties, participants were initially recruited by contacting the local party branch 
and constituency representatives at the local, national and European level. 
Further the author visited a local party branch and spend one day there asking 
visitor if they were willing to be interviewed. Following each interview, the snow-
balling method was applied to recruit further participants. This approach was 
highly effective. 
 
Before turning to the operationalization of the indicators, the next section 
discusses some of the limitation of the data. This is mainly relevant for the data 
used to capture the dependant variable, particularly for membership and turnout 
figures. Both measures are at the aggregate level and thus are not a perfect fit 
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to test how individual level of party membership changed. Nevertheless it is a 
good proxy to capture how different types of primaries affected the motivation of 
individual members to participate in the primary (turnout) and if it motivated 
individuals to join or leave the party. Another limitation of the membership data 
is that it hides turnover effects. Thus, a stable number of members might hide a 
loss of existing members that have been replaced by the identical amount of 
new members. This would be interpreted as no change and no gain of new and 
no loss of existing members. Thus by equating net membership gain of 
members to measure new members, the share of new member may be 
systematically underestimated This in turn might have impact on the results and 
also the calculation of how turnout might differ between new and existing 
members. These limitations are vital to bear in mind and some caution in 
interpreting findings is always advised. However, in order to partly compensate 
for some of these limitations, the study complements this aggregated data with 
both survey questions and interview items to capture the effects of the type of 
primary on turnout and motivation to join, leave or re-join the party. 
3.4 Operationalization of the Indicators 
Membership Figures and Turnout 
The measurements of membership size and its trajectory due to the new 
selection rules is relatively straight forward. Rather than reporting the share of 
party members of the electorate or population, the project uses absolute 
membership figures. This allows for a better detection of small changes in 
membership size. To trace membership development in individual parties, the 
project first presents the overall membership trend over a longer period of time 
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and then focuses on how the size changed between the year before the 
adoption of the new section rules, during and after the year of the selection. 
This approach enables the project to detect whether the development during the 
selection years follows the party’s general trend in membership development or 
not. In addition to reporting the absolute values in party membership size, the 
project also reports percentage changes. 
 The second indicator to look at is turnout. The project looks at overall 
turnout and the relative turnout of the two sub-groups, existing members and 
new members. The latter provides information about the influence each sub-
group has on the outcome of the selection process. In order to determine the 
relative size and thus strength of the two sub-groups, the project uses the 
differences between the membership in the year of selection and then in the 
year before the new selection method was adopted. A member who joined in 
the year of the adoption and from then onwards is considered a new member, 
while members who were already in the party prior to the reform are considered 
existing members. Based on the outcomes, the project calculates the 
percentage share of each sub-group. This operationalization allows seeing to 
what extent the vote of new members had the potential to determine the 
outcome of the selection process, or whether existing members still held a 
decisive share of the vote. The main drawback of this approach is that it cannot 
be applied in cases of overall declining party membership. In such cases, the 
project assumes that the sub-group of new member does simply not exist. For 
the case of open primaries, the project also compares the membership turnout 
rate with the share of non-members to measure how much the voice of party 
members is crowded out by a large external selectorate. To evaluate whether 
the turnout is good or not, the overall turnout rate is compared to the turnout in 
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other selection processes with similar rules, mainly based on a study by Kenig 
et al. (2015b) that compares how different selectorates affect turnout rates. 
 
The Challenge of Measuring the Change in Party Membership Quality and 
Attitude 
As discussed above (chapter 1), various studies on IPD point to the 
potential negative effects of increased IPD on the attitude and behaviour of 
party members. The argument often states that members’ attitude towards the 
leadership will drop; they will become more passive and overall assume more 
the role of followers of a leader than of active party members (Katz and Mair, 
1994, Kirchheimer, 1966) The only way to observe whether these changes 
really do occur and membership is changing in the outlined way is to analyse 
individual level data in the form of membership surveys before and after a 
substantial increase in IPD brought about by adopting primaries. Unfortunately, 
we do not have perfectly comparable pre- and post-reform membership 
surveys. However, as discussed in the data section of this chapter, we do have 
a variety of individual membership surveys for only a limited number of cases. 
These allow us to study the development of party membership over time 
measuring membership attitude, intra-party activism and political external 
efficacy.  
Based on the limited availability of survey data, the project mainly 
focuses on within-case comparisons. Hence, it will trace the developments and 
changes triggered by the use of different types of primaries within each party. In 
most cases, the project uses equivalent rather than identical survey items 
(Harkness et al., 2003). They capture the same concept and construct but are 
 106 
 
operationalized and measured in a slight different manner (see, for examples, 
Kosiara-Pedersen et al., 2014). In some cases, this implies combining data from 
individual items to create an aggregated measure. For example, in some 
surveys participants are asked if they held a party office in the past, while in 
others they are provided with a list of possible party offices. The latter will be 
combined to provide one single measurement. Overall, the project thus provides 
first and foremost separate case study analyses each representing a conceptual 
category of the different types of primaries developed in the previous chapter. 
This shows how the interplay of selectorate, who can vote, and candidacy rules, 
who can run, differently affects membership. To a more limited extend, the 
project discusses similarities and differences to establish some more general 
conclusions. 
Despite some limitations, the above listed surveys are best suited to 
study both the change in quality and attitude of party members under increased 
IPD due to different types of primaries. The use of pre- and post-surveys allows 
to capture how changes in party organization and power distribution, i.e. the use 
of primaries, changed party membership over time. One disadvantage of this 
method is that it cannot completely isolate the effect of primaries on 
membership. Still, due to the usually intense discussion about their adoption, 
the often increased media attention, intensified intra-party conflict and the 
instability that often follows the adoption and use of primaries (see the conflict in 
the French PS or the UK Conservatives with the only exception being the 
Greens), it can be assumed that primaries have a substantial effect on party 
membership, both its quality and attitude.  
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The section below illustrates how the theoretical concepts of membership 
quality and attitude are translated into measurable concepts based on the 
availability of concrete survey items in different existing surveys. Further, it 
shows how survey items used to operationalize the two theoretical concepts are 
partly based on survey items developed as part of the general-incentive model 
by Seyd and Whiteley (1992) and efficacy-and-trust model developed by Craig 
et al. (1990). The former provides survey items to capture changes in 
membership quality, while the latter provides survey items to measure the 
changes in membership attitude. The survey items and measurement for the 
quality of membership are based on a variety of items, such as levels of activity 
(self-perceived levels and time spent) and type of activities (running for party 
and elected offices). It is mainly based on behavioural indicators. In contrast, 
the membership attitude towards the leadership is mainly based on items 
asking how members perceive their role within the party, if they feel they have 
influence, and whether the leadership is responsive. The next section provides 
an overview of the individual survey items used in the party membership 
surveys in ordered to capture the two theoretical concepts of membership 
quality and attitude. 
As discussed in the previous conceptual chapter, the project will study 
the impact of the three types of primaries for both sub-groups of members, 
those that joined before the reform and those that joined since the reform, 
separately. The operationalization of how to isolate the two sub-groups is 
discussed at the end of this section. 
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Quality of Membership 
 
Why Members Join the Party? 
As outlined in chapter two, the thesis uses the general-incentive model by Seyd 
and Whiteley (1992) and revised by Klein (2006) to look at the reason for why 
members joined in the first place. The model itself distinguishes between seven 
different incentive categories for why people join parties, which can be captured 
in surveys by using a specific question battery. The following section unpacks 
the questions used in each individual membership survey to capture the 
different incentives and shows how they are operationalized. The table below 
only list the items available in both the pre- and post-reform surveys. While in 
some surveys participants were provided with an open question asking why 
they joined, and the replies were afterwards grouped according to the incentives 
outlined below, in other cases participants were supplied with a list of reasons 
to join representing the different incentives, and they had then to indicate the 
importance of each in their decision to join.26 Despite this difference, the 
surveys are based on the same theoretical concepts and are therefore 
comparable.  
Selective Incentives 
As discussed in chapter two, we can distinguish three different types of 
individual selective incentives: process, outcome and ideological incentives.  
1. Outcome incentives are personal aims, such as working towards an intra-
party or elected office. Further, by joining the party, new members expect 
advantages for their professional life. Thus, benefits are mainly personal and 
                                            
26
 Using a four point Likert scale. 
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not collective. The following responses capture individuals motivated by 
outcome incentives: 
Table 3.2 General-Incentive Model—Outcome Incentives 
Selective—
outcome 
incentives 
UK Conservative Party: 
- In order to advance my career  
 
German Green Party: 
- To gain a career advantage  
- In order to gain a public 
mandate 
- In order to gain a party office 
 
PS 1985/ 1998 
- In order to gain a public 
mandate 
- In order to gain a party office 
- In order to gain a public or 
party office 
 
PS 1998/ 2011 
- In order to gain a public 
mandate 
- In order to gain a party office 
 
2. Process incentives refer to benefits derived from participating within the 
party. This category mainly applies of members who joined the party due to the 
enjoyment of political work, to be better informed about politics and to socialize. 
Items measuring process incentives are: 
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Table 3.3 General-Incentive Model—Process Incentives 
Selective—
process  
incentives 
UK Conservative Party: 
- For social reasons 
 
German Green Party: 
- Because I enjoy the political 
work 
- To be better informed about 
politics 
- To meet nice people 
 
PS 1985/ 1998 
- To meet nice people 
- To meet like-minded people 
 
PS 1998/ 2011 
- To meet nice people 
- To be informed about politics 
 
3. Ideological incentives address the idea that party members are more radical 
than both party leadership and voters, which in return motivates them to be 
active in the party. It is hard to capture this last incentive, and Whiteley et al. 
(1994) argue that this incentive most likely applies to people who join to meet 
like-minded ideologically oriented people or to support a specific ideological 
principle or current within the party. Based on this, the recent revision of the 
model by Klein (2006) suggests the following survey items to capture 
ideological incentives: 
Table 3.4 General-Incentive Model—Ideological Incentives 
Ideological 
incentives 
German Green Party: 
- To strengthen a specific wing 
within the party 
- To influence the political course 
of the party 
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PS 1985/ 1998 
- To influence the political course 
of the party 
 
PS 1998/ 2011 
- To strengthen a specific wing 
within the party 
- In order to influence the 
political course of the party 
 
4. Collective political incentives. Members in this category join to push for 
specific ideological objectives, policies, goals and political actions. Collective 
group incentives can be both positive and negative; members join to support the 
party or to oppose another group’s ideas and polices (Whiteley et al., 1994: 86-
87). Items to measure the two are:27 
Table 3.5 General-Incentive Model—Collective Political Incentives 
Collective 
political 
incentives 
UK Conservative Party: 
- Because joining the party 
provides me with greater 
influence  
 
German Green Party: 
- To promote the aims of the 
party 
- To increase the influence of the 
party 
- To promote ecologically 
motivated politics 
 
PS 1985/ 1998 
- To promote the aims of the 
party 
(to participated in the 
                                            
27
 There are items directly measuring positive incentives for all cases but not negative 
incentives. Therefore, it is not always possible to trace changes in negative incentives for all 
cases. 
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transformation of society) 
 
- To increase the influence of the 
party 
(to win elections 
 
PS 1998/ 2011 
- To promote the aims of the 
party 
(to participated in the 
transformation of society) 
 
5. Normative incentives can be found when people who join a party to fulfil 
certain expectations in their social environment. They join due to pressure or 
influence from family and friends. Items to capture this are: 
Table 3.6 General-Incentive Model—Normative Incentives 
Normative 
inceptives 
German Green Party: 
- Through the influence of family 
and friends 
 
PS 1985/ 1998 
- Through the influence of family 
and friends 
 
PS 1998/ 2011 
- Through the influence of family 
and friends 
 
6. Altruistic incentives. People join to contribute to the functioning of democracy 
or to fulfil their duty as citizen. The following survey items are used to capture 
this: 
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Table 3.7 General-Incentive Model—Altruistic Incentives 
Altruistic 
motives 
UK Conservative Party: 
- To promote freedom and 
democracy 
- Good for helping Britain 
 
German Green Party: 
- To fulfil my responsibility as 
citizen 
 
PS 1985/ 1998 
- To fulfil my responsibility as 
citizen 
 
PS 1998/ 2011 
- To change political practices 
 
7. Expressive attachment incentives allow members to express their support for 
a specific party or an impressive person within the party; consequently, the 
following items are used: 
Table 3.8 General-Incentive Model—Expressive Attachment Incentives 
Expressive 
incentives 
German Green Party: 
- Due to the impressive 
personalities at the top of the 
party 
- To demonstrate my sympathies 
for the party 
 
Based on the survey item above, it is possible to trace how the 
motivations to join changed over time and differed between existing and new 
members due to the four types of primaries. The next section provides the 
operationalization of the type and intensity of membership activity. 
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What Members Do Within the Party: Intensity and Type of Activities 
The second aspect to look at, after why people join a party, is what they 
actually do, once they joined the party. In other words, how active are they, and 
what kind of activity do they engage in. To capture this, it is possible to look at 
two different indicators: (1) measuring the amount of time party members invest 
into the party (intensity): and (2) what type of activity party members engage in. 
 
With regards to item (1) above, all surveys include questions on how 
many hours members are active in the party in an average month. The 
measurements vary very little across cases but are always consistent within 
cases. In most cases, the question asked for the amount of time spent per 
month. In cases where the question asked for an estimate about weekly time 
spent, the response was multiplied by four to provide the average amount per 
month. In addition, participants are asked to rate their overall level of activity. 
These survey items typically use a four point Likert scale. Further, to capture 
short-term change in levels of activity, some of the surveys include a question 
on whether members would describe themselves as more active or less active 
than five years ago. The project uses the following survey items:  
Table 3.9 Perceived Level of Activity: 
How active do you consider yourself to be in the Party? 
Do you consider yourself as: 
(1) No response  
(2) Simple party member  
(3) Episodic activist 
(4) Party activist 
Are you more active, less active within the party than you were five years ago, 
or about the same? 
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Hours: 
How much time do you devote to party activities in the average month? 
(1) Up to 5 hours  
(2) 6-10 hours  
(3) 11-20 hours  
(4) 21-30 hours  
(5) 31-40 hours 
 
A second group of questions captures the type of activity members 
engage in. These activities can range from activists with very low time and 
financial investment (e.g., display a poster, wear a button, etc.) to activities with 
very high time and financial investment (e.g., run for office, co-ordinate 
campaign, etc.). In order to ensure within-case and limited across-case 
comparability, the project mainly focuses on members’ activities of either 
running or holding a party public office and working for the party organization. 
Thus, it mainly looks at high intensity participation. These indicators are also 
chosen, as it is often argued that more direct selection methods attract more 
professionally minded members; thus, we expect to see an increase in these 
activities. Most survey items measuring the type of membership activity asked 
how frequently the participants had engaged in a specific activity over the past 
years. The following survey items are used: 
Table 3.10 High Intensity Intra-Party Activities 
Do you currently hold any office within the party? (list of positions and offices)28 
Do you currently hold any publicly elected office? (list of positions and offices) 
We would like to ask you about political activities you may have taken part in 
during the last five years:  
(1) Stood for office within the party organization? 
(2) Stood for elected office in a local or national election?29 
                                            
28
 The amount of items in the lists varies but normally distinguishes between offices/ positions at 
different levels (regional, national, European. etc.).  
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Please tick, if you have ever held any of the following positions or got elected 
for the following offices: (list of positions and offices) 
 
Overall, these survey items allow the project to see whether there is a change in 
the amount of participation and the type of participation due to increased IPD; 
and whether certain members with specific incentives, mainly with individual 
selective outcome incentives, become more or less active within the party. 
Further, the study of the two sub-groups of new vs. existing members enables 
the project to see whether these groups have similar activity profiles, and 
whether primaries differently affected their level and pattern of participation. 
 
Members’ Attitude Towards the Party and its Leadership 
The Efficacy-and-Trust Model 
The subsequent section shows how survey items developed as part of 
the efficacy-and-trust model (Craig et al., 1990) are used to operationalize and 
measure the impact of different types of primaries on membership attitudes 
towards the leadership. As outlined in chapter two, this project only focuses on 
external political efficacy as we are interested in member’s perceived influence 
within the party. External political efficacy captures the members’ believe about 
how responsive the party leadership and party bodies are to their demands, and 
the extent to which they feel their participation matters. Political efficacy can be 
divided into two sub-aspects. 
 
First, regime-based external efficacy measures how members perceive 
the opportunities to influence political process offered by formal rules and 
                                                                                                                                
29
 This question asked for the frequency of engagement in these activities. 
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procedures or their outcome provided by the political organization (Craig et al., 
1990: 291). This is measured by a variety of survey items asking for how much 
influence members feel they have over the party in general and its candidate 
and leadership selection process in particular. All the survey items chosen here 
asked about the perceived distribution of power within the party, and whether 
members feel that specific groups do have too much power over certain areas. 
The perceived power distribution and influence in key decision-making areas 
affects the overall satisfaction with party membership. Admittedly, asking for 
overall satisfaction with membership does not directly capture the perceived 
opportunities of members but acts as a useful proxy and item to triangulate 
responses to other more direct items. Listed below are the items used to 
operationalize this construct: 
Table 3.11 Regime-based External Efficacy 
- Conservative Central Office should have a more influential role in the selection 
of parliamentary candidates 
- Do you think that the leadership has too much, not enough or about the right 
amount of influence in the candidate selection process? 
- Do you think the influence of the following groups over the selection process is 
generally too little, too great or about right? 1) National Party Leadership 2) 
Local Party Members 
- In the Greens, every member has the possibility to actively influence the 
politics of the party 
- If you know personally a publicly elected representatives do you feel you can 
influence them? 
- How do you think elected office holders see party activists: (1) As simple 
supporter of their electoral campaign (2) Are part of the defining process of their 
campaign  
- How satisfied are you with your party membership today? 
 
Second, incumbent-based external efficacy captures the responsiveness 
of the leaders themselves rather than the ability of the individual to influence the 
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party as a whole. Thus, it focuses on how members see the ability and 
motivation of the leader to respond to members’ demands (Shingles, 1988, 
Craig et al., 1990: 291). Surveys deploy a variety of questions to measure this 
concept including items of how well members perceive their party official to 
listen to them, whether it is necessary to be a party official to achieve anything, 
and what they would like to reform to increase their influence. The following 
items are used in the various surveys to capture this concept: 
Table 3.12 Incumbent-Based External Efficacy 
The party leadership doesn’t pay a lot of attention to the views of ordinary party 
members. 
In the Greens, the party reacts to criticism of the members. 
The opinions of ordinary party members do not find an open ear within the 
Greens. 
- Do you think that in order to gain influence in your party, one must hold a local 
elected office (local councillor, major, departmental councillor)? 
The leaders of the party are not very attentive to what the members think. 
To what extend do you agree with the following statements: 
(1) The leaders of the party are not very attentive to what the members think. 
(2) In general, the PS MPs try to resent the views of the party members. 
(3) In general, the party is more interested in representing the views of the 
electorate of the party members. 
Reforms: 
The Conservative party leader should be elected by a system of ‘one member, 
one vote’. 
How sensible/ useful do you find the following measures to reactivate party 
membership participation: 
(1) Selection of the national party executive by all party members 
(2) Selection of the front running candidate by an all membership congress 
(3) Decision over central policy issues via intra-party votes 
 
Of course, we do not have all the above items in all surveys and across all 
parties. However, there are sufficient items within cases to capture the 
development of political efficacy due to the adoption of primaries. In some 
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instance, we can also compare across parties, for example, between the two 
French cases, and thus come to some more general, albeit limited, conclusions. 
An increase in external efficacy is clearly a positive effect for party members 
and is most likely in cases where they have influence on both aspects of the 
primary. While in cases where members influence is constrained because of 
very strict candidacy requirements and open primaries, external efficacy is likely 
to decrease affecting membership negatively. 
 
As stated above, the project aims to distinguish the two sub-groups of 
existing and new members. Throughout the analysis, the different survey items 
will not only be studied on an aggregate level, but the sample will be split into 
two groups: (1) members who joined before the reform and (2) members who 
joined after the reform. The spilt of the dataset will be based on the year the 
party introduced the primary and not on the year it used it first, as it can be 
assumed that members motivated by participating in the primary started joining 
from this point onwards and not only in the year of the selection itself. Further, 
usually the time span between formally adopting a primary and running it is very 
small. This allows us to see whether there is a difference in the effects the 
reform had on the two groups. The survey item to allocate two membership 
cohorts is the following: 
 
- When did you first join the party: _______ Year30 
 
                                            
30
 This is the question in all surveys, apart from the PS in 1985, which provided different periods 
of joining.  
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In some cases, the survey also asked, whether participants were 
constant members since they first joined, or whether they ever exited the party, 
and if so when they re-joined. In other cases, respondents are asked whether 
there was a specific event that motivated them to join. In cases where such data 
is available, it can provide further insight into what role primaries and increased 
IPD in general played in joining or re-joining the party. However, the project’s 
findings mainly rely on the first indicator (year first joined). 
 
Overall the above section outlined the operationalization for the four 
indicators used throughout the project to analyse changes in party membership. 
To measure changes in the quality of party membership, the project uses items 
developed as part of the general-incentive model by Seyd and Whiteley (1992). 
This allows capturing if and to what extend members’ motivation to join the 
party changed due to increased IPD. To further account for changes in 
membership quality, the project uses survey items capturing the amount of time 
members devote to the party and types of activities they engage in. The last set 
of survey items to measure external political efficacy are taken from the 
efficacy-and-trust model developed by Craig et al. (1990).  
Interviews 
In addition to the party membership surveys and to triangulate the findings, the 
project also uses party member and elite interviews. This part discusses the 
interview methods used and their utility in verifying survey data, and how 
interviews can provide further background information. From the perspective of 
the mixed-method approach chosen, qualitative interviews provide an 
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opportunity to collect more detailed information and to gain a better 
understanding of party members and how different types of leadership 
selections affect them on an individual level (Warren and Karner, 2005; Kvale 
and Brinkmann, 2009). One of the main criticisms of using only party 
membership surveys is that it is hard to control for the fact that observed 
changes in membership might be due to other factors and/ or might have 
happened without a primary. While some surveys include direct questions 
asking about the impact of the reforms on party membership, others do not. 
Thus, the interviews are a possibility to ask members how the new selection 
method affected them, whether they observe changes in their surrounding and 
to capture alternative factors that might have had an effect on membership in 
the past years. In short, the interviews are an effective way to as much as 
possible isolate the effect of the new leadership selection method and to 
determine its weight and role in changes in membership since its introduction. 
Overall, the project conducted 24 in-depth semi-structured interviews with both 
party members and elites lasting between 20 and 60 minutes each from autumn 
2015 to spring 2016 (for a detailed list of participants, see Appendix I). 
The interviews were organized in the following way. First, participants 
were asked to sign a consent form with the option to remain anonymous and a 
’face sheet‘. The face sheet provides important background information about 
the participant, such as gender, age and when they joined the party (new vs. 
existing members) but also contained questions about whether or not they 
currently hold or in past held any party or public office(s), and if they voted in 
the past leadership selection(s) (for face sheet, see Appendix II). This not only 
permits to place the consecutive answers of the interviewee to their specific 
personal and professional context but also was useful as an ice breaker to start 
 122 
 
the interview. All interviews were recorded and later transcribed by the 
interviewer. To conduct a structured and clear interview, the interviewer used an 
interview guide based on the four dimensions of party membership discussed in 
chapter two. These were further divided into nine themes consisting of 
questions used in the membership survey (for the interview guide, see 
Appendix III). This design allowed to adopt the questions asked for each theme 
according to who was interviewed and to react to responses in previous themes 
and/ or sub-questions.  
The first theme includes questions to capture the motivation to join the 
party in line with the general-incentive model of Whiteley et al. (1994) and 
asked about the personal experience and development of the interviewee. The 
second theme on ‘intra-party democracy and your party’ requested them to 
define the term and provide examples from with their party. It further includes 
questions to gauge the perceived level of external efficacy of members (Craig et 
al., 1990; Niemi et al., 1991). The third theme asked about the general long-
term impact of the primary along the four dimensions of the individual level 
conception of party membership size, turnout, quality and attitude. This section 
is practically relevant for the case of the French PS and UK Conservative Party 
where, in contrast to the Greens, the post-reform surveys did not include 
question directly asking about the effect of and experience with the primary. The 
fourth theme examined the context of the reform (Cross and Blais, 2012), and 
the role members played in it. The fifth section inquired about their personal 
experience and satisfaction with the primary and their knowledge about its 
underlying rules, and if they would like to change them. Based on their 
response in this section, the interview moves either to one of the following 
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themes: participation (sixth), attitude (seventh) or political efficacy (eighth). 
For each theme, interviewees were asked how the primary affected these 
aspects of party membership in general and for them in particular. Further, they 
were asked about other factors that might have affected membership along 
these dimensions and led to the observed changes since the introduction of the 
primary. The ninth and final theme asked directly about their view on the 
representativeness, reliability and possible explanations for the results of party 
membership surveys. The interview ends with providing the participants with an 
opportunity to add any further comments or add points they think are important 
but were not covered in the interview. Further, they were asked if they can think 
of anyone else who would be interested to be interviewed (snowballing 
approach). 
3.5 Conclusion 
This chapter outlined the case selection, method, data and operationalization of 
all indicators. As outlined above, the case selection is based on Seawright and 
Gerring (2008: 297). The project uses a typical case study method. The cases 
of the German Greens, UK Conservative Party and French PS are chosen as 
they are representative of a wider population of cases that can be placed in the 
same quadrats combining candidate requirements and selectorate. As such 
they allow confirming or disconfirming the theoretical expectations of the 
specified relationship between primary rules and effect on party membership for 
each of the three types of IPD. In total, the study looks at three parties but four 
cases, as the PS reformed its leadership selection method twice. 
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The project opted for a mixed-method design consisting of quantitative 
individual level survey data and qualitative in-depth semi-structured party 
member and elite interviews. Thus, while the surveys allowed to collect data 
from a large population and provide insight into its characteristics and how it 
changed over time, the interviews provide the opportunity to elaborate and to 
offer detailed explanation of these changes and the context of them. The 
chapter then proceeds by outlining the data it will use to capture the leadership 
selection rules (selectorate and candidacy requirements) and the four indicators 
to measure the impact on the individual level concept of party membership. 
Primary rules, turnout and membership figures are based on primary sources, 
such as party statutes, party-self information and secondary sources, like the 
MAPP project database. The other two indicators of membership quality and 
attitude towards the leadership are based on various survey items and question 
batteries, such as the external efficacy questions developed by Niemi et al. 
(1990) or the general-incentive model by Seyd and Whiteley (1992). Further, it 
uses various attitudinal and behavioural indicators developed by existing 
surveys. The above also forms the foundation of the survey design for the new 
membership survey conducted among German Green Party member in 2015. In 
total, the project uses five existing and one new survey, three pre- and three 
post-reform surveys.  
 Finally, the chapter presents the operationalization of the survey items 
and the structure of the interview guide. The survey design and outcomes 
informed the interview guide highlighting specific survey items to be asked 
about, stressing how interviewees explain certain membership developments 
and offering further details and context. It also included questions already used 
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in the survey to triangulate survey findings. The operationalization of the four 
indicators now allows studying how the quality of party membership changed 
with the introduction of different types of primaries; it further contributes to a 
general assessment of increased IPD for the nature of party membership. 
 Base on the above chapter, it is now possible to test the conceptual 
framework developed in chapter two with the help of the three cases studies 
chosen using both survey and interview data. However, before doing so, it is 
necessary to recall some of the caveats of this study. The main aim of the study 
is to examine the validity of the conceptual framework for investigating the 
consequences of different types of primaries on party members. Thus the main 
analysis compares and traces within-case development due to the reforms. The 
availability and comparability of the data, especially secondary survey data, and 
the different survey designs allow only for very limited across-case comparison 
and any such conclusion is very general and provisional. The next chapter 
analyses the case of the UK Conservatives followed by the case of the German 
Greens and finally the French PS. 
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4 The Case of the UK Conservative Party 
4.1 Introduction 
The Conservative Party adopted closed primaries for selecting its party 
leader in 1998 and used it for the first time in 2001. The party opted for a two-
round selection process, where in the first round MPs reduced candidates to 
two finalists who then faced a full party membership vote to establish the next 
leader. Following the adoption of the new leadership selection method, the party 
underwent a turbulent period marked by intra-party fighting (Bale, 2011). During 
this time, the party held three leadership selections of which two were closed 
primaries (2001, 2005) and one MPs vote only in 2003, as only one candidate 
was nominated.31 With the selection of Cameron in 2005, the party returned to 
more stable times. This section studies how the members of the Conservative 
Party were affected and reacted to the reform in 1998, and, thus, how their 
individual level conception of party membership changed due to the introduction 
of the closed primary. In order to do so, it will use two membership surveys 
(Whiteley et al., 1994, YouGov, 2009) complemented by six in-depth qualitative 
interviews with both ordinary party members and party elites. The interviews 
were conducted in 2016. Further, the chapter to a very limited extend uses a 
further small survey conducted by Webb and Bale in 2013 to either highlight 
long-term developments for certain items or compensate for the lack of an item 
in the 2009 survey. The case of the UK Conservatives is a good case for 
exploring the expectations of this quadrant: it represents a mainstream UK 
party, and, until recently, its membership vote was more direct than Labour’s 
                                            
31
 In 2016 the Conservative Party also had a leadership selection by MPs vote only as only one 
candidate remained.  
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electoral college system (until 2015)32. It is also an interesting case, as it allows 
for analysis of the  influence of a two-step selection model on the individual 
level conception of party membership, and whether it differs from the effect of 
primaries with the same rules—in terms of candidacy strictness and openness 
of selectorate but only a direct membership vote in the same quadrant—or not 
(see chapter six on the PS primary in 1995 and 2006).  
The chapter starts by outlining the external factors that related to the 
adoption of the primary in 1998, using the hypotheses suggested by Cross and 
Blais (2012). It then places the case of the UK Conservative Party in the 
analytical framework and briefly discusses the theoretical expectations 
associated to  the four dimensions, before it offers a detailed empirical analysis. 
In conclusion, the chapter finds that the empirical case of the Tory party 
supports the theoretical expectations for the case of controlled 
democratization suggested in the framework. 
Background of the Reforms 
In 2012, Cross and Blais suggested four factors to explain reforms in party 
leadership selection methods. These are mainly based on external party system 
factors. They argue that parties are more likely to reform its leadership selection 
method after an electoral setback, when in opposition, and if other parties within 
the system have already democratized their selection process (contagion 
                                            
32
 Until the adoption of a direct membership vote in 2015, the Labour leadership selection 
method consisted of three electorates or sections that carried over the years either equally or 
different weights towards the total vote. The three electorates were (1) Labour members of the 
House of Commons and the European Parliament, (2) Labour constituencies/ individual 
members of the party and (3) individual members of affiliated organisations, such as trade 
unions and socialist societies (for more details, see Cross and Blais, 2012). 
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effect). They argue further that new parties are more likely to adopt a more 
inclusive selection method.  
The UK Conservative Party experienced a substantive electoral defeat 
before the reforms in 1997, when they lost power after 18 years in government 
(1979-1997). Consequently, they were in opposition when they reformed in 
1998. Thus, the case reflects Cross and Blais (2012) approach, and the reform 
should be viewed as an attempt of party organizational renewal after the 
dramatic electoral defeat in 1997.  
Figure 4.1 Timeline: The Conservatives 
 1997   1998                       2010  
Re-enter opposition  Adoption of closed primary     Wins General election 
 
 
 
Government        Opposition             Government 
 
The third factor of the contagion effect also holds in the case of the 
Conservatives. It was the last major party in the UK to reform its leadership 
selection method, after the Social Democrats and Labour did so in 1981, and 
later, after the merger, the Liberal Democrats reformed in 1988. The final factor 
mentioned by Cross and Blais (2012) is not supported as the Tory party is 
certainly not a new party; after all, it was founded in 1834. Overall, the case of 
the Conservatives reflects all of Cross and Blais (2012) factors but party 
newness. Thus, external factors played clearly a major role in triggering the 
party leadership reform in 1998. The next section of the chapter outlines the 
theoretical expectations for the effect of the reform on members in the case of 
the UK Conservative Party, followed by a detailed empirical analysis. 
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4.2 The UK Conservatives in the Conceptual Framework and its 
Expected Effects 
The UK Conservative party has a closed selectorate limited to party 
members and strict candidacy requirements that only allows Members of 
Parliament backed by two other MPs to stand as candidates. This makes it an 
example of controlled democratization and the conceptual framework 
developed in chapter two suggests the following impact for the individual level 
conception of party membership under this type of intra-party democracy (IPD): 
Table 4.1 The Expected Effects for the UK Conservative Party 
Open 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Selectorate – 
Primary Zone 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Controlled 
Democratization 
Overall effect: + 
Membership level  
Existing: - New: + 
Quality of Membership 
Existing: - New: + 
 Attitude towards 
Leadership 
Existing: - New: + 
Turnout in Primary 
Existing: high New: high 
Closed Permissive             Candidate Requirements              Strict 
Explanation: (-): decrease ;(o): stays the same ;(+): increase 
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Overall, the new selection method should be associated with a positive 
effect on party membership. The use of the primary should attract new 
members, improve the quality of membership and its attitude towards the 
leadership. Further, turnout should be high. However, as the table suggests, we 
should see a partly different effect on new and existing members with the latter 
being more sceptical about the reforms. Some party activists might be 
disappointed as they feel bypassed with voting rights granted to all members. 
Thus, they might moderately reduce their activity contributing to a decrease in 
the quality of membership, and their attitude towards the leadership worsens, as 
activists feel they have lost influence. As a reminder, the framework outlines the 
consequences associated with the different perceived levels of IPD from a 
member’s point of view, and how their conception of membership is altered. The 
next section, first, discusses the findings for membership levels and turnout 
before turning towards quality of membership and attitude towards leadership. 
Membership Level 
Overall, similar to most UK parties, the Tories experienced a substantial 
membership decline over a long period of time (McGuinness, 2012). In order to 
gain a better picture of how this long-term negative trend was affected by the 
adoption of the new leadership selection, the table below just presents the 
membership development in the years of the reform and since then. Following 
the electoral defeat in 1997, the party lost 50,000 members, dropping from 
400,000 to 350,000 (Mair and van Biezen, 2001). With the announcement by 
William Hague to reform the leadership selection method and at the end of 
1998, membership started to grow again reaching 401,000 by 2000 
(McGuinness, 2012). Thus, the initial reform and prospect of more influence in 
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the leadership selection method seems to be related to a positive impact on 
membership figures in the short run. However, in the year of the first primary, 
membership actually seem to have dropped to 311,000 members and continued 
to decline in the first half of the 2000s. This is partly explained by the fact that 
the Tory party underwent a difficult time in the first half of the 2000s. As result 
the party had four different leaders between 1997 and 2005, in contrast to only 
two for 22 years between 1975-1997 (Snowdon, 2010). This related to a level of 
uncertainty among party members and a high level of membership fluctuation 
over the period reaching its lowest point in 2004 with 215,000 members. This 
lends support to the suggested development of existing members leaving the 
party in reaction to the leadership selection method and its outcomes. In 2005, 
the year of Cameron’s election as party leader, membership improved to 
258,000 and even reached 290,000 in 2006 (McGuinness, 2012), the year after 
the general election. However, since 2005, the party held no leadership 
contests and since then membership has declined again to 130,000 by 2011.  
Figure 4.2 UK Conservative Membership Development 1995-2011 
Sources: (Mair and van Biezen, 2001; Van Biezen et al., 2012; Webb et al., 
2002; McGuinness, 2012) 
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Overall, it can be seen that the introduction of a closed primary with closed 
candidate requirements for the leadership selection is associated with a positive 
impact on party membership levels in the short run, attracting new members by 
providing new participatory tools as incentives. However, we can also see that 
existing members seem to have left the party in reaction to the outcome of the 
primary in 2001 and after. Thus, broadly speaking, this is in line with the 
suggestions in the conceptual framework. Further, it shows that if primaries are 
not used for a while, its effect wears off and membership levels seem to start 
dropping again. This points towards the constant need to involve members in 
intra-party decision-making to avoid members exit from the party. Thus, it 
seems that although the use of the primary might not have halted or even 
reversed the decline in membership in the long run, it is connected with  a 
substantial slowdown in the short run.  
The interviewees describe a similar short-term positive effect of the 
reform, and how for many it seems to have been an additional incentive to join 
the party. One interview partner stated that “one of the reasons to be a member 
of the Conservative Party is to have your voice in the leadership selection, as it 
is the intro to choosing the prime minister and people like that” (elite-member 
since 1991). Another one clearly highlights the recruitment potential of the 
primary by outlining that “if you want people to join you, you have to give them 
some form of say” (activist-member since 1995). The same interviewee also 
described how the reform of the leadership selection in 1997 initially contributed 
to the “renewal process” of the party after the “traumatic electoral defeat” but 
quickly led to chaos in the party, and thus membership declined due to 
uncertainty and only really worked for the selection of Cameron. However, the 
positive impact of Cameron’s selection did not last long as many interviewees 
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describe him as a “bad party manager”, and one even said that “when David 
Cameron was the leader, some left because they didn’t like him” (mid-level 
elite-member since 1991). With regard to the anticipation of a potential 
leadership selection in 2016, one member of the party elite reported an increase 
in party membership in the months before the EU referendum, and another mid-
level elite person confirmed this by stressing that “just after the resignation (of 
Cameron) there were reports of twelve hundred applications in 48 hours!” (mid-
level elite-members since 1999). However, it seems there is very little optimism 
about these new members, as the same interviewee goes on to say “they could 
become activist with any luck. On the other hand, they could join but not 
remain”. Overall the interviews support the trend outlined in the framework of an 
effective recruitment tool, inflow of new members but also exit of existing 
members in response to the primary.  
Turnout in the Primary 
The second indicator to look at is turnout. In the case of the UK Tory Party, the 
turnout in the two leadership contests that used a membership vote was nearly 
the same with 79.1 per cent in 2001 and 78.0 per cent in 200533 (Kelly and 
Lester, 2005). The study by Kenig et al. (2015) outlined that on average turnout 
for party membership votes range from 31.3 per cent to 79 per cent. Thus, the 
UK Tory Party has a very high turnout, which points to large acceptance of the 
tool among members. The next step is to look at the share of new and existing 
members during the leadership contest. From 2004 to 2005, the party gained 
43,000 new members, if all of them voted, this would constitute a 21.6 per cent 
                                            
33
 However, looking at the actual numbers of participants, there is a decline from 256,797 in 
2001 to 198,844 in 2005. 
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share of the turnout. Hence, existing members still have a larger share in the 
turnout, but the share of new members is moderately high and potentially has a 
large influential. In 2005, members that joined in the year of the primary made 
up 16.94 per cent of the total membership compared to 83.06 per cent of 
existing members. The new members’ share of the turnout is slightly higher 
than their overall proportion of the total membership. For 2001, it is not possible 
to provide similar findings, as the party actually lost 90,000 members from 2000 
to the end of 2001. This points to the limitation of the data outlined above and 
so there might have been new members but the data does not allow to identify 
them. However, the overall number of members who participated is with 
256,797 much higher than in 2005. This points to a high acceptance of the new 
selection methods among the remaining existing members. Overall, the case of 
the Conservatives seems to endorse the expected findings outlined in the 
conceptual discussion of high turnout and a high share of both existing and new 
members in 2005. While in 2001, it just confirms the expectation of high turnout 
among all members. 
Table 4.2 Turnout in Conservative Primaries 2001 and 2005 
Year Number of 
candidates 
Turnout 
2001 2 Overall turnout: 79.1 per cent 
Share of turnout existing members: 79.1 per cent 
Share of turnout new members: - (membership 
decline) 
2005 2 Overall turnout: 78.0 per cent 
Share of turnout existing members: 78.4 per cent 
Share of turnout new members: 21.6 per cent 
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The interviews support the fact that members accepted and appreciate the new 
participatory possibility and that this is reflected in the high turnout. One elite 
member stated that “the opportunity to vote for the leader was extremely 
positive” (elite-member since 1970). This is confirmed by interviews with both 
ordinary members and mid-level elite with one of the latter saying “I think people 
did appreciate that they could vote, and they had a voice” (mid-level elite-
members since 1999). Many also stated their frustration of not being allowed to 
vote in the leadership election in 2016, but some make the point that an all 
membership vote is a luxury a party only has when in opposition (ordinary 
member- since mid-1980s).  
So far, it can be seen that the case of the Tories mainly in line with the 
theoretical expectations of controlled democratization. The party experienced 
a short growth in membership and a generally high turnout with the share of 
existing and new members roughly proportionate to their share of the overall 
membership. The next step is to outline how the reforms relate to membership 
quality and attitude, and if these two differ between existing and new members.  
Quality of Membership 
The next section moves from the two quantitative indicators to the two 
more qualitative indicators of membership quality and attitude. To explore 
developments in these two, mainly the pre- and post-reform membership 
surveys are used. Under controlled democratization, an overall positive effect 
in both dimensions is expected. The next section first outlines changes in 
motivations to join the party followed by analysing variations in intra-party 
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activity and lastly how members’ attitude towards the party leadership was 
affected. 
Motivation to Join the Party 
As outlined in chapter two, the study uses the general-incentive model by Seyd 
and Whiteley (1992) to investigate why members join the party. In both surveys, 
participants were asked to provide their most important incentive for joining the 
Conservative Party. Overall, Seyd and Whiteley (1992) developed seven 
incentives to join but due to the difference in survey design, it was only possible 
to study developments across four of them. The first is selective-outcome 
incentives. This category identifies members who joined mainly for reasons of 
personal benefit. Overall, there is a slight decrease in this incentive, however, 
when looking at existing and new member separately, the amount of new 
members that joined to advance their career is much higher. Thus, the new 
leadership selection method seems more likely to attracted more career-
oriented members but also reduced the number of existing members who see 
the party as an effective arena to advance their career. The second category is 
selective-process incentive. Here members join to be part of the political 
process itself and find it enjoyable. Overall, we see an increase in this incentive, 
which might predict a more active membership motivated by this incentive. It is 
also interesting to see that existing members are more motivated to join based 
on the selective-process incentive than new members. In terms of party activity, 
this would envisage that existing members are should be more active compared 
to new members. The third group is altruistic motives, which are important for 
people who join the party to express their support for abstract and idealistic 
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goals. There is an increase in people sharing this motive to join the party 
between the two surveys. Further, for both existing and new members, it is of 
nearly equal importance when it comes to joining the party. This increase is a 
sign that people are more likely to have increased trust in the party and see it 
again as an organization that can make a real difference for the country and 
democracy as a whole. The last category encompasses collective positive 
incentives. Here, members are motivated by promoting party policies and the 
vision of the party acting for the collective good, mainly by winning elections. 
Once more, there is an overall increase in this motivation to join the party. It is 
interesting to observe that it is slightly stronger among new than existing 
members. Overall, this increase indicates that members see the party as an 
effective mean to address issues and to change them. 
Table 4.3 Motivation to Join the Conservative Party 1992 and 2009 
Incentive Measurement  1992 2009 
 N ALL ALL EXISTING NEW 
  2467 1690 1050 509 
Selective-
outcome 
incentives 
- In order to advance my 
career  
1.4 1.0 0.6 1.8 
Selective –
process  
incentives 
- For social reasons 11.4 13.2 15.2 10.0 
Altruistic 
motives 
 
- Promote freedom and 
democracy 
- Good for helping Britain 
2.5 
3.3 
12.2 
58.8 
12.9 
57.1 
10.7 
60.9 
Collective 
positive 
incentives  
- Because joining the party 
provide me with greater 
influence  
4.434 7.0 6.3 8.4 
1) all values in per cent 2) For 1991 “very important” or “important” motivation to 
join the party, for 2009 “most important” (open ended question). 
                                            
34
 Composed of Answers stating the main motivation to join is to increase general influence and 
joined to influence specific local or national policy concerns. In all cases they joined to increase 
their influence. 
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When asked during the interview about the development and changes in 
motivation to join the party, many confirmed that there are “a lot more of 
careerists in the party” (elite-member since 1991) and especially new members 
want to use the “party as springboard” (mid-level elite-member since 1999). 
Further, an activist (member since 1995) confirms that “they are less people 
nowadays who join for non-political reasons, I mean the social aspect is dead”. 
In addition, many of the long-term members confirmed that their involvement in 
politics was not intentional but just happened (mid-level elite-member since 
1999), and that they initially joined after they helped during election campaigns, 
due to their partners’ involvement or to keep Labour out. One ordinary member 
(since mid-1980s) sums up the new mentality in the following way: “People will 
run for office; they want to wear the crown but not do the work which is really 
frustrating”. This already indicates that there might be a divide in intra-party 
activity between new and existing members that will be explored in more detail 
in the next section. 
So far, it seems that the introduction of primaries is related to attracting a 
new group of highly motivated members and, thus, members who might be 
more active, as they join for incentives that require more membership 
participation to be realized. The next section discusses, whether this is also 
reflected in a change of the level and type of intra-party activity.  
Intra-party Participation  
Intra-party participation can be measured in two different ways: How active 
members are, and in what type of activities they participate in. With regard to 
the former, the table below illustrates that overall party membership became 
 139 
 
more active since the introduction of primaries in 1998. In 2009, 31.8 per cent 
stated that they were “active” compared to only 20 per cent in 1992. Further the 
“not at all active” category dropped by nearly 16 per cent in the period between 
the two surveys. When looking at existing and new members separately, it can 
be seen that new members are more active with 37.1 per cent compared to 
30.7 per cent of existing members. Further, the level of totally passive party 
members in both groups was nearly equally high. Thus, an increase in activity 
seems to be mainly driven by a small group of highly motivated party activists.  
Table 4.4 Level of Perceived Activity in Conservative Party 1992 and 2009 
How active do you consider yourself to be 
in the Conservative Party? 
1992 2009 
 ALL ALL EXISTING NEW 
N 2467 1690 1050 509 
Very active 6 10.1 9.8 12.5 
Fairly active 14 21.7 20.9 25.6 
Not very active 36 39.9 41.5 36.3 
Not at all active 45 28.2 27.7 25.6 
1) all values in per cent 
 
To determine whether this is a long-term trend or due to more recent 
events prior to the survey, the next survey item looks at how membership 
activity changed over the past five years. Taking the 2009 survey, it asked how 
active members were compare to five years ago (i.e., in 2004—before the 
election of Cameron as party leader). The table shows that most members have 
about the same level of activity, and only a small number increased its activity in 
the past five years. When looking at new and existing members separately, it 
can be seen that a large share of new members is more active now than in 
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2004, and in contrast existing members’ activity seems more constant or even 
declining. This is supported by the finding that 20.6 per cent of all and 26.1 per 
cent of existing but only 9.1 per cent of new members state that they are much 
less active than they used to be. This points to the outlined potential negative 
effect of primaries on existing party members. Further, there is a large group of 
new members that joined in the past five years, which points again to the 
mobilizing effect related to primaries and its potential to attract new motivated 
members. However, this most likely comes at the cost of decreasing activity 
among existing members. 
Table 4.5 Level of Perceived Activity in Conservative Party 2009 Five Years 
Before 
Are you more active or less active within the party 
than you were five years ago, or about the same? 
2009 
 ALL EXISTING NEW 
N 1690 1050 509 
Much more active 9.1 6.3 15.8 
A little more active 9.6 8.5 12.3 
About the same 36.8 41.3 27.4 
A little less active 12.3 15.6 7.2 
Much less active 20.6 26.2 9.1 
N/A - I was not a member five years ago 11.7 2.2 28.2 
1) all values in per cent 2) overall more active: 18.7 per cent, less active: 32.9 
per cent 
 
The next question is whether this general increase in the stated level of activity 
is also reflected in the amount of time people invest into the party. When the 
members where asked in the 1992 survey how much time they invested into the 
party, the large majority stated none. In 2009, the majority still stated to spent 
no time for the party in an average month, however, the number declined from 
76.0 per cent to just 55.6 per cent. Thus, it seems that many members shifted to 
a more active engagement since the introduction of the primary. A large group 
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now states to spend up to five hours a month. It is also interesting to notice that 
the increase in activity is not only visible in the lower categories but in 2009 2.7 
per cent claimed to spend between 20 and 30 hours a month in contrast to only 
0.8 per cent in 1992. When looking at the two sub-groups of new and existing 
members separately, it can be seen that there seems to be little difference 
among them in the top categories of spending ten or more hours working for the 
party. There are, however, slight differences in the lower categories. Existing 
party members provide a larger share of members spending no time at all 
working for the party. There is also a larger share of new members in the middle 
categories of spending up to five and between five and ten hours compared to 
existing members. This again points to the envisaged positive effect the primary 
has on intra-party activity by reducing the number of totally passive members 
and increasing the number of active new members. 
Table 4.6 Hours Spent Working for the Party 1992 and 2009 
How much time do you devote to party 
activities in the average month? 
1992 2009 
 ALL ALL EXISTING NEW 
N 2467 1690 1050 509 
None 76 55.6 57.0 47.4 
Up to 5 hours 15 27.1 25.6 32.9 
From 5 to 10 hours 5 6.8 6.3 8.7 
From 10 to 20 hours 2 5.0 5.2 5.7 
From 20 to 30 hours 0.8 2.7 2.9 2.6 
From 30 to 40 hours 0.4 0.9 1.0 0.6 
More than 40 hours 0. 7 1.9 2.0 2.0 
1) all values in per cent 
The next step is to study whether the introduction of primaries is associated with 
a change in the kind of activities members engaged in. Due to limited availability 
of compatible items in the two surveys, the analysis focuses on three high 
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intensity activities (1) working for the party, (2) running for elections and (3) 
holding a publicly elected office. These survey items are available in both 
surveys. Between the two surveys, there is a general upwards trend, when it 
comes to participating in more time-intensive party activities. For the two 
indicators of (1) running for elections and (2) holding a publicly elected office, 
the development is mainly driven by an increase in stated participation at the 
local level in the 2009 survey. Thus, for example, 15 per cent stated to have 
stood for local party office and 11.4 per cent ran for local mandates. 
Unfortunately, the last item is not directly comparable as the 1992 survey only 
asked whether respondents currently hold an elected mandate but did not ask 
about the past. Nevertheless, following the trend in the other two items, it is 
likely that there is also an increase in members that held public office, however, 
it is not as drastic as the table might indicate. Looking again at new and existing 
members separately, it can be seen that new members are generally 
participating less in high intensity activities. This gap is the widest when it 
comes to standing for intra-party offices. The gap for running for elections and 
especially holding a publicly elected office are much narrower. This points to a 
group of new, ambitious and career-oriented members within the party. Thus, 
the overall development seems to point to a more active but also more 
professionalized party membership with the clear aim to forge a career in 
politics mainly by gaining a public office. 
The last item in this section looks at how many party members stated to 
never have taken part in any high intensity party activities. Comparing the two 
levels of non-participation between 1992 and 2009, there is a clear decrease, 
and, thus, more members started to take part in high intensity party activities. 
However, when looking at the two sub-groups of new and existing members in 
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the 2009 survey, it seems that new members are less likely to participate in high 
intensity party activities. It seems that only a small share of new members take 
part in such activity. Further, it seems to mobilize existing members to become 
more active, at least for high intensity activities. 
Table 4.7 Participation in High Intensity Activities 1992 and 2009 
We would like to ask 
you about political 
activities you may 
have taken part in 
during the last five 
years 
Did you in the past five 
to 10 years…. 
1992 2009 
 ALL ALL EXISTING NEW 
N 2467 1690 1050 509 
- stand for office within 
the party organization 
11.0 24.1 21.4 14.0 
- stand for elected 
office in a local 
government or 
national parliamentary 
election 
6.0 11.6 13.3 9.8 
-hold an publicly 
elected office on local 
or national level 
2.0** 7.5 8.5 6.5 
NEVER 93.2 69.8 66.8 72.9 
1) all values in per cent 
* The Yes score for 1992 is the sum of the categories: rarely, occasionally and 
frequently in question 19. 
** The question only asked, are you currently a local councillor, and did not 
include the past.  
 
The interviews support the recent development in party membership activity; 
one outlined that there are certainly “two types of members, those who want to 
register their support on the base that if there is a vote, they get to exercise it 
but do not do anything else, and then there is people like me who are politically 
motivated or motivated by politics” (activist-member since 1995). Thus, there is 
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a small group of highly ambitious new members, who invest a large amount of 
time and are highly active in the party. But most interviewees observed that 
more and more there are “members who will come for events or discuss politics 
but don’t want to deliver leaflets” (elite-member since 1970). This is supported 
by others who state that “you cannot get anyone to do anything. People seem to 
like to sign up to things to show support but do not do anything. So there is a 
difference between membership and active membership, people might just want 
a say in it but don’t want to do the hard work to deliver leaflets and bang on 
doors” (activist-member since 1995). The interviewee empathized that he 
particularly faced this challenge as an officer of Conservative Future (first half of 
2000s) belonging to the sub-group of new party members. Further, most 
interviews confirmed that existing members are more active in general, i.e. also 
in high intensity activism, and that there is no replacement of their work by 
younger members.  
In total, members report to be more active both in terms of the self-
reported level and hours spent working for the party. But a considerable, large 
group of existing members say they are less active than five years ago, 
generally more passive and seem to spend less hours working for the party 
than new members in 2009. Further, at the same time members are more likely 
taking up high intensity activities, especially in running or holding a public office. 
Overall the case of the Tories seems to supports the theoretical expectations for 
controlled democratization outlined by the conceptual framework for highly 
motived new members and some decline in activity among existing members. 
However, overall the introduction of primaries seems be associated with a 
positive effect on the quality of party membership positively, as more members 
 145 
 
are ready to take up high intensity activities, work more hours and see 
themselves as more active. The next step is to see, if a similar positive 
development can be observed with regard to membership attitude towards the 
party leadership. 
Membership Attitude and External Efficacy 
After outlining how the primaries relate to the motivation of members to join the 
party, their level and type of activities, the next section looks at how it relates to 
members’ attitudes towards the party leadership and members’ perceived 
influence on it. The project uses survey items developed as part of the external-
efficacy model by Craig et al. (1990). Generally, the level of external efficacy in 
1992 was relatively low with 43 per cent of members agreeing with the 
statement that the party leadership does not pay a lot of attention to ordinary 
party members. A similar question in the small membership survey conducted 
by (Bale and Webb, 2013) in 2013 (N=852) showed that 53 per cent think the 
party leadership does not respect ordinary party members very much. Thus, it 
seems that in general external efficacy decreased over the past twenty years. 
The next step is to move from general efficacy to the specific case of perceived 
influence on the leadership and candidate selection process. While in 1992, 41 
per cent disagreed with the statement that Conservative Central Office should 
have a more influential role in the selection of parliamentary candidates, in 2009 
68.9 per cent agreed that the leadership’s influence in the candidate selection 
process is “about right”. Nevertheless, there is still 26.4 per cent who think it is 
too high. Nearly identical views emerge when one looks at existing and new 
members separately. The next item asks, if members think that either the 
national party leadership or local party members’ influence over selection 
 146 
 
processes is generally too small, too big or about right. Overall, members think 
with 45.5 per cent that the influence of the party leadership is about right, but 
there is a large share of 38.0 per cent that think it is too big. This view is equally 
shared among new and existing members. However, when asked about the 
influence of local party members, 39.7 per cent think it is too small. This view is 
more dominant among existing members with 47.2 per cent compared to 36.9 
per cent among new members.  
Table 4.8 Influence in Leadership Selection 2009 
Do you think the influence of the following 
groups over the selection process is generally 
too small, too big or about right? 
2009 
 ALL EXISTING NEW 
N 1690 1050 509 
National party leadership:  
Far too little 1.7 2.1 2.1 
Too Little 5.4 7.3 5.2 
About right 45.7 53.6 55.7 
Too great 22.3 26.4 26.9 
Far too great 8.5 10.7 10.0 
Don’t know 16.3   
Local party members  
Far too little 8.1 9.2 10.9 
Too Little 31.6 38.0 26.0 
About right 38.3 44.2 45.5 
Too great 5.7 6.7 6.3 
Far too great 5.7 2.0 1.4 
Don’t know 14.9   
1) all values in per cent 
So far, the overall membership seems mainly satisfied with their influence over 
the leadership selection. However, there is a substantial group of members—
especially existing members—who think that the national party has too much 
and the local party members to little influence over the leadership selection 
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process. This seems to indicate that the theoretical expectation of the 
framework is sustained by pointing towards overall increased political efficacy 
with some existing members feeling left out. In addition, in 1992, 50 per cent of 
the survey respondents also agreed with the idea that the party leader should 
be selected by a ‘one member, one vote’ system thereby expressing a wish for 
more influence and increased external efficacy. Nevertheless 35 per cent were 
critical about the proposal in 1992. When asked in 2009 to what extend they 
agreed that the new leadership selection method is democratic and fair, 76.3 
per cent of all members agreed with the former and 69.2 per cent with the 
latter.35 When looking at the two sub-groups separately, both nearly equally 
agree that the process is democratic with 81.2 per cent of existing and 82.7 per 
cent of new members and fair with 73.1 and 78.1 per cent respectively. Thus, 
some previous scepticism among existing members regarding the direct 
selection of party leaders seems to have decreased after actually using the 
method. All this seems associated with a high level of perceived influence over 
the leadership selection among members and thus a high level of perceived 
external efficacy. In addition, when asked the same questions about the general 
parliamentary candidate selection process, the same picture emerges with 53.6 
per cent of all members agreeing that it is a democratic and 46.9 per cent a fair 
process. This holds when looking at existing and new members separately, with 
the latter being somewhat more critical of the process. 
The interviews support the argument that there is a positive effect of the 
primary on perceived levels of influence and an increased role of party 
members. One mid-level elite-member in the party (member since 1999) 
                                            
35
 They were further asked, if the leadership selection method is efficient (68.3 per cent agreed), 
complicated (24.7 per cent agreed) and transparent (61.3 per cent agreed). This further 
supports the overall positive evaluation of the new leadership selection method. 
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described the primary as “a genuine attempt and it has been a genuine 
democratizing [attempt]” and an activist (members since 1995) confirmed that 
he found “it empowering that I was actually able to pick the one I thought was 
better”. Further, members seem to have newly gained confidence, as an 
interviewee stated that in “the past loyalty to the party leader was always very 
strong, even if someone had doubts, they would be expressed very privately 
[…] now people feel embolden to criticize the party leadership very openly” 
(elite-member since1991). Nevertheless, most interviews also stressed the 
limits of the influence members have. Thus, one interviewee stated that due to 
the primary, members “are empowered but got the feelings that as ordinary 
member my only right in the party is the right to vote” (mid-level elite-member 
since 1991). Even one member of the party elite reported, “to do anything 
through the party structure would be impossible (in my constituency); so for me, 
if I want to achieve any kind of impact, it would be much better done through the 
local government” (elite-member since 1991). Further, one activist claimed that 
“Cameron has been a bad party manager in failing to creating a direct link 
between leader and members” and goes on to say “there isn’t a link to the 
leadership” (activist-member since 1995). Thus, one interview points out that if 
“you really wanted to democratize the party […] you have to take away this 
corpus of power that lies with MPs” (elite-member since 1991). In short, as a 
one long-term party elite-member (member since 1997) summaries “on the 
voluntary side of the party, we would always like a little bit more influence”. 
Overall, it seems that external efficacy seem positive related to the 
introduction of primaries. Party members both new and existing are more likely 
to feel that they have improved influence on the leadership and candidate 
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selection. Members feel that the leadership cares more about them, partly due 
to the fact that they met their demand of introducing primaries. Further, 
members are more likely to continue to feel that their power and influence in the 
key intra-party decision-making areas of leadership and candidate selection are 
largely distributed fairly between the national leadership and party members. 
With regard to the last point, there is a substantial group of existing members 
who feel that they still have too little power. In addition to the overall higher level 
of members who think leadership does not respect ordinary party members, this 
very much seems to indicate a decrease in the political efficacy of existing 
members, despite the fact that the leadership listened to the existing members 
who demanded the introduction of the primary. Thus, overall, the case of the UK 
Conservatives seem to support the theoretical expectations about the effect of 
controlled democratization on membership attitude towards the leadership. 
4.3 Conclusion 
Overall, it can be seen that the introduction of the closed primary in the UK 
Conservative Party support the theoretical expectations of controlled 
democratization type of IPD. The perceived high level of control over the 
leadership selection process by members (but also the elite) seem to be 
associated with a positive effect on the individual level conception of party 
membership. It is interesting to see that the effects on membership in selection 
processes using a two-round design also seem to also confirm the theoretical 
expectations of the analytical framework, as much as in the case of the French 
PS discussed later (see chapter six), which uses a direct membership vote and 
no mediation by MPs. Overall, the primary seem to be linked to an inflow of new 
 150 
 
members after the reform and the year of the selection in 2005, but total 
member levels continued to drop. The overall turnout rate in the two primaries 
was very high and both sub-groups participated equally with their shares being 
proportional to their sizes in the overall membership. Further, the primary seem 
to have had the expected positive effect on the quality of overall party 
membership and the two sub-groups. New members perceived themselves as 
more active than existing members and spent more hours working for the party 
but participated slightly less in high intensity activities. Further, it is more likely 
to have a negative effect on existing members, as they contributed fewer hours 
and perceived themselves as less active but continued to engage more in high 
intensity activities than new members. Finally, the expectations for attitude 
towards the leadership are also in line with a high level of perceived influence 
over the leadership selection process by all members. However, this is slightly 
lower among existing members and here more feel that members have not 
enough influence over the process. These developments were supported in the 
in-depth qualitative party member interviews. Thus, one party activist (member 
since 1995) sums up the reform of the leadership selection as “superficial 
democratization of the party, while in fact it is very centrally controlled as I, as a 
member, I can only select out of an approved pool of candidates”.  
In conclusion, this chapter is a first step in demonstrating how useful and 
reliable the conceptual framework developed in this project is for studying the 
associated impact of different leadership selection rules (in the form of 
selectorate and candidacy requirements) on the individual level conception of 
party membership. 
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5 The Case of the German Greens 
5.1 Introduction 
The chapter investigates the case of the German Greens to assess the 
theoretical expectations for the lower right quadrant with permissive candidate 
requirements and a closed selectorate, making it an example of protected 
democratization from a members’ perspective (see Table 5.1 below). 
Empirically, the case of the German Greens is an interesting case, as it is the 
first German party to formally adopt a ‘one member, one vote’ selection system 
to determine its two top executive candidates,36 the leaders of the parliamentary 
group or, in case of government participation, the top ministerial posts.37 
Previously, for the 2002 and 2005 election, the top executive candidate was 
chosen by the party’s council consisting of 16 members (Rosar and Ohr, 
2005)38. In 2009, the top duo was selected by the national party delegate 
meeting. Thus, the use of the all membership selection method is a natural 
continuation of the trend towards more inclusive selection methods in the Green 
Party over the past decade. Further, the party has decided to continue using 
primaries for the selection of the top candidate for the 2017 national election, 
which so far attracted four candidates39. In addition, primaries are now also 
used to determine the top candidate for regional elections (see, for example, in 
Bavaria). Therefore, the adoption and continued use of primaries constitutes a 
structural change towards a higher level of intra-party democracy (IPD) in form 
                                            
36
 The party rules require always two leaders, one female and one male. 
37
 The SPD used a membership vote in 1993 to select its party leader but not its top executive 
candidate. Further, the final choice needed to be confirmed by the party delegate meeting. 
38 
Before the 2002 election the Green Party did not selected a top executive candidate. One 
long-term member stated during the interview that until then the argument was that a top 
candidate would distract to much from the policy issues. 
39
 Candidates can register until the 17 October 2016. 
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of a shift from a narrower selectorate to a selection process involving all 
members. Further, the Green Party was already considered the most internally 
democratic party in Germany in terms of participatory possibilities and grass-
root involvement and, nevertheless, opted for further democratization (Alemann, 
2003). 
The Greens are also a good case from a methodological perspective, 
namely to test the two membership subcategory outlined in the framework as 
the party allowed to run a survey among its members, including survey 
questions specifically tailored to capture the changes in party membership due 
to the use of the primary. Furthermore, as the party already had a long history 
of a high level of IPD, the effects on party members due to the more inclusive 
leadership selection method should be more visible and easier to identify than 
in parties where there were multiple reforms towards higher levels of IPD 
simultaneously or very close to each other. The relatively short time span 
between the primary and the survey should further ensure that the observed 
changes are mainly explained by the adoption of the primary. As a reminder, 
the empirical data used to study the German Greens are two membership 
surveys (2009 and 2015) with the latter being conducted especially for this 
project; the survey data is triangulated by in-depth qualitative party elite and 
membership interviews (for a detailed discussion, see chapter 3). 
 The chapter unfolds in the following way. It first outlines why the Green 
Party adopted primaries using the hypothesis developed by Cross and Blais 
(2012). The chapter continues by placing the case of the German Greens within 
the developed framework and discusses the theoretical expectations for the 
case of protected democratization for party membership. It then presents the 
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empirical findings for the case using both survey data and interviews. The 
chapter shows that, overall, the case of the German Green Party supports the 
theoretical expectation for the protected democratization category with a 
positive development along all four aspects of party membership: increase in 
membership size, high level of turnout, improved membership quality and 
positive attitude towards the leadership. 
Background of the Reforms 
Before analysing the impact of the primary on party members, the next section 
explores why the German Green Party reformed its leadership selection 
mechanism in the first place and adopted closed primaries. In order to do so, 
the project uses the approach developed by Cross and Blais (2012). It links the 
negative impact of external factors in a party’s comparative position to the 
reform leadership selection method. According to Cross and Blais (2012), a 
party is more likely to reform its leadership selection method after an electoral 
setback, when in opposition, if it is new, and when other parties within the 
system have already democratized their selection processes (contagion effect). 
The general rules for all membership votes and primaries were adopted 
by the Länderrat in Lübeck in April 2012, while the details for the primary to 
select the two top executive candidates and the 2013 procedure was adopted in 
Berlin on 2 September 2012, about a year before the next general elections 
(BÜNDNIS 90/DIE GRÜNEN-Länderrat, 2012a; BÜNDNIS 90/DIE GRÜNEN-
Länderrat, 2012b). With regard to an electoral setback, the Greens consistently 
increased their vote share, apart from 1990, since they first entered parliament 
in 1980 becoming government coalition partner from 1998 to 2005. Despite their 
continued electoral gains, reaching 10.7 per cent in 2009, the party failed to re-
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enter national government and reformed in 2012. Thus, the Greens continued to 
improve their electoral performance of winning votes but failing to re-enter 
government. This was a clearly disappointing electoral performance that 
contributed to reforming the leadership selection mechanism, supporting the 
first suggestion. Further, the party was in opposition, when they adopted the 
primary also reflecting the second aspect of Cross and Blais (2012) approach. 
 
Figure 5.1 Timeline German Greens 
 
1998   2005               Sep. 2012                 Sep. 2013 
Enters government Moves back into opposition Adoption of closed primary   Election 
E 
 
Opposition  Government        Opposition  
 
During time in opposition, reforms can be motivated by the party 
leadership either to promote party renewal or as a strategic electoral tool. As 
pointed out above, in the case of the Greens the decision to reform the 
leadership selection method was made shortly before the election. Thus, this is 
more in line with the explanation of reform as an electoral tool. With regards to 
the third factor, the German Green Party is by most definitions a new party 
(Hug, 2001, Bolleyer, 2013). Despite this, it did not opt for an inclusive 
selectorate from the start, nor did it reform during the party’s formative period. 
While the party enshrined the possibility of a primary in its statues since the 
early 1990s, it did no reform until 2012. So the third factor outlined by Cross and 
Blais (2012) is only partly confirmed, as certainly the Green party can be and is 
often defined as a new party but was not young, when it adopted the closed 
primary. The final factor of Cross and Blais (2012) approach is that parties are 
more likely to reform, when other parties within the system have already 
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democratized their selection process (contagion effect). This is not confirmed in 
the case of the German Greens, as it is the first German party to permanently 
adopt a closed primary. One might argue that the one-time use of a 
membership vote to select the SPD’s party general secretary in 1993 might 
support the contagion effect theory, but it is highly unlikely that this played a 
significant role nearly 20 years later. The above clearly outlined the external 
factors that are related to the adoption of the closed primary by the German 
Greens in 2012. The next step and main purpose of the project is to look at how 
the reform actually might have affected the party and, more specifically, its party 
membership. 
5.2 The German Greens in the Conceptual Framework and its Expected 
Effects 
The German Green Party fits the category of Protected Democratization 
(permissive candidacy/ closed primary). It carries this label, as from a members’ 
perspective the reform empowered them, since they now hold the deciding vote 
on who will lead the party, and their voice is not crowded out by a large external 
selectorate associated with an open primary. Further, they can run in leadership 
selection contests, if they wish to do so. Thus, members feel that their interests 
and organizational role is protected, and their role is strengthened. Thus, they 
have influence and control over both aspects of leadership selections: 
candidacy and selection. In the closed primary, the only restriction to candidacy 
was party membership, leading to 15 members running in 2012. According to 
the theoretical discussion above, the following consequences can be expected: 
Table 5.1 The Expected Effects for the German Green Party 
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Open 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Selectorate – 
Primary Zone 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Protected Democratization 
German Greens 
Overall effect: ++ 
Membership level 
Existing: o New: + 
Quality of membership 
Existing: + New: + 
Attitude towards leadership 
Existing: + New: + 
Turnout in primary 
Existing: high New: high 
 
Closed Permissive             Candidate Requirements              Strict 
Explanation: (-): decrease ;(o): stays the same ;(+): increase 
 
Before discussing the theoretical expectations, it is important to stress 
once more that the categories of IPD refer to the member’s perception of 
democratization brought about by the primary, and how this in turn might affects 
the individual level conception of party membership expressed in changes along 
the four dimensions. Overall, the predicted impact on party membership should 
be very positive. Thus, in terms of party membership size, there should an 
inflow of members due to the new incentive created by the primary vote. 
Further, there should also be an increase in intra-party participation, an 
improved quality of membership and a more positive attitude towards the 
leadership. The latter is further supported by the fact that due to the candidacy 
rules, new candidates can enter the contest and challenge the leadership. The 
positive assessment of the primary should be reflected in an overall high 
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turnout. Returning to the impact of the closed primary on the two sub-groups of 
existing and new members, no decline in membership level of existing members 
can be expected, and some former disillusioned members might even return 
due to the new incentive. This should also attract new members to join the 
party. The overall turnout among existing members should be high, and they 
should provide a high share of it. However, some activists might abstain due to 
the feeling of disempowerment, as they lost the exclusive right to vote for the 
leadership in the delegate conference. New members’ participation rate and 
share of the overall turnout should be high, as one of the main reasons to join 
the party was to vote in the primary. For both sub-groups the share of turnout 
should be proportional to its share of the overall membership. The quality of the 
membership among existing members is likely to increase, as activists are re-
motivated and some formerly passive members start to actively participate. As 
the party did not create a new membership category or launch a recruitment 
drive, the new membership quality is likely to be high. Thus, they will invest time 
and resources into the party to get a return on their initial investment to join the 
party, beyond voting in the primary (Scarrow, 1995). The attitude of the existing 
membership towards the party leadership should improve, as they now feel that 
they have more influence over the party leadership. New members should also 
have a positive attitude towards the leadership, as they joined to vote for it. It 
seems to be the optimal form of intra-party democracy from both the 
membership and organizational perspective, as it strengthens the power and 
role of the membership and at the same time creates loyal and engaged 
members working for the benefit of the organization. Having established 
theoretical expectations, the chapter now moves on to the empirical part testing 
whether these assumptions hold in the case of the Germany Green Party. 
 158 
 
Membership Level 
In terms of membership, the party only gained 579 new members in 2012, 
which is a 1 per cent growth from 2011 (Hampel, 2013). A possible explanation 
for this low growth rate is that in a party with already many possibilities for 
ordinary members to get involved, the new selection method might provide little 
incentive for new members to join. This is also reflected in the survey with only 
8.5 per cent claiming the leadership selection method played an important role 
in joining the party. Another argument presented above is that former 
disillusioned members might re-join the party, after it introduced a primary. The 
fact that for only very few members the overall membership selection method 
played a role to join in 2012 seems to not support this point. Further, while in 
2009, 56.1 per cent stated that there were reasons to be unsatisfied with their 
membership in the Green Party in recent years, only 4.3 per cent of those 
threated to leave the party as a reaction, while the majority used different ways 
to voice or demonstrate their dissatisfaction but remained loyal. So probably, 
there were not many existing members in the first place that left the party and 
could return due to the primary. The low exit rate can be associated to the 
already higher level of IPD before the primary providing ample opportunities to 
voice discontent. However, in parties with lower levels of IPD before the reform, 
the return of former disillusioned members should be more visible. In addition, 
the party experienced a prolong period of growth in previous years gaining 
alone 6,000 new members in 2011 (Hampel, 2013). This is with 11 per cent the 
biggest growth in membership since 1990 (Niedermayer, 2015). Further, since 
the leadership selection process the party continues to grow reaching over 
60,000 members in early 2013 and 60,329 by the end of the 2014 (Reif, 2014). 
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Thus, the party grew more moderately than expected, but it is likely that in 
parties with less IPD before the reform in leadership selection method, the 
increase in membership would be more pronounced. Further, it is the only 
German party that did not lose members and grew by 46 per cent since 1990 
(Niedermayer, 2015). Thus, returning to the theoretical framework, it can be 
seen that the case of the Greens the introduction of the primary is associated 
with the expected pattern of no membership decline among the existing 
membership and a moderate inflow of new members. 
Figure 5.2 Membership Development of the German Green Party (1980-2014) 
Source: Niedermayer, Oskar: Parteimitglieder in Deutschland: Version 2015. 
Arbeitshefte a. d. Otto-Stammer-Zentrum, Nr. 25, FU Berlin 2015 
Turnout in Primary 
The turnout of the closed primary was 61.73 per cent (BÜNDNIS 90/DIE 
GRÜNEN, 31.10.2012). As mentioned above in chapter two, the turnout for 
primaries using an all party membership vote ranges from 31.3 per cent to 79 
per cent (Kenig et al., 2015b). With a turnout of 61.73 per cent, the Greens are 
located towards the top end of this range. If we assume that all members voted 
who joined in 2012, they would provide a share of only 1.6 per cent; and if all 
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new members who joined between 2011 and 2012 voted, they provided 18 per 
cent of the turnout. Comparing the new party membership share of turnout to 
the overall share of membership, it can be seen that it was proportionate with 
new members providing 1 per cent of all membership in 2012 and 12.4 per cent 
of all members in 2011 and 2012 together. This is a proportionate share of new 
members’ turnout and supports the argument that the existing members remain 
in control, as they hold the decisive majority, and their interests are protected. A 
similar picture of the level of turnout emerges, when one looks at the survey 
with 67 per cent of the respondents stating to have participated in the primary. 
Further, the large majority of survey participants who joined either in 2011 or 
2012 also claimed to have participated in the selection process. Here again, the 
framework seems to hold with existing members forming a high share of the 
turnout and an overall high membership turnout. 
Table 5.2 Turnout in German Green Primary 2012 
Year Number of 
candidates 
Turnout 
2012 15 Overall turnout: 61.73% per cent 
Share of turnout existing members: 98.2% per cent 
Share of turnout new members: 1.6% per cent 
 
In 2012 Existing members’ share of total membership: 99% per 
cent 
New members’ share of total membership: 1% per cent 
Quality of Membership 
So far, the two quantitative indicators seem to point to a positive impact of the 
primary on party membership as it seems related to a continued inflow of new 
members in the year of the primary and after, and an overall high turnout 
pointing to general acceptance of the new participatory tool and mobilization 
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effect of the primary. All this supports the theoretical expectations of the 
framework. The next section studies the expected effects of primaries related to 
membership quality and attitude. Thus, the question is whether primaries are 
complementary to other intra-party activities or even have a positive effect on 
them, as they motivate members; or are primaries seen as substituting such 
traditional activities leading to their decline. In order to do so, the thesis 
analyses data from the 2009 German Party Membership Survey (Spier et al., 
2011) and the author’s own survey conducted in 2015. Changes in quality are 
captured by looking at changes in the motivation to join the party and patterns 
of participation, while changes in the attitude of party members is captured by 
survey question measuring external efficacy (Craig et al., 1990, Niemi et al., 
1991).  
Motivation to Join the Party 
The first indicator to measure changes in the quality of party membership is to 
ask why members do join the Greens in the first place. The thesis uses the 
general-incentives model consisting of seven incentive categories used 
previously for German party members (Klein, 2006; Laux, 2011) and based on 
the original model developed by Seyd and Whiteley (1992). These are based on 
the argument that specific organizational rules can encourage different types of 
members. Thus changes in party rules, here the leadership selection method, 
might—intentionally or not—lead to a shift in the incentives for why members 
join the party. 
The first category of incentives to consider is selective-outcome 
incentives. They address direct personal benefits for the individual member 
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mainly in terms of a career in the party. Following a rational choice logic, the 
fact that under the new selection regime every member can vote and more 
importantly be a candidate, selective-outcome incentives should become more 
powerful (Olson, 1965). This development should be more pronounced among 
new members. The table below (Table 5.3) indeed shows an increase in 
respondents who stated that selective-outcome incentives played an important 
role in their motivation to join the party. We can clearly see an increase in all 
three items measuring selective-outcome incentives between 2009 and 2015, 
and they seem to be slightly more important for new members. This supports 
previous findings by Laux (2011) who finds that selective-outcome incentives 
among members and, especially, new members were already on the rise 
between 1999 and 2009. Or as one interviewee put it: “The Urwahl provides the 
possibility for everyone to participate but also to promote yourself; this makes it 
attractive” (party elite-members since 2004). Thus, the new, more individualistic 
and open selection method seems to have reinforced and accelerated the 
trajectory towards a more career-oriented party membership. The next category 
of selective-process incentives encompass incentives individuals achieve 
through participating in party life, such as meeting nice people, being informed 
about politics but also because they enjoy political work. For all three indicators, 
an increase between 2009 and 2015 can be observed. Further, these incentives 
are more important for new members than existing members. Thus, they are not 
only motivated by the outcome of the political process or personal gains but 
also the process and interaction within the party. This should have a positive 
impact on intra-party participation. The third category captures collective 
incentives, and members join in the hope to benefit from public goods provided 
by the party through influence and policy realization. Again, we can observe a 
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positive development in this incentive, but it is slightly more important to existing 
members than new ones. However, this is clearly still the most important 
incentive in comparison to the two aforementioned ones. Thus members 
continue to be mainly motivated to contribute to the improvement of society 
rather than purely personal gains. This again should have a positive impact on 
intra-party participation. In this regard, it is interesting to observe that the 
increase in incentives to join relates to more active participation, such as joining 
to influence the political direction of the party or to advance its influence and 
policies. The next category of normative incentives motivates members to join 
due to social norms. Here, a clear decrease from 10.2 per cent in 2009 to 7.2 
per cent in 2015 can be observed, and it plays a nearly equally low role for both 
membership sub-groups. The fourth category of altruistic incentives consists of 
the motivation to join to fulfil one’s perceived civic duty; it also increased 
between the two surveys and plays a slightly more important role for existing 
than new members. This incentive is often linked to more passive intra-party 
participation. Thus, an increase points to the symbolic act of joining the party, 
rather than the intention to become a party activist. The next category of 
ideological incentives expresses the wish to increase the parties influence or to 
support a specify fraction. Here the developments are also positive with 
increase among all members and new members, especially, who stated they 
were motivated to join to influence the political course of the party. Further, the 
share of members that joined to support a specific fraction did not increase and 
was slightly smaller among new members. Thus, primaries seem not to have 
necessarily the negative impact on cohesion and party unity as often suggested 
(for an overview, see Cordero and Coller, 2015). The last category is expressive 
incentives. Here individuals join to communicate their perceived psychological 
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attachment to a party. In 2015, considerably fewer new members with 7.5 per 
cent compared to 19.2 per cent of existing members seemed to be motivated to 
join due to impressive personalities at the top of the party. This is an overall 
decrease from 20.4 per cent in 2009 to 16.6 per cent in 2015.The level of 
members that joined to demonstrate their sympathies for the party remains high 
and important in both sub-groups. Hence, members seem to see the party as 
an effective way to express their support, but their positive evaluation of the 
party is not solely based on who leads the party but the overall party 
organization.  
In the interviews, a similar picture emerged. All members stated they joint 
out of sympathy for the party but clearly emphasized that they joined to take an 
active role in the party and to influence the party. For example two members 
stated: “I didn’t just wanted to be a nominal member […] and I didn’t just join out 
of sympathy or admiration for anyone […] but I believe in my party willingness 
and the wish to actively participate is very pronounced” (mid-level elite member 
since 2000) and “I just wanted to join to be active and support it [the party]” 
(former mid-level elite now party activist member since 2004) Overall, this 
seems to point to an increase in the quality of membership as specified by the 
conceptual framework. Members are increasingly motivated by selective-
outcome and process incentives in addition to collective political incentives. All 
of them require a higher level of participation to be realized within the party and 
the overall political process. The growing but still small number of professionally 
motivated members is a positive development for the party providing it with a 
bigger personnel reservoir for internal recruitment but without being (yet) 
dominated by career politicians. Also contrary to often expressed theoretical 
expectations, members and especially new members seem to be less not more 
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motivated by expressive incentives to just support the leadership. As discussed 
in chapter two, parties often use recruitment drives to increase the number of 
people voting in primaries resulting in large membership spikes of passive 
members, who only join for the primary. Despite the fact that the Greens did not 
opt for a recruitment drive, they experienced membership growth, and this 
suggests that new members have a higher level of motivation and want to be 
active in the party beyond just being a primary voter. This should result in more 
active and long-term members. So far, there seems to be no sign of the docile 
and passive membership produced by higher levels of IPD predicted by Mair 
(1997), but rather members see the party as effective in representing their 
values and as an arena to actively participate and shape party goals. In order to 
consolidate these first findings, the next section looks at whether the positive 
association between the adoption of the primary and the development towards 
more participatory motivations to join actually translates into more party activism 
beyond voting in the primary selection. 
Table 5.3 Motivation to Join the German Green Party 2009 and 2015 (All, 
Existing and New) 
Types of 
incentive 
To join the 
party 
Measurements 2009 2015 2015 
 All All Existing New 
N 1835 391 271 120 
Selective-
outcome 
incentives 
- To gain a career advantage  
- To gain a public mandate 
- To gain a party office 
2.2 
11.1 
8.9 
3.6 
15.6 
13 
2.5 
14.4 
11.5 
5.8 
18.3 
16.7 
Selective -
process 
incentives 
- Because I enjoy the political 
work 
- To be better informed about 
politics 
- To meet nice people 
45.8 
 
34 
 
21.9 
52.1 
 
40.2 
 
28.1 
47.6 
 
36.9 
 
25.4 
62.5 
 
47.5 
 
34.2 
Collective 
political 
- To promote the aims of the 
party 
80.9 
 
87.5 
 
89.3 
 
83.3 
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incentives - To increase the influence of 
the party 
- To promote ecologically 
motivated politics 
76.4 
 
91.7 
80 
 
90.8 
84.1 
 
91.9 
70.8 
 
88.3 
Normative 
inceptives 
- Through the influence of 
family and friends 
10.8 7.2 7.1 7.5 
Altruistic 
motives 
- In order to fulfil my 
responsibility as citizen 
57.7 63.9 64.6 62.5 
Ideological 
incentives 
- To strengthen a specific wing 
within the party 
- To influence the political 
course of the party 
20.7 
 
37.5 
20.7 
 
47.5 
21 
 
45.4 
20 
 
52.5 
Expressive 
incentives 
- Due to the impressive 
personalities at the top of the 
party 
- To demonstrate my 
sympathies for the party 
20.4 
 
 
64 
15.6 
 
 
63.9 
19.2 
 
 
64.6 
7.5 
 
 
62.5 
1) all values in per cent; 2) “very important” or “important” motivation to join the 
party 
Intra-party Participation 
After having outlined how change in leadership selection are related to the 
motivation to join the party and thus the membership type that the Green Party 
attracted as a result, the next section outlines how membership activity was 
affected. In particular, the next section outlines whether the positive increase in 
motivations to join that related to a more active party membership is reflected in 
higher levels of intra-party participation. Broadly speaking, in 2009 only 30 per 
cent of members considered themselves active compared to 49 per cent in 
2015. Interestingly, also in 2015 existing members claimed to be more active 
than new members with 50.8 per cent and 44.4 per cent, respectively. Further, 
in 2015 members invest more hours per month into the party than previously. 
Most remarkably is the drop from 30 per cent to 11 per cent of responses of 
members who stated to spend no time for the party and the strong increase in 
members that claim to spend working between five to ten or ten to 20 hours per 
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month for the party. There are slightly fewer existing members who are 
completely inactive, and there are more members represented in the two top 
categories of over 30 hours per month. In addition, 25.3 per cent of the total and 
30.3 per cent of existing members claimed to be more active than five years 
ago. This points to an overall positive development in intra-party participation.  
Table 5.4 Time Devoted Working for German Green Party 2009 and 2015 (All, 
Existing and New) 
How much time do you devote to party activities in an average month?  
 2009 2015 
all 
2015 
existing 
2015 
New 
N 1835 391 271 120 
None 31.1 11.1 10.1 13.3 
Up to 5 hours 29.7 28.8 28.3 30.1 
From 5 to 10 hours 15.7 22.6 20.5 27.4 
From 10 to 20 hours 11.5 21.0 22.1 18.6 
From 20 to 30 hours 5.9 7.8 8.5 6.2 
From 30 to 40 hours 1.9 3.8 3.9 3.5 
More than 40 hours 3.5 4.9 6.6 0.9 
1) all values in per cent 
This trend also emerges from the interview with one members saying: “I 
believe that it [the Urwahl] was very important for the members, and it also 
motivated them“(mid-level elite member since 2000), and another one stated: “I 
think through it [die Urwahl] the grass-roots were motivated and became more 
active. I believe the more one has the feeling to be able to influence something, 
the more one gets involved” (former mid-level elite now party activist member 
since 2004). More precisely 25.7 per cent of all members and 23.5 per cent of 
existing members agree with the statement that the use of a more inclusive 
leadership selection method motivated them to take part in more party activities. 
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For 31 per cent of the new members, the selection methods motivated them to 
be more active.  
After discussing the positive link between the new selection method and 
the intensity of membership activity, the next step is to look at what type of 
activities members engage in with a special focus on high intensity activities. 
The table below clearly outlines that overall intra-party participation increased 
across a large variety of party activities. For example, in 2015 more members 
stated to have attended a party meeting, to have worked at a public information 
stall of the party or distributed flyers and displayed posters than in 2009. Also 
attendance at social occasions and participation in charity events increased. 
Unsurprisingly, existing members took part more frequently in all the above 
listed activities. However, the differences for most activities are not very large. 
Thus, new and existing members both frequently participate in a large variety of 
intra-party activities. Nevertheless, it is possible to observe some interesting 
differences between new and existing members when looking at high intensity 
activities, such as running or holding a public or party office. The share of 
members that held a party office or ran for public office increased between 2009 
and 2015. While existing members are more likely to have engaged in one of 
the activities with 39.5 per cent and 38.8 per cent respectively, the share of new 
members is not as low as one might expect after only four or less years of 
membership. Hence, 19.5 per cent of new members held a party office and 18.9 
per cent stood for public office. A similar picture emerges when one looks at 
members who ran for a party office or actually held a public office. 
Unfortunately, the 2009 survey does not include the survey items for members 
who ran for a party office or actually held a public office to capture the overall 
level of members that engaged in these activities but asked for individual party 
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and public offices. However, it seems that a similar picture emerges when one 
looks at members who ran for a party office or actually held a public office. 
Table 5.5 Membership Activities in the German Green Party 2009 and 2015 (All, 
Existing and New) 
We would like to ask you about political activities you may have taken part in during the 
last years? 
 2009 
all 
2015 
all 
2015 
existing 
2015 
new 
N 1835 391 271 120 
Displayed posters, distributed flyers and other 
information material of the party 
29.3 48.4 51.7 40.7 
Participated in party social events  24.2 41.7 42.6 39.8 
Attended a party meeting 42.1 65.1 67.5 59.8 
Helped at a party charity event (e.g., collected 
existing cloth) 
6.4 9.0 9.0 9.1 
Helped to recruit new members in form of 
personal discussion 
9.8 12.9 15.2 8.0 
Worked at public information stalls of the party 29.5 47.2 51.9 36.3 
Donated additional money to the party 15.6 21.0 26.3 9.0 
Contributed to the formulation of the political 
program of the party in committees and other 
working groups 
26.2 41.8 45.5 33.7 
Stood for office within the party organization - 32.2 37.9 19.5 
Held an office within the party organization 25.9 33.5 39.5 19.5 
Stood for a public office  28.6 32.8 38.9 18.9 
Held a public office - 24.9 29.6 14.1 
Helped organising the work of the party business 26.8 41.8 46.9 30.1 
1) all values in per cent 
*Percentage for often and very often patriated in the political activity 
 
Overall, the above shows that we do not only see an increase in hours 
and stated activity, but members participate also more in high intensity 
activities, such as run for public mandates, work at info stalls or hold a party 
office. Thus, the empirical analysis shows a positive association between the 
primary and the level of party membership quality in terms of motivation to join 
and intra-party participation confirms the theoretical discussion outlined above. 
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Further, the empirical findings for new and existing members support the 
suggestions made by the conceptual framework for the use of a closed primary 
with permissive candidacy requirements. In short, all this points towards a 
positive development of the individual conception of party membership due to 
the new perceived level of IPD achieved under protected democratization. The 
next step is to see whether the primary is also related to a positive impact on 
the attitude of members towards the party leadership as suggested by the 
above findings, or whether members are active despite negative attitudes and 
the feeling of discontent. 
Membership Attitude and External Efficacy 
After discussing the impact of the primary on membership size, turnout 
and membership quality, the next section turns its attention to the final 
dimension: the primaries’ effect on membership attitude towards the leadership. 
To do so, the section looks at overall levels of membership satisfaction, 
perceived levels of IPD, and how much influence members feel they have in the 
party. 
Overall satisfaction with membership increased between 2009 and 2015 
from 66.8 per cent to 72 per cent. Looking at the two subgroups separately, new 
members are slightly less satisfied with 70 per cent compared to 88.2 per cent 
of existing members. Further, the number of very unsatisfied members stayed 
the same between 2009 and 2015 with 1.3 per cent. However, when looking at 
the two sub-groups, 1.5 per cent of existing members stated they are totally 
dissatisfied compared to 0.8 per cent of new members. This might point to a 
very small group of long-term activists that are now dissatisfied due to the use 
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of the primary. Nevertheless, overall the primary seems to be associated with a 
positive effect on membership satisfaction. In terms of membership perception 
of IPD, a similar positive image emerges. First, 77.5 per cent of all members 
agreed in 2015 with the statement that the internal party organization is highly 
democratic. This few is equally high when looking at the two sub-groups 
separately. Also new and existing members stated both with 74.6 per cent that 
the new leadership selection method made the party more democratic. 
Unfortunately, there are no similar questions in the 2009 survey but 52.6 per 
cent back then confirmed that it would be very sensible to determine the 
national leaders of the party using a primary, and only 3.3 per cent disagreed 
completely with the idea.  
Another way to measure the change in attitude of membership is to ask 
how satisfied they are, and how much influence they feel they have in the party. 
To do so the project uses the survey items develop as part of the external-
political-efficacy model (Craig et al., 1990; Niemi et al., 1991). The lower the 
satisfaction and the perceived level of political efficacy, the worse the 
membership’s attitude towards the leadership, and this probably has negative 
effects on party activity and quality. As the table below shows regarding the 
three items available in both surveys, members continue to agree that they 
have the possibility to actively contribute to the party, are listen to and the party 
reacts to criticism of its members. The scores are overall high among both sub-
groups, however, existing members are more critical towards the leadership 
and see their influence as being more constrained. Thus, while only 8.0 per cent 
of new members agree with the statement that the decision-makers within the 
Green Party do not listen to the views of ordinary party members, this doubles 
to 16.3 per cent among existing members. Further 72.5 per cent of existing 
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compared to 80.5 per cent agreed that all members have the possibility to 
influence policy and 60.1 per cent compared to 66.4 per cent respectively 
agreed that the Green Party is responsive to criticism from its members. The 
interviews confirmed the overall positive relationship, and even ordinary 
members claimed to have enough influence over the decision-making process 
within the party; an activist statement confirms the good relationship between 
members and the leadership saying, he only knows “very few who constantly 
complain about the national leadership”. Another member supports this view 
affirming that: “Every, from the leadership perspective, unimportant member has 
the chance to speak out and is listened to. In so far our party found a way at the 
organizational level to indeed provide members with possibilities that other 
parties do not grant so readily”. (mid-level elite member since 2000).  
The additional items measuring external efficacy further and linking it to 
the primary in the 2015 survey confirm its overall high level. Both existing and 
new members have a very similar core for each item. Most importantly, 42.9 per 
cent agreed that thanks to the new leadership selection method, they have the 
feeling of more influence within the party, with 42.4 per cent agreeing among 
existing and 44.0 per cent among new members. Thus, overall, members 
express a high and improved level of satisfaction with their party membership 
and the perceived level of political efficacy. Further, the survey responses 
endorse the positive effect of the primary on both membership satisfaction and 
efficacy; this again is in line with the theoretical suggestions of the conceptual 
framework. 
 
Table 5.6 External Political Efficacy of Green Party Members (2009 and 2015) 
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External Efficacy—Survey Item 2009 2015 
 
N 
 
1835 
All 
370 
Existing 
271 
New 
120 
The decision-makers within the Green 
party do not listen to the views of ordinary 
party members.* 
13.6% 13.8% 16.3 8.0 
The Green party is responsive to criticism 
from its members.* 
56.7% 62% 60.1 66.4 
In the Green party every member has the 
possibility to actively influence the 
policies of the party. * 
74.8% 75% 72.5 80.5 
Are you satisfied with the personal 
influence you have within the party?** 
- 63.3% 64.6 60.0 
There are many official possibilities for 
members to influence the actions of the 
party leadership.* 
- 57.1% 59.2 52.0 
Members like me have no influence over 
what the party leadership is doing.* 
- 23.3% 22.6 25.9 
Thanks to the use of the new leadership 
selection method, I have the feeling of 
more influence with the party.* 
- 42.9% 42.4 44.0 
1) all values in per cent 
*Responses for “strongly agree” and “agree” with statement. 
**Responses for “very satisfied” and “satisfied”. 
 
One aspect presented in the discussion of the analytical framework is 
that party activists might become disappointed due to the feeling that they lost 
their former exclusive power to nominate the party leader during the party 
conference. Thus, there might be a small group of unhappy party activists 
whose attitude towards the leadership is negative. Indeed, there are 10.8 per 
cent of members who disagree that the use of the new leadership selection 
method increased the feeling of more influence within the party. This feeling is 
stronger among existing members with 13.2 per cent compared to only 5.0 per 
cent among new members. However, if you asked members to what extend 
they agree with the statement that the involvement of all members reduced the 
meaning and rights of active party members, 65.6 per cent of all members and, 
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more importantly, 66.7 per cent of existing members disagree. Only 13.8 per 
cent of existing members agree with this statement and, somewhat ironically, 
with 18.0 per cent more new members approve this statement. The theoretical 
argument of the unhappy or disappointed activist is further weakened in the 
case of the German Greens by the fact that 73.7 per cent of existing members 
also agree with the statement that all members, regardless of being passive or 
active, should have the same rights within the party; and the majority disagrees 
with the statement that active members should play a more important role in 
decision-making processes than passive members. In addition, the large 
majority of members, irrespective of being existing or new, agree that all 
members regardless of the length of their membership should be able to put 
themselves forward as a candidate in the leadership selection. Clearly, the 
above seem to contradict some theoretical claims (Mair, 1997; Lefebvre, 2011). 
Existing members and activists seem not to feel disempowered by the 
introduction of an all membership vote but see it as very positive. However, the 
2015 survey also shows clearly that members with 77.6 per cent do not wish to 
extend the right to vote in to non-members. This view is nearly equally strong 
among new members with 75 per cent and existing members with 78.6 per 
cent. Members are clearly in favour to empower all members of the organization 
but against a blurring of the line between members and non-members in the 
case of leadership selection. 
In summary, party members, new and existing alike, are seem to be very 
satisfied with their membership, perceive a high level of political efficacy, view 
the new leadership selection method as positive, while the often claimed 
negative effect on party activists is very limited. The last point is not to 
surprising given that in 2009, 52.5 per cent of all members supported the idea of 
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electing the national leader via an all membership vote. Overall, the survey 
results support the expectations of the analytical framework regarding the 
membership attitude towards the party leadership, namely that a closed 
selection method with permissive candidacy requirements are associated with a 
positive effect on both existing and new members’ attitude towards the 
leadership. 
 
New Rules—New Attitude? 
In October 2015, the party changed the candidacy rules for primaries. While 
until then all members could be candidates, the new rules require them to be 
nominated or on the nomination ballot for the parties national electoral list. 
While this is undoubtedly a move towards more closed and strict rules, it allows 
a large pool of over 600 potential candidates to compete in the leadership 
contest. Further candidates for the lists are first selected by local membership 
votes. Thus, the process is still highly democratic and inclusive, but moderately 
restricts candidacy to individuals who have some experience or are seen as 
qualified to present the party as a Member of Parliament. Given that the primary 
selects the party leader in public office, it makes sense to limit candidacy to 
individuals on the electoral list. Returning to the candidacy dimension of the 
framework, this move would shift the Green party slightly from the extreme end 
of the permissive-restrictive scale towards the centre, but leave it firmly in the 
permissive half. During the interviews, most participants were very supportive of 
this change, as it guarantees more qualified candidates with a good track 
record. They also saw it as an effective way to reduce the risk of fringe 
candidates that could damage the party’s image or avoid unnecessarily high 
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costs of an internal contest that would use up energy and resources needed to 
compete in the inter-party arena. This point is supported by the fact that the 
party effectively funds the entire primary process; the previous primary attracted 
15 candidates among them only a few had a realistic chance to be elected. This 
unnecessarily increased the cost of the process. Until now, the 2016 primary 
attracted four candidates. 
5.3 Conclusion 
Overall the empirical analysis of the case of the German Greens supports 
the theoretical expectations the conceptual framework made for the category of 
protected democratization. The fact that the German Greens already had a 
high level of IPD before the shift to primaries and the permission to run a 
membership survey with specify items to capture the effect of the primary on 
party membership made it an ideal case to study. To do so the chapter used not 
only quantitative party membership surveys but also qualitative in-depth 
membership interviews. 
The chapter started by mainly outlining the external factors that led to the 
adoption of the primary in 2012. The case of the Greens reflects Cross and 
Blais (2012) approach that electoral defeat and being in opposition are external 
factors that contribute to the adoption of primaries, while the additional factors 
of party newness and contagion effect are only in part or not confirmed by the 
case of the German Greens. The chapter then presented a short theoretical 
discussion of the expected effect of the closed primary with permissive 
candidacy requirements on the individual level conception of party membership 
brought about by the changed level of perceived IPD. The empirical discussion 
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supports the overall assumption of the framework, namely a positive association 
between the closed primary in the protected democratization category and the 
effect on party membership. Members seem to have high political efficacy and a 
positive view of the elite. Further, they are overall more active and engage in 
more high intensity activities. Also, overall turnout is high, and new and existing 
members participate proportionally. The theoretical expectation of membership 
growth is only partly met. While the party experienced substantial growth in the 
years before the reform and after, the membership increase in the year of the 
selection can be described as moderate at best. The empirical findings for the 
German Greens also support the theoretical expectations for the sub-groups of 
existing and new members. There is an inflow of new members and no decline 
of existing members; the quality of both in terms of motivations to join and intra-
party activity is improved as well as high, and they both have a positive attitude 
towards leadership. Also, existing and new members provide a high and 
proportional share of the turnout in the primary. The interviews with party 
members mainly confirmed the positive impact on party membership and the 
positive role the primary played in the party’s development since its introduction.  
In conclusion, the new selection method protects the power and interest of 
the party members from a large external selectorate and empowers it by 
providing members with a new intra-party participatory tool. Moreover, the 
elite’s power over the selection outcome is restricted; together, this seems to be 
associated with a positive impact on all aspects of the individual level 
conception of party membership. Moreover, the chapter further highlights that 
the conceptual framework developed in this project is useful and seem to be 
reliable when it comes to studying the impact of different leadership selection 
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rules (in from of selectorate and candidacy requirements) on the individual level 
conception of party membership brought about by changing perceptions of IPD. 
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6 The Case of the French Parti Socialiste (PS) 
6.1 Introduction 
The following chapter analyses the effect of primaries on the nature of party 
membership in the Parti Socialist (PS) in France. It is a particularly interesting 
case, as the party first adopted a closed primary in 1995, used it again in 2006 
and later adopted an open primary in 2009 for the presidential candidate 
selection in 2011. Thus, the case allows tracing the impact on membership the 
shift had from a selection by a party congress to both closed and open primary 
within the same party. Despite the reform towards a more and more inclusive 
selectorate, candidate requirements remained strict. While in 1995 candidacy 
had to be authorized by the National Council (306 members), in 2006 it required 
endorsement of 30 National Council members. In 2011, candidates had more 
options and could be endorsed by either 5 per cent of MPs, or 5 per cent of 
National council members, or 5 per cent of regional councillors or 5 per cent of 
mayors. Nevertheless, all contests attracted more than one candidate with two 
in 1995, three in 2006 and six for the open primary in 2011. Thus, 
competiveness increased over the years. 
Returning to the framework developed in chapter two, the case of the PS 
can be classified as an example of Controlled Democratization for the period 
of 1995 to 2006 and an example of Disempowering Democratization since 
the adoption of the open primary in 2009. As a reminder, the cases chosen here 
are typical cases (Seawright and Gerring, 2008) and are representative 
examples of a wider population of cases that can be placed in the same 
quadrants. They allow to explore the theoretical expectations of the specified 
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relationship between primary rules and effect on party membership for each of 
the different types of intra-party democracy (IPD).  
 As outlined in chapter three, the empirical chapters follow a mixed-
method approach. Thus, the project uses here a combination of three 
independent and one party-conducted membership surveys (1986, 1998, 2006, 
2011) complemented by nine in-depth semi-structured interviews with both 
ordinary rank and file members and the party elite, conducted in autumn 2015. 
 The chapter will first analyse the impact on the nature of party 
membership for those primaries in 1995 and 2006 that match the Controlled 
Democratization type. The second part of the chapter will study the 2011 
primary classified as a Disempowering Democratization type. The chapter 
finds that most of the framework’s theoretical expectations associated with the 
two types of democratization are supported when one looks at the effect of 
different primary rules on the nature of party membership in the case of the PS. 
While the impact of the 1995 and 2006 primaries on party membership seem to 
have been largely positive in terms of size, turnout, intra-party activism and 
attitude towards the leadership, the consequences of the 2011 open primary 
were from the party membership’s perspective seem more negative overall. 
Following the 2011 primary, membership declined, became more passive, and 
members only provided a very small share of the turnout. Further, the 
membership perceived political efficacy as decreased, and its attitude towards 
the leadership was more negative. Overall, the empirical findings in the case 
study below supports the theoretical expectations derived from the conceptual 
framework for the categories of controlled and disempowering democratization. 
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Background of the Reforms in 1995 and 2009 
Before analysing the consequences of primaries for PS party members, a first 
step is to establish why the party adopted a closed primary in 1995, later on 
reformed a second time and opted for an even more inclusive open primary in 
2009. Here, the approach developed by Cross and Blais (2012) is used. They 
link party factors and changes in a party’s comparative position within the party 
system to the reform of leadership selection methods. With regard to the later, 
they stipulate that an electoral setback for the party, being in opposition and 
following other parties within the system that have already democratized makes 
reform of its leadership selection method more likely. Further, they argue that 
new parties are more likely to have more inclusive selection methods.  
When the PS reformed in 1995, the party still held the presidential post 
but experienced a dramatic electoral setback during the 1993 parliamentary 
election, resulting in the most right-leaning parliament for 100 years (Rene 
Remond in Mitrache, 2011: 75) and the loss of the prime ministerial position to 
the political right. Further, in the polls for the presidential elections the right was 
leading from early 1994 on. Thus, with regard to the first aspect, the party did 
experience an electoral setback but on the legislative and not executive branch 
and, consequently, was in opposition in the legislature. Therefore, aspects one 
and two are met in part. It is further likely that the party hoped, although in vain, 
that adopting the primary in 1995 would avoid electoral defeat in the 1995 
presidential election. However, in case of the second reform in 2009, aspects 
one and two clearly apply. The further opening of intra-party elections only took 
place after a long series of dramatic electoral defeats and setbacks. Further, the 
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party was in opposition in both the legislature (since 2002) and the executive 
(since 1995). 
Figure 6.1 Timeline: French PS 
 1995    2006     2009  
Re-enters opposition   2. Closed primary  Adopts open primary 
Closed primary 
 
 
 
Government  Opposition   Re-enters government 2012 
 
 
With regard to the third aspect, the PS was not a new party when it opted 
for closed primaries in 1995. It was the result of a merger of multiple left parties 
in 1969. In 1995 the PS was also the first party in France to reform its selection 
method, so aspect four ’external contagion effect‘ does not hold in this case. 
However, the second reform in 2011 can be partly explained by external 
contagion, as by then other parties in France also reformed, and the PS wanted 
to maintain its competitive advantage. Further, there also seems to be a case of 
internal contagion. Though contrary to the argument by Cross and Blais (2012), 
this was not triggered by positive experience but rather despite negative 
experiences. 
While for the initial reforms in 1995 a more mixed picture emerges, the 
second reform in 2009 fully reflects the approach by Cross and Blais (2012) 
except for the aspect of party newness. While in 1995 party newness and the 
contagion effect do clearly not apply, electoral setbacks and being in opposition 
are partly confirmed and most likely played a significant factor in the strategic 
consideration to reform. One point not captured by Cross and Blais (2012) but 
often marshalled to explain the reform in 1995 is the fact that the PS lacked a 
clear presidential candidate. The primary was a transparent and fair way to find 
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one (De Luca and Venturino, 2016). Thus, while in 2009 external factors clearly 
provide an explanation for the reform, it seems that in 1995 it was more a mix of 
internal and external factors.  
6.2 The PS 1995 and 2006 in the Conceptual Framework and its Expected 
Effects 
 Returning to the conceptual framework, the following impact on the 
nature of party membership is expected under Controlled Democratization: 
Table 6.1 The Expected Effects for the Closed Primary in 1995 and 2005 in the 
French PS  
Open 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Selectorate – 
Primary Zone 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Controlled 
Democratization 
Overall effect: + 
Membership level  
Existing: - New: + 
Quality of membership 
Existing: -New: + 
 Attitude towards leadership 
Existing: - New: + 
Turnout in primary 
Existing: high New: high 
Closed Permissive              Candidate Requirements             Strict 
Explanation: (-): decrease ;(o): stays the same ;(+): increase 
 
The overall effect should be positive. The use of the primary should attract new 
members, improve the quality of membership and its attitude towards the 
leadership. Further, turnout should be high. However, as the table suggests, we 
 184 
 
should see partly different effects on new and existing members with the latter 
being more sceptical about the reforms. The next section discusses, first, the 
findings for the membership level and turnout, before it turns towards the quality 
of membership and attitude towards the leadership. Finally, the section 
discusses the unique profile of the new members that joined during the 2006 
recruitment drive, and whether they differ from the existing membership.  
Membership Level 
 Looking at the overall trend of party membership, it can be seen that 
while party membership is lower than in the past, it fluctuates significantly. In 
order to better understand these fluctuations, the section discusses the overall 
membership trend, inflow of new members and outflow of existing members 
separately.40 While new members are defined as members that joined in the 
year the use of the primary was announced, while existing members are those 
who were in the party before. By the end of 1994, the year before the first 
primary, the PS had 102,991 members (figure 6.2). However, by the time the 
party voted on 5 February 1995, 112,681 members were entitled to vote. Thus, 
the party managed to attract 9,690 new members in the few months between 
the announcement of the primary and the vote itself. The increase in party 
membership in the PS continued until 1999, before it started to decline again, 
reaching 133,831 in the year just before the next primary and the ’20-Euro-one-
year-membership‘ recruitment drive. Returning to 1995, it can be observed that, 
                                            
40
 A decline of existing members is given, if the numbers of members at the end of year or the 
year following it, is lower than the base membership level in the year before, as this means not 
only that new members left after the primary but also that members who were in the pay before. 
Some of these members might have died, rather than voluntarily left the party. But, for example, 
in 1995, this would imply the death of nearly 10,000 members. Taking the German CSU, which 
has a similar size as the PS of 1995, it reports that on average 1.2 per cent of members leave 
because of death. That would be about 1,352 of PS members in 1995.The remaining about 
8,650 members can assumed to be existing members that left. 
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while at the beginning of the year, the party managed to recruit new members, 
by the end of the year party membership actually declined relatively to the year 
before by 19,078, before increasing again by 17,933 in 1996. It seems that 
some existing members decided to leave the party after the adoption of the 
primary and its outcome. This already points to a more negative reception of the 
reform by existing members and might be reflective of a large-scale change in 
the nature of the PS party membership. If so, this should become visible in the 
survey responses discussed below. The use of an all membership vote to 
determine the new party leader for the first time in 1995 probably also partly 
contributed to the increase in membership during the second half of the 1990s. 
The survey also asked, in the case members re-joined the party, when they did 
so. It can be seen that re-entry rate between 1994 and 1996 is very high 
compared to other years, and even years with a presidential election. Thus, 
while it is normal that membership increases and members re-join in years with 
presidential elections, the rate was much higher than usual. So there probably 
was a further incentive, most likely the primary, that made former disillusioned 
members re-join the party.  
 As mentioned above, by 2005, the year before the next closed 
presidential primary, membership dropped to 133,831. In comparison to the 
previous primary, the party had more experience and time to prepare. Thus, it 
opted to adopted the ’20-Euro-one-year-membership‘ recruitment drive to 
increase the electorate of the primary and the legitimacy of the new presidential 
candidate, as he/ she would be voted by a larger and more divers section of the 
population. The drive was highly successful, and on the day of the primary on 
the 16 November 220,269 PS members were eligible to vote. However, by the 
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end of the year the party’s membership was again slightly lower with 218,771. 
Thus, while the party managed to recruit new members, some of the existing 
members also left the party. In the following year 2007, the year of presidential 
election, the party again managed to attract new members reaching 239,520. 
This was the highest membership count since 1947. 
Overall, it can be seen that there is an association between the new 
incentive provided by the party to determine the presidential candidate by an all 
its membership vote (closed primaries) and the recruitment of new members for 
the party. It can also be seen that some existing members left the party in the 
year of the primary. Thus, so far, the case of the PS seems to confirm the 
expectations of the conceptual framework. 
Figure 6.2 Membership Development in the PS 1944-2014 
 
Source: Delwit, P. (2015), ‘Party Membership Figures. France 1944-2014’. 
MAPP Project Data Archive [www.projectmapp.eu], Sandri et al. (2015), Le 
Monde (2015) 
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Turnout in Primary 
 The second indicator to look at is turnout. The section looks at the overall 
turnout and the share of turnout among existing and new members. The primary 
is often considered to be a new incentive for people to join the party, and in 
many cases, it is combined with a recruitment drive. Thus, it can be assumed 
that most if not all members who joined in the year of the primary will vote in it, 
as this probably was their main motivation to join. The split of the turnout into 
the two sub-groups also reveals who dominated the process, and whether the 
voice of existing members is crowded out or not. In 1995, turnout was high with 
73.4 per cent (De Luca and Venturino, 2016). Assuming that all members that 
joined since the end of 1994 also voted, they provide 11.72 per cent of the 
turnout and 8.5 per cent of the total party membership. Thus, existing 
membership with 88.28 per cent of the turnout clearly dominated and had the 
decisive power in the primary. Existing members made up 91.4 per cent of the 
total party membership. In 2006, overall turnout is even higher with 81.97 per 
cent. As mentioned above, the party managed to attract 86,438 new members, 
this is 39.24 per cent of the overall membership. Assuming that all new 
members voted, they would provide a share of 47.87 per cent of the overall 
turnout. In contrast, existing party membership in 2006 made up 60.76 per cent 
of the total party membership and 74.12 per cent of the turnout.  
Table 6.2 Turnout in PS Primary 1995 and 2006 
Year Number of 
candidates 
Turnout 
1995 2 Overall turnout: 73.4 per cent 
Share of turnout existing members: 88.28 per cent 
Share of turnout new members: 11.72 per cent 
2006 3 Overall turnout: 81.97 per cent 
Share of turnout existing members: 60.76 per cent 
Share of turnout new members: 47.87 per cent 
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The turnout rates in the PS primaries from 1995 and 2006 are in line with 
the theoretical expectations of the framework. In both, overall turnout is very 
high and both sub-groups participate proportionally to their overall membership 
share. However, in 2006 the power of existing membership is more reduced 
compared 1995, and new members have a more substantial influence on the 
outcome of the primary. This shows the potential negative effect of recruitment 
drives on the shares of the turnout. While the existing membership still 
represents the larger and decisive part of the selectorate, its power is reduced 
in favour of new often more docile and short-term party members (Cross and 
Young, 2004). Whether this translates into a lower quality of membership and 
more negative attitude towards the leadership will be discussed in the next 
section.  
Quality of Membership 
 Following the analysis of the two quantitative indicators of membership 
size and turnout, the next section investigates the quality of membership. First, 
it looks if there is an association between the change in the motivation to join 
the party and the introduction of the primary, and, second, how this relates to 
the type and intensity of participation among members. The surveys of the PS 
members included items comparing membership activity within the party and 
within other voluntary associations. The following section also includes these 
items to see whether party membership activity is slowly replaced by activities 
in other voluntary associations, as it might not be seen as effective any more.  
 According to the analytical framework, the quality of membership 
should decrease as many mid-level activists invest less resources into the 
 189 
 
party, as the previous reward to select the next party leaders in a delegate 
meeting is removed (Sandri, 2011). This might also encourage some more 
passive, existing members to become more active, as it could re-motivate them. 
Further, new members that joined and paid the full membership fee should 
invest time into the party to gain a return on their investment (Scarrow, 1995). 
However, due to lower fees for new members in 2006, they need to invest less 
time to regain their cost of membership resulting in more passive new 
members. Nevertheless, overall the move to a closed primary should have a 
positive impact on the quality of membership. The next section, first, looks at 
how this is reflected in the motivation to join the party, and, second, in the type 
and intensity of intra-party participation. The next section is mainly based on 
two membership surveys conducted in 1986 (pre-primary) and 1998 (post-
primary) (Rey and Subileau, 1991, Subileau et al., 1999). 
Motivation to Join the Party 1986 and 1998 
 As outlined before, to study the different motivations to join a party, the 
project uses the general-incentive model developed by Seyd and Whiteley 
(1992). The model suggests seven distinct incentives that can be captured with 
different survey items. While both surveys include items to capture most 
incentives, they do not necessarily use the same questions to capture these 
incentives. Nevertheless, the questions used are mostly comparable across 
surveys, as they represent only different measures for the same incentive. 
Thus, changes in the overall increase or decrease of the incentive—rather than 
the individual items—can be traced and allows capturing broader developments 
in the motivation to join the party before and after the introduction of the closed 
primary. 
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 The first incentives to look at are selective-outcome incentives. This 
category identifies members who joined mainly for personal gain. It can be seen 
that while in 1986, 41.8 per cent joined with the ambition to take up a party and/ 
or public office, in 1998 the figure rose to 57.5 per cent. Nearly equal shares of 
new and existing members state this as an important reason to join the party. 
This points to a continuous professionalization of the party and its membership. 
The next incentives are selective-process incentives. Here members join to be 
part of the political process itself finding it enjoyable. Thus, the party is seen as 
a place to socialize. In 1985, 69.1 per cent joined the party to meet like-minded 
people, and, in 1998, 89.2 per cent agreed with the statement that the party is a 
good place to meet interesting people. Support for this statement is slightly 
stronger among new members. It seems that, compared to 1998, the party is 
increasingly more perceived as a social space than before. It seems there are 
two parallel developments pointing into opposite directions among members, on 
the one side, there are more professional members and, on the other side, 
there are more social members, leaving less and less room in between, a room 
traditionally occupied by the classical party activist. The third incentives are 
collective political incentives. Here, members are motivated by promoting party 
policies and a vision of the party acting for the collective good mainly by winning 
elections. Thus, while in 1986, 78.8 per cent claimed they joined the party to 
support it to win the election; this figure further increases in 1998 to 82.7 per 
cent. Also, both new and existing members are equally motivated by this 
incentive. Further, the members that joined to promote the party’s aims and 
thus contribute to transforming society rose from 90.5 per cent in 1986 to 93.65 
in 1998. Again, both new and existing members share this incentive as a main 
motivation to join the party. To achieve this aim, members need to be active, 
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which should be positive for the party. Thus, whether the rise in these 
incentives, requiring active participation to fulfil, is also reflected in actually 
higher levels of participation is discussed below. Another incentive to look at is 
normative incentives. They capture whether members join on the grounds of 
external societal pressure and norms rather than their will to do so. In 1998, 
24.4 per cent stated that they joined the party to continue family tradition, this 
number decreased to 19.9 per cent a bit more than ten years later. While in 
1998 still 20.5 per cent of the existing members list this as an important reason 
to join, only 16.3 per cent of new members do so. This should contribute to a 
decline in passive members, who just joined due to family pressure and thus 
have a positive effect on party membership. Altruistic motives are important for 
people who join the party to express their support for abstract and idealistic 
goals. Thus, rather than to join for specific policy goals, they join based on more 
moral grounds. Unfortunately, there is no relevant directly comparable item in 
the two surveys. However, in 1986, 43 per cent stated that an important reason 
to join is to be a better citizen, while in 1998 82.2 per cent joined, because they 
“care for other people”. This was equally strong between new and existing 
members. Thus, while it is difficult to say, whether altruistic incentives increase 
or not, it is clear that they still play an important role in the decision to join the 
party. The last incentives are ideological incentives. Here, members join to give 
expression of their deeply held believes and, thus, to influence the course of the 
party accordingly. The surveys show that this was and remains a very important 
motivation to join the party among all members. Following Whiteley et al. 
(1994b), in the case of the PS the high level of ideological incentives is further 
reflected in high levels of process incentives. 
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When asked during the interviews what their main incentive to join was, a 
very similar picture emerged to the one drawn by the surveys. Many long-term 
members stated that they joined because of a “desire to change society” 
(activist-member since mid-1970s) or to “advance my convictions” (elite 
member since 1992), and only one member stated that a main motivation to join 
was to run as candidate in the local elections (activist and former elite-member 
since 1981). In contrast, members who joined later clearly stated their 
motivation to join was influenced by the option of being a candidate; one even 
stated that “I decided to run for an elected office […] so I said to myself that in 
order to be elected it would be useful to become actually a member of the party” 
(elite-member since 2006). Overall, there is little change in the motivation to join 
the party. Further, there is only a small difference between new and existing 
members. Nevertheless, the party attracted more new, more career-oriented 
members than before without this becoming the dominant incentive to join the 
party. Also, process and collective incentives increased, while normative 
incentives decreased. All this should contribute to an increase in intra-party 
participation. Whether this really transformed the case or just produced more 
social but passive members is discussed in the next section by looking at 
changes in the type and intensity of membership participation. 
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Table 6.3 Motivation to Join the French PS 1986 and 1998 (All, Existing and 
New) 
Types of 
incentive 
to join the 
party 
Measurements 1985 1998 1998 
 All All Existing New 
N 4319 2000 
(12,000) 
1409 473 
Selective-
outcome 
incentives 
- To gain a public mandate 
 
- To gain a party office 
 
- To gain a public or party 
office 
 
 
 
 
41.8 
29.8 
 
27.7 
29.6 
 
28.3 
29.6 
 
26.5 
Selective-
process 
incentives 
- To meet nice people 
(agree-disagree five point 
Likert scale) 
 
- To meet like-minded people  
 
 
69.1 
89.2 88.2 91.5 
Collective 
political 
incentives 
- To promote the aims of the 
party 
(to participated in the 
transformation of society) 
 
- To increase the influence of 
the party 
(to win elections) 
90.5 
 
 
78.8 
93.6 
 
 
82.7 
93.7 
 
 
83.2 
92.4 
 
 
82.1 
Normative 
incentives 
- Through the influence of 
family and friends 
24.4 19.9 20.5 16.3 
Altruistic 
motives 
- To fulfil my responsibility as 
citizen 
43 82.3 82.3 81.2 
Ideological 
incentives 
- To influence the political 
course of the party 
87.5 88.0 88.0 88.8 
1) all values in per cent, 2) “very important” or “important” motivation to join the 
party 
Intra-party Participation 
 The above showed that more people join for career reasons, and 
because they enjoy political work. Both motivations are usually associated with 
higher membership participation especially in high intensity activities, such as 
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running or holding a party of public office. A good starting point to analyse the 
level of participation is to ask members whether they consider themselves to be 
an active member or not. In 1985, 17.5 per cent described themselves as 
passive, 27.4 per cent as occasional and 51.9 per cent as active party 
members. In 1998, the passive and occasional membership slightly decreased 
to 16.6 per cent and 23.7 per cent respectively, and active membership 
increased to 57.1 per cent. When looking at new and existing members 
separately, existing members see themselves as considerably more active with 
60 per cent and only 14 per cent as passive members, in comparison to 49.3 
per cent of active new members and 22.4 per cent of passive new members. 
Thus, so far, it seems the primary re-activated existing members, and new 
members are more passive. To verify this trend further, the next step is to look 
at how many hours member states they spend working for the party.  
 While in 1985, the survey asked how many hours they spent working per 
week, in 1998 the survey asked for an monthly estimate. In order to be 
comparable, the responses from 1986 are multiplied by four to account for the 
amount worked for the party in a month. Nevertheless, direct comparisons are 
very difficult between the two surveys. Comparing 1986 and 1998, it seems that 
members spend much less time working for the party than before. The fact that 
the survey question was changed from a weekly to a monthly estimate is 
probably further evidence for this. However, it is possible to compare the hours 
spent working for the party by existing and new members for 1998. 
Interestingly, there are nearly no differences between the two groups. Thus, 
over time existing members became more passive, and former activists were 
not replaced by new ones. If we compare this to the amount of time members 
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spent working for the party to other voluntary associations, we can see that 36 
per cent in 1986 and 48.7 per cent in 1998 stated they spent most time working 
for the party compared to trade unions or other associations. Looking at existing 
and new members separately, while in the former group 40.8 per cent claimed 
to spend more time working for the party compared to other associations, this 
drops to 34.7 per cent among new members. Further, in 1998 37 per cent 
stated they spent more time working for other type of associations in contrast to 
only 23 per cent in 1986.  
 In addition to looking at how much time party members work for the 
party, the next section looks at what type of activities members engage in. The 
section first looks at low intensity activities, such as attending a party meeting or 
knocking on doors, and then high intensity activities, such as running or holding 
party or public offices. The only survey item that measure low intensity activities 
in both surveys refers to the attendance of local party meetings. There is little 
difference between 1986 and 1998 with about 70 per cent of all members (both 
existing and new) attending party meetings on a regular basis. The 1998 survey 
has some more items measuring low intensity activities that can provide an 
insight into whether existing and new members participate in different activities. 
When asked, whether they had signed a petition of the party or a petition that 
the party supported in the past five years, 80.3 per cent of all members said 
they did. Existing members are more likely to sign a petition with 83.1 per cent 
in comparison to 73.6 per cent among new members. When asked, whether 
they had donated extra money to the part in the past five years, 54.3 per cent 
had donated extra money to the party in the past five. The readiness to give 
more is higher among existing members with 59.5 per cent in comparison to 
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38.3 per cent among new members. Further 79 per cent stated that they have 
distributed party fliers during the last election camping with 81.4 per cent of 
existing members and 74.0 of the new members. Thus, it seems that overall 
party membership is less active in 1998 than in 1986, but members still 
regularly attended party meetings. Further, there seems to be little difference in 
the hours new and existing members spent working for the party in 1998, but 
new members are less involved in low intensity actives than existing members. 
Whether or not new party members rather spent more time in high intensity 
actives and are more career-oriented is discussed next.  
As mentioned above, high intensity activities are defined as holding or 
running for a public or/ and party office. In 1986, 20 per cent claimed that they  
currently hold a position within the party, while in 1998 the number rose to 23.3 
per cent with 27.9 per cent of the old members and 10.6 per cent of the new 
members. When looking at whether members have or had a public office, 27.6 
per cent answered with yes in 1986. In contrast, in 1998, 40.5 per cent reported 
to either have or had a public office. Looking at new and existing members 
separately, it can be seen that 48.5 per cent of all existing members and 26.6 
per cent of new members either have or had a public office. The latter is very 
high considering that they only joined the party over the past four years. This 
supports the finding that new members are generally more career-oriented. This 
is further supported by the fact that 18.8 per cent of all new members were a 
candidate in an election for a party office and 20.1 per cent for a public office in 
the past five year, compared to 34.7 per cent and 37.5 per cent of existing 
members. Thus it seems that party members and especially new party 
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members seem to be more active in high intensity activities rather than low 
intensity ones, pointing towards a professionalization of the party.  
Returning to the framework, the expectations for membership quality are 
only partly met, while indeed the primaries seem to have positively associated 
with the quality of new members, as they attracted highly active members. 
However, the negative consequences on existing members manifest in less 
participation cannot be observed.  
This positive relation between the move to primaries is also confirmed by 
the members during the interviews. One of them, a member since 1992, who 
took part in the 1995 primary, reported that “with the opening of the primary in 
1995 legitimacy increased, it created a dynamic among party member; they 
kept their claim over the power and influence in the life of the party to choose 
this person”. Another long-term activist stated “indeed, it [the primary in 1995] 
gave more power to the activist and this is good” (former elite and activist since 
1981). Despite continuous involvement, it might be that existing members are 
less satisfied with their membership and influence than in the past. 
Consequently, the next section looks at the attitude of party membership 
towards the leadership.  
Membership Attitude and External Efficacy 
 After having discussed how the shift towards closed primaries relates to 
changes in the quality of membership in terms of motivation to join the party and 
members’ patterns of activity, the next section discusses the influence on the 
attitude of the party membership towards the party leadership. The surveys of 
PS members also included items comparing membership satisfaction and 
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perceived influence in the party and within other voluntary associations. The 
following section also includes these items to see how party membership 
satisfaction and perceived influence in parties compares and changes relative 
to other voluntary associations. Overall, a positive attitude can be expected as 
now members are allowed to directly vote for the leader and, thus, should feel 
empowered. However, when looking at new and existing members separately, 
the latter sub-group is more likely to be negatively affected, as activists lose 
their exclusive right to determine the leader during the party congress, and their 
voice is reduced by the vote of the entire membership. As discussed in chapter 
two, the project uses the external-efficacy model suggested by Craig et al. 
(1990) It is mainly based on survey items asking about the perceived influence 
of party membership, and whether their needs are listen to or not. 
 A first useful indicator to look at is the overall level of satisfaction among 
party members. In 1986, 70.9 per cent were satisfied with their party 
membership, while in 1998 this increased to 79.9 per cent. When looking at the 
two sub-group separately, the satisfaction among existing members seems to 
be higher than among new members with 81.9 per cent and 75.3 per cent 
respectively. In comparison to other voluntary associations, in 1986 25 per cent 
said that working for the party was the most satisfying. In 1998 the number 
increased to 29.7 per cent with 30.2 per cent of existing and 28.5 per cent of 
new members. Thus, so far, it seems that the primaries had a positive effect on 
the overall attitude of party membership. The next questions look closer at the 
relationship between ordinary members and the party elite.  
The first question in this regard is to ask who usually takes the decisions 
in the local party section. In 1986, 47 per cent stated it is either local party elite 
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or elected officials. A similar picture emerges at the regional level with 41.1 per 
cent. In addition, in 1986, only 28.3 per cent felt they had influence on elected 
officials, and 31.9 per cent claimed to have any influence in the party, one had 
to be an elected official, and a further 54.1 per cent said it is not necessary but 
very helpful. A similar question asked in 1998 showed that only 35.7 per cent 
felt they could influence elected officials. While 38.5 per cent of the existing 
members felt they had influence, only 26 per cent of the new members felt they 
did. In 1998, still 37.6 per cent of all members thought that one had to be an 
elected official, and 49.9 per cent agreed that it was very helpful to have 
influence in the party. Looking at the two sub-groups, 32.1 per cent of new 
members and 39.7 per cent of existing members thought one had to be an 
elected official to have influence in the party, 51.6 per cent of new and 49.5 per 
cent of existing members thought it was not necessary but very helpful. This is 
further supported by the fact that in 1998, 73.6 per cent agreed with the 
statement that the party leadership did not care much about the views of the 
members, and a further 77 per cent agreed with the statement that the 
leadership cared more about voters than party members. New members were 
less negative about the leadership with 68.1 per cent agreeing with the 
statement that the party leadership did not care much about the views of the 
members and 72.1 per cent agreeing with the statement that the leadership 
cared more about voters than party members compared to 75.8 per cent and 
78.5 per cent of the existing members respectively. In addition, in 1998, only 
38.5 per cent were satisfied with the listening skills of the party leaders. In line 
with the above, new members were more satisfied with 43.8 per cent compared 
to existing members with 35.9 per cent with the leadership’s capacity to listen to 
members. This is further supported by the fact that in 1986 46.0 per cent of 
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respondents felt that elected officials saw party members only as “electoral tool” 
and only just above 50 per cent were satisfied with the relation between 
members and the party’s elected officials. In 1998, the share of members that 
felt elected official saw party members only as “electoral tool” rose to 54.9 per 
cent with this view slightly more pronounced among existing members. 
Nevertheless, in 1986 compared to other voluntary associations, they saw party 
membership as the most important activity and invested substantially more time 
in volunteering for the party compared to other associations. Overall, in 1998, 
party members still spent most time working for the party, but when looking at 
the two sub-groups separately, this is only the case for existing members and 
new members spent slightly less time working for the party compared to 
working for other associations. 
It is also interesting to note that in 1986, the satisfaction with the internal 
democratic functioning of the party was low, with 66 per cent of responses 
stating that internal problems of the PS were a frequent topic during party 
meetings; 70.1 per cent felt that activities of the party membership were not 
recognized enough and 79.1 per cent felt their main function in the party was to 
support the government in comparison to only 34.7 per cent who feel their main 
function was to contribute to the political debate. This only improved slightly in 
1998, as members were only reasonably satisfied with the democratic 
functioning of the party with 59.6 per cent. New members were more satisfied 
with 62.3 per cent compared to 58.4 per cent of existing members. On the other 
end of the scale, 37.7 per cent of all members were not satisfied with 39 per 
cent of existing members and 34.9 per cent of new members not being satisfied 
with the democratic functioning of the party. 
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As already outlined above, the interview partners clearly expressed that 
the primary had a positive impact on membership activity and that this 
translated into a positive impact on the attitude towards the party leadership. 
Thus, one long-term activists stated that “before the 2000s we had the 
impression [...] to be heard and to participate in decisions, to contribute to a 
development that was influenced a bit by the grass-roots” (activist-member 
since mid-1970s). Moreover, another member claimed that in 1995 “party 
activists were rather happy and […] expressed themselves, because Jospin had 
a good campaign and […] had been the leader of the PS for a long time, so he 
had legitimacy” (elite-member since 1992). In addition, he went on to explain 
that even though his favourite candidate did not win, he felt empowered and 
motivated to support the winning candidate, as he was selected in an inclusive 
and democratic manner.  
Overall as suggested by the analytical framework, there seems to be a 
positive link between the attitude of the party membership towards the 
leadership and the new leadership selection method. They were overall more 
satisfied with their membership and their perceived influence on elected officials 
improved. However, members’ perception that one had to be an elected official 
to be heard in the party increased and was especially high among existing 
members. Further, as the framework suggests, the attitude of existing members 
towards the leadership was more likely to be negative, and their level of 
dissatisfaction with the internal democratic functioning of the party was higher. 
Nonetheless, the primary seems to have contributed to the improvement of the 
overall perceived political efficacy of members. 
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The Nature of New Members in 2006 
In 2006, the party decided to use a primary to select its presidential candidate 
for a second time. However, in difference to the 1995 selection, the party 
decided to link it to a recruitment drive by offering a reduced membership fee for 
the first membership year. Returning to the theoretical framework, we expect 
slightly different consequences of controlled democratization with a recruitment 
drive than without such an initiative. In case of a new low-cost membership 
category, membership quality should decline, as new members join only to vote 
rather than to become party activists. In this case, loyalty should be low, and 
large amounts of members should only become active during the leadership 
contests (Young and Cross, 2002). The party conducted a new membership 
survey, which forms the base for the following discussion on the nature of the 
new members attracted in 2006. 
 As outlined above, the primary in 2006 attracted a large amount of new 
voters, and the overall turnout was high. Further, if we assume all new 
members voted, they provided 47.87 per cent of the total turnout. Of the new 
member that joined in 2006, 91.3 per cent were never a member of any political 
party. Of the 10 per cent that were, 30.4 per cent were previously a member of 
the PS. Thus, the recruitment drive did not only attract new members but 
motivated former disillusioned members to re-join. The first aspect to look at is 
what the motivations to join the party were. The dominant motivation was to 
support the upcoming presidential election with 76.3 per cent, to determine the 
next president candidate with 64.6 per cent and to defend the values of the left 
with 60.2 per cent. While only 10.5 per cent stated that the personalities at the 
top of the party were an important reason to join, and only 26.7 per cent joined 
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to fight the right. Thus, it seems that collective political incentives and 
ideological incentives were more important than expressive incentives. Further, 
47.5 per cent joined also, because they had friends in the PS pointing toward 
selective-process incentives. Unfortunately, there is no direct question 
measuring selective-outcome incentives, but as a proxy 11.5 per cent of the 
new members said they were already on an electoral ballot paper at previous 
elections. Thus, they might see joining the party as the next step in their political 
career. As these were all new members, the survey did not ask about past 
membership activities, but about which activities they were most willing to 
engage in the next months. 51.5 per cent would attend a meeting to help with 
specific projects of the party, but only 48 per cent would attend a local party 
meeting and even less, 29.5 per cent, an election event. Only 11 per cent would 
be willing to help with distributing leaflets, and a tiny share of 1.2 per cent were 
willing to knock on doors. In contrast, 82.7 per cent were willing to vote for the 
next presidential candidate of the party. Thus, overall, this new party 
membership seemed to be rather passive and did not engage in many party 
activities. However, 24.1 per cent were willing to be on the ballot paper at a 
local election. Thus, not only were new members more passive, they were 
clearly more career-orientated. All this points towards a decline in membership 
quality among new members. With regard to the attitude of the new members 
towards the party leadership, the fact that 82.7 per cent were willing to vote for 
the next presidential candidate indicates a positive attitude. Unfortunately, there 
are no direct measures for perceived external efficacy in the survey. 
Nevertheless, 76.1 per cent thought the party was transparent and democratic. 
Further 67.3 per cent believed the party was close to the people’s concerns. 
This clearly supports the analytical framework’s expected positive attitude of 
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new members towards the party leadership, as they not only joined to vote for it, 
but also think that the party is close to the people’s needs. In comparison to the 
new members that joined in 1995, they seem to be more passive, more career-
oriented and have a very positive attitude towards the leadership. Thus, overall 
the recruitment drive seems to lead to a lower level of membership quality 
among new members but a positive attitude towards the leadership compared 
to the selection that was not preceded by a recruitment drive. 
When asked about the 2006 primary, all interview partners had a 
comparatively more negative view then after the 1995 primary. While many of 
them believe that the form of the closed primary was great, they are highly 
critical of the parallel large-scale recruitment drive and its impact on the nature 
of party membership. The following statement probably summarises best the 
feeling among existing members: ”The primary of 2006 with its membership for 
20 Euros produced the feeling that internal democracy had been confiscated 
and therefore led to a result that wasn't completely legitimate”. He further 
outlines how disappointed most activists were afterwards: “There was a great 
debate afterwards, because, we said yes ok, but it's too easy, why they pay 20 
Euros and we pay more, [...], it [the selection process] did not go well” (elite-
member since 1992). With regard to long-term membership, one interviewee 
said that “we gained five or six members in addition, and I would say that three 
or two stayed. [...] people have been interested in that moment so they just 
wanted to join to vote, after they did not renew their membership” (member 
since 1981). This is confirmed by other members who stated, for example, that 
in 2006 "there were a lot of people who participated in the selections and after 
did not renew their membership” (activist-member since 2004). And one said 
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that the debate surrounding the 2006 primaries was very negative with the main 
arguments against it being the “Americanization of French politics, elitist 
personalization that would push ideas into the background […] and the 
dispossession of the power of part activists” (activist-member since 2002). 
Thus, it seems, while the idea of a closed primary is welcomed by existing and 
new members alike, the combination of it with a large recruitment drive, creating 
two types of membership with equal rights at different cost, is seen more 
negative by members. Not only did this not contribute to any long-term 
membership growth, it considerably undermined the power of existing members 
during the primary.  
Summary of the Consequences of the Closed Primary 
 The above discussion of the effect of the closed primary on the PS party 
membership highlighted the overall positive consequences of primaries under 
Controlled Democratization (strict candidacy/ closed primary). Both leadership 
contests in 1995 and 2006 are associated with higher levels of party 
membership size and produced high turnouts. It also seems to confirm the 
expectation for the two sub-groups of existing and new members. While new 
members flowed in, some existing one left, and the share of the turnout was 
proportional to the share of overall party membership among the two groups. 
Further, the empirical discussion of the PS also supported the expectations of 
an improved attitude of the party membership towards the leadership, while 
existing members’ attitude toward the leadership were more negative and 
showed a higher level of dissatisfaction with the internal democratic functioning 
of the party. The expectations for membership quality are only partly met. While 
indeed, the primary seems to have be positively related to the quality of new 
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members, as it attracted highly active members, the negative consequences on 
existing members in form of less participation cannot be observed in the 1995 
survey.  
 The 2006 survey conducted among new members gave further support 
to the theoretical expectations of the framework with regard to new members. In 
addition, as can be seen by the interviews, many existing members were deeply 
dissatisfied with the 2006 primary and especially with the recruitment drive. 
Thus, the recruitment drive seems to have had negative effect on the attitude of 
existing members towards the party leadership.  
 Overall, the effect seems positive, as the membership, especially the 
existing members, continue to hold the deciding vote on who will lead the party, 
and their voice is not crowded out by a large external selectorate. However, the 
elite can still limit the list of candidates and thus contain unwanted outcomes. 
This combination leads to a clearly defined and distinct selectorate and provides 
the elite with extensive control over the process. Hence, even though, this is a 
more democratic method in comparison to others, such as delegate meetings, it 
overall remains highly controlled by both sides (Indriðason and Kristinsson, 
2013). 
6.3 The PS 2011 Primary in the Conceptual Framework and its Expected 
Effects 
 After the two closed primaries in 1995 and 2006, the party decided to go 
a step further, and adopted an open primary to determine its next presidential 
candidate in an all membership vote with 67.91 per cent of all members in 2009 
(Libération.fr, 2009). The first time the party used it was in 2011. The next 
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section discusses the impact this shift had on party members in from a closed to 
an open primary. Returning to the conceptual framework outlined above, the 
following consequences for members are expected, when using an open 
primary: 
Table 6.4 The Expected Effects for the Open Primary 2011 in the French PS 
Open 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Selectorate – 
Primary Zone 
 Disempowering 
Democratization 
Overall effect: - 
Membership level  
Existing: - New: + 
Quality of membership 
Existing: - New: - 
Attitude towards leadership 
Existing: - New: +  
Turnout in primary 
Existing: low New: high 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Closed Permissive             Candidate Requirements              Strict 
Explanation: (-): decrease ;(o): stays the same ;(+): increase 
 
The overall effect is expected to be negative with a lower level of 
membership, a lower quality of membership, a low turnout with a low share of 
party membership and even lower share of existing members and finally mostly 
negative attitude towards the party leadership. The data used here are the PS 
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membership surveys conducted by Dargent and Rey (2014)41 and Subileau et 
al. (1999). The next section starts by disussing the potential impact of the open 
primary on the membership level and turmout, before turning to mebership 
quality and the attitude towards leadership. 
Membership Level 
In 2008, after the closed primary, party membership peaked at 232,511. The 
highest membership level since the late 1940s. However, the membership size 
soon dropped again to 145,361 in 2010, the year before the open primary. 
Despite no real new incentive to join the party, as one could vote without being 
a member, membership size increased to 174,022 (Parti Socialist, 2012) by the 
end of 2011. Thus, in the year of the primary, 28,661 new members joined. This 
already points to the importance of other incentives to join among these new 
members, in addition to or instead of voting in the primary. However, growth 
was short lived and membership figures declined again in the following year and 
declined since. It is interesting to see that even in the year of the presidential 
election 2012, in which parties normally experience membership growth, party 
membership already started to decline again. This might be explained by the 
fact that many members were disappointed by the outcome and felt their voice 
was crowded out by the large external selectorate. Thus, in protest some 
members, probably mainly long-term activists, left the party. 
 
 
                                            
41
 The authors did not supply me with a full data set but only the frequencies of responses per 
survey item. Therefore, it was not possible to study the effect separately for new and existing 
members in this section. 
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Figure 6.3 Membership Development PS 1995-2014 
 
Source: Delwit, P. (2015), ‘Party Membership Figures. France 1944-2014’. 
MAPP Project Data Archive [www.projectmapp.eu]. Sandri et al. 2015, (Laurent, 
2015) 
 
 The case of the PS seems to support the suggestion of the analytical 
framework that the use of an open primary should reduce party membership in 
the long run. Further, it seems also to support the expectations for the two-sub-
group with an inflow, albeit limited, of new members during the year of the 
primary and a further decline of existing membership. This trend is also outlined 
in the interviews with some reporting that new members joined motivated by the 
primary and existing members leaving because of it. One interviewee claimed 
that in the running up to the primary in 2011 there “were people who really didn't 
want this development and left the party and people who simply did not renew 
their contributions” (former elite and activist-member since 1981). The next 
indicator to look at is turnout.  
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Turnout in Primary 
 In terms of participation, the primary was a big success for the party, as it 
managed to attracted over 2.6 and 2.8 million voters42 in the first and second 
round respectively (Evans and Ivaldi, 2013), together representing about 6 per 
cent of the overall electorate (Boissieu, 2013). This did not only increase the 
legitimacy of the outcome, but the party even made a financial profit from the 
primary. Assuming that all members voted, their share of the turnout would 
have been 6.54 per cent and 6.08 per cent in the second round. The non-
member share of the turnout is 93.5 per cent in the first and 93.92 per cent in 
the second round. The next step is to look at the two sub-groups of new and 
existing members separately. Again assuming that existing membership is the 
level of membership in the year before the primary, their share of the first round 
is 5.5 per cent and 5.08 per cent of the second. In comparison, the share of the 
new members that joined during the year of the primary is 1.07 per cent in the 
first and 1.00 per cent in the second round. Thus, it can be clearly seen that the 
voice of the party membership is literally crowded out, and they are 
disempowered. While during the closed primaries, existing members’ share 
declined over time from 88.38 per cent to 60.76 per cent in 2006, it still 
controlled the decisive share of the vote, which was not the case under the 
open primary. Thus, it can be assumed that turnout among existing members 
would be lower than in the past, especial since they had to pay a one Euro 
voting fee regardless of membership. Further, despite the fact that the main 
incentive for new members to join was probably not only to vote in the primary, 
it nevertheless played an important role, and thus it is likely that most new 
                                            
42
 2,661,231 in the first and 2,860,157 in the second round. EVANS, J. & IVALDI, G. 2013. The 
2012 French presidential elections : the inevitable alternation, Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan. 
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members voted. So far, the theoretical expectations of the framework for 
disempowering democratization in terms of membership development and 
turnout seem to be supported by the case of the PS. The next step is to look if 
there is an association between the introduction of the open primary and 
changes in membership quality and attitude towards the leadership. 
 
Membership Quality and Attitude towards the Leadership 
Motivation to Join the Party 
As outlined in chapter two, the project uses the general-incentive model 
developed by the Seyd and Whiteley (1992) to capture the changes in the 
motivation to join the party before and after the introduction of the open primary. 
While the design of the two surveys follows the general-incentive model, the 
question batteries used, however, slightly differ in questions and scope. Thus, 
to be comparative here the chapter focuses on the seven items covering five of 
the seven incentives.  
The table below shows that the majority of members in 2011 continued to be 
motivated by collective political incentives with over 80 per cent members still 
seeing the party as a good place to meet interesting people. However, this 
number slightly decreased in comparison to 1998. Also less and less people 
join the party to be informed about politics.  
Overall selective-process incentives were declining. Further, selective-
outcome incentives were also declining with considerably less members joining 
the party to either gain a party or public office. This might be related to the 
decline in altruistic motives to join the party with fewer members joining the 
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party in order to change political practice. Thus, they might feel disillusioned 
and do not see the party as an effective way to challenge the existing political 
structure. On a more positive note, members who mainly join to continue the 
family tradition further declined. Overall, it seems that the majority of members 
supported the abstract ideas of the party rather than its concrete policy goals, 
and they were less and less motivated to join in order to actively influence the 
party’s direction. While overall career incentive seems to decrease, many of the 
interviewees said that it seems nevertheless to be a very dominant motivation 
among new members. Thus, one activist claims that the party is “struggling to 
recruit new party activists except for those who want to have a party post or be 
elected, but the party also needs grassroots activists!” (activist-member since 
2004). A new member with elected office even openly admits that “the reason 
why I joined the party is because voters want to know what direction we belong 
to and in an average size city one needs a party machine, the logistics and the 
means to convey my ideas, which explains that I am committed and a member 
of the PS” (elite-member since 2008). In addition, a party activist criticized that 
“today there are people who are elected, who have used the system of the PS, 
its structure and who are not members and once elected, they can do what they 
want and this annoys me greatly” (active member since 2004). This all points to 
a professionalization of the party. 
So far, it seems that there is a negative association between the  open 
primary and the quality of party membership supporting claims by, for example, 
Lefebvre (2011) that open primaries cause an end to the party of party activists. 
As Whiteley et al. (1994) point out, the motivation to join affects the intensity 
and type of activity members are likely to engage in. To get a full picture of how 
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the open primary influences the quality of membership, the next section looks 
exactly at these two indicators. 
Table 6.5 Motivation to Join the French PS 1998 and 2011 (All, Existing and 
New) 
Measurements 1998 2011 
 All All 
N 2000 
(12,000) 
11,000 
Selective-
outcome 
incentives 
- To gain a public mandate 
 
- To gain a party office 
 
29.8 
 
27.7 
23.0 
 
19.1 
Selective-
process 
incentives 
- To meet nice people 
(agree-disagree five point 
Likert scale) 
 
To be informed about politics 
89.2 
 
49.7 
86.8 
 
41.7 
Collective 
political 
incentives 
- To promote the aims of the 
party 
(to participated in the 
transformation of society) 
93.6 92.7 
Normative 
incentives 
- Through the influence of 
family and friends  
19.9 13.2 
Altruistic 
motives 
- To change the political 
practices 
85.8 75.2 
Ideological 
incentives 
-To strengthen a specific 
wing within the party 
- To influence the political 
course of the party 
 
 
 
 
 
1) all values in per cent, 2) “very important” or “important” motivation to join the 
party. 
Intra-Party Participation 
 This section starts by looking at overall participation, then at high 
intensity activities and finishes by comparing the level of activity between the 
PS and other voluntary associations. 
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 Between 1998 and 2011, the number of party activists decreases slightly, 
and the share of sporadic and passive members increased. While, in 1998, 57.1 
per cent classified themselves as active members, this decreased to 52.8 per 
cent in 2011, and the share of ordinary members increased from 16.5 per cent 
to 19.9 per cent.43 This development is further supported by an overall decline 
in the number of members who claim to participate regularly in local party 
meetings, declining from 70.7 per cent to 66.4 per cent, and 9.6 per cent 
compared to 2.3 per cent in 1998 stating that they never attend a local meeting.  
In contrast, it seems the hours individuals invest into the party increased 
moderately. In 1998, 54.2 per cent worked three hours or less, in 2011 this 
decreased to 44.9 per cent. Further, the number of members stating that they 
work more than ten hour per month for the party increased from 10.2 per cent to 
12.2 per cent. Combing the type of party membership variable with the time 
spent working for the party, it can be seen that there is a clear difference 
between ordinary members, activists and members with an official party 
function. Thus, while 69 per cent of ordinary members work less than three 
hours per month, only 26 per cent of those are activists and 15 per cent have an 
official party function. This development might be explained by an increase in 
members engaging in high intensity activities, such as holding an official party 
or elected office. 
 
 
 
                                            
43
 Sporadic party activism remains nearly equal with 24.7 per cent and 25.7 per cent in 1998 
and 2011 respectively. 
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High Intensity Activities 
At first sight the above outlined contradiction between an increase in hours 
spent, despite a reduced attendance of party meetings and a decrease in 
members classifying themselves as activists might be explained by an increase 
in high intensity activities, with fewer members working lots of hours for the 
party. This would also point to a professionalization of the party relying more on 
party officials and public office holders than activists and members. When 
asked whether they were candidates in an internal party election in the past five 
years, in 1998 30.2 per cent said yes, while only 25.1 per cent did in 2011. 
However, when asked whether they currently held a party office, there was a 
small increase from 23.3 per cent to 24.6 per cent of members who held a local, 
federal and/ or national party office. Further, when asked whether they currently 
hold or held a public office in the past, 40.5 per cent answered with yes in 1998 
and 45.8 per cent in 2011. Further, in 2011, 25.2 per cent stated that they ran 
for public elected office in the past five years, while a further 16.8 per cent said 
they were asked by the party to be a candidate. There seems to be less and 
less active party members sharing public and party offices between them. Thus, 
it seems the party is shifting from a party of activists to a party of mainly elected 
officials. This further points to a negative development in the quality of party 
membership. In addition, when asked whether they had donated additional 
money to the party in the past five years, 54.3 per cent stated they did so in 
1998, while only 33.3 per cent agreed in 2011. In contrast, the number of 
members who claimed they distributed leaflets during election campaign 
increased from 79 per cent to 82.4 per cent. This points further to the fact that 
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members are more sporadic activist during elections campaigns and that they 
rarely engage in diverse low intensity activities outside of elections. 
 In terms of membership quality, the last aspect to look at is to compare 
party participation with participation in other voluntary organizations. In 1998, 
38.7 per cent stated they spent most time working for the party; this number 
reduced to 32.1 per cent in 2011. Further, in 2011, only 19.3 per cent reported 
to exercise most responsibilities within the party, while it was 24.5 per cent in 
1998. Thus, party activism among members is more and more replaced by 
either activity in alternative associations or inactivity.  
 The decline in party activism is also a recurring theme in the interviews. 
One long-term member simply states that "there are more [...] passive members 
than activists at the moment” (activist-member since 1981) and even newer 
members report that “activists became demotivated and we arrive at the current 
situation of total abstention. It is interesting that we were forced to resort to the 
primary to choose people (candidates)” (elite-member since about 2008). 
Another long-term member describes the current majority of members as "more 
distant; they pay a fee in order to obtain information, to be invited, participate a 
little, to support by giving money; this is useful for their ideas but they do not 
want to be active members neither in their voting behaviour or commitment to 
the party” (elite-member since 1992). Others claim that membership activities 
only occur during election times (elite-member since 2006), and one activist 
states that due to the lack of party activism in her section, she doubts the 
usefulness of her membership every year before renewing it nevertheless 
(activist-member since 2004). Further, another activist that joined in 2002 
claims that the party membership is becoming more and more depoliticized and 
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that the classical way of PS activism “is over or it exists less, especially in 
people of my generation, [...], it is replaced by something else such as the 
investment in the community of the party branch or municipality. The interviews 
confirm the more and more passive and sporadic nature of party activism in the 
party. Further, it can also be seen that newer members and elites, while 
acknowledging this decline, see it more as a new way of party membership in-
activism.  
Returning to the analytical framework, the tendency of open primaries 
with strict candidacy requirements having a negative association with the quality 
of party membership holds. Overall, members claim they are less active and not 
as much engaged in high intensity activities as they used to be. Further, many 
of them seem to become only active during election times. It can also be seen 
that fewer and fewer members share party and public offices between them. 
Overall then, the shift towards open primaries seems to have further contributed 
to a shift from a party of activists to a party of elected officials, negatively related 
to the quality of grass-root party membership. 
Membership Attitude and External Efficacy 
The last aspect to study is how the perceived level of external efficacy of party 
members changes with the introduction of the open primary. According to the 
theoretical framework, an increasingly negative attitude towards the leadership 
should be expected. 
The first indicator to look at is how this affected satisfaction with party 
membership. In 1998, 79.9 per cent stated that they were very satisfied with 
their party membership; this dropped to 52.5 per cent in 2011. The drop is 
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mainly due to a large decline in very satisfied members from formally 24.4 per 
cent to 10.6 per cent in 2011. Further, the satisfaction of party membership also 
decreased in comparison with the level of satisfaction of the membership in 
comparison to other voluntary originations. While, in 1998, 29.7 per cent 
reported the party was the most satisfying membership the hold, this decreased 
to 20.9 per cent in 2011.  
 The next indicators to look at measure the influence and relationship 
between ordinary members and elected party officials. In 1998, 35.7 per cent of 
members had the feeling they had influence over elected officials. This 
decreased to 30.1 per cent by 2011. Further, in 2011, fewer members had the 
impression that their views were considered by their local candidates in the 
planning of the electoral camping, declining from 39.4 per cent in 1998 to 34.7 
per cent. Further, an increasing number of members, up from 21.85 per cent in 
1998 to 27.3 per cent in 2011, fully agreed with the statement that the party 
leadership did not listen to the party members. In addition, a similar share of 
58.5 per cent in 2011 and 57.7 per cent in 1998 were unhappy with the listening 
ability of party officials. While, in 1998, 5 per cent were very satisfied with the 
listening ability of officials, this dropped to 2.7 per cent in 2011. Also, the 
majority of members continued to agree with the statement that the party is 
more interested in representing voters than its members. Despite all of the 
above, it is interesting to notice that the satisfaction with the quality of the 
functioning of internal democracy only decreased moderately. Thus, while in 
1998, 59.6 per cent were satisfied with the level of IPD (includes 15.9 per cent 
that were very satisfied), in 2011 this is reduced to 56.7 per cent (includes 8.8 
per cent that were very satisfied). A similar picture emerges on the other side of 
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the scale with 37.7 per cent unsatisfied in 1998 and 40.2 per cent in 2011. 
These first findings confirm the negative attitude suggested by the theoretical 
framework.  
When asked about their satisfaction with party membership in the 
interviews, there seems to be a division between newer and long-term 
members. One long-term member states that in the past “four to five years 
membership influence has decreased, and we do not have the impression that 
our wishes, our desires, orientation would lead to anything in reality”. He goes 
on to say that the primary gives only “the impression of occasionally being 
useful, it is only temporary” (member since mid-1970s). Even office holders 
stated that they had the feeling that there were too few party meetings, and 
when they happened, "we have the impression to speak into emptiness and that 
is frustrating for party activists” (elite-member with public office since 2006), or 
they never hear back from Paris (member since 2006). One long-term party 
elite-member admits that “members can have an influence, if they come at the 
right time, in a good discussion with good arguments and they might be able to 
convince a party leader or elected official” (elite- member since 1992). This is 
supported by former activists who felt that to be heard and achieve anything in 
the party, she had to get an elected public office (elite-member since 2002), and 
thus another activist observed that some local party braches only consist of 
elected officials (activist-member since 2002). Another member outlined the 
loss of power to the large external primary electoral by exclaiming that if “I pay 
membership fee or not, I have no extra rank”. The member went on to clearly 
distinguish members and primary voters explaining that they " have not the 
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same ideological background; this can tip the outcome [of the primary] which 
could contradict the will of the members” (activist-member since 2004). 
Thus, the interviews support the trend found in the survey, namely that 
members and especially long-term members feel their external efficacy is 
declining, or they even just have an illusion of influence. Further, the interviews 
confirm the perspective that to achieve something in the party, one needs to be 
a public office holder. In addition, most interview partners felt the influence of 
members in the party was undermined by the large external electorate.  
Overall, it can be seen that the open primary is indeed associated with  a 
decrease in political efficacy, reducing the perceived influence of members over 
its elected officials and diminishing satisfaction with the internal democratic 
working of the party. This trend is supported by the survey results and 
confirmed during the interviews. Together, this seem to produces  a more 
negative attitude towards the party leadership as suggested by the analytical 
framework.  
Summary of the Consequences of the Open Primary 
Overall, the case of the PS (from closed to open primary) seems to 
support the theoretical expectations of the category Disempowering 
Democratization. From a party membership’s perspective, the consequences 
are overall more negative. Membership declines, becomes more passive, and 
members only provide a very small share of the turnout. The interview with 
party members and elites confirmed this development in the nature of party 
membership since the introduction of the open primary. Further, the interviews 
shed some light on the relationship between new and existing members. These 
accounts broadly point to the development suggested by the framework for the 
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two sub-groups. Thus, the process might be more democratic in form but the 
high level of inclusiveness and strict candidate requirements effectively 
disempowers party members and reduces their ability to influence the selection 
process. Further, members were less satisfied with their membership; the level 
of intra-party democracy and their attitude towards the leadership was negative, 
all pointing to a low level of perceived political efficacy among the party 
membership. 
6.4 Conclusion 
Overall, the empirical analysis of the case of the French PS seems to 
confirm the theoretical expectations of the conceptual framework of the two 
categories of controlled and disempowering democratization. The case of the 
PS is very useful in studying the development in party membership associate to 
the two types of primaries, since the party held selections using both open and 
closed primaries. The chapter used both quantitative party membership surveys 
and qualitative membership interviews to study the impact of primaries on 
members. 
The chapter started by providing the background for the reforms that led to 
the adoption of the closed primary in 1995 and the open primary in 2009. It 
showed that external factors stressed by Cross and Blais (2012) clearly 
dominated in 2009, while it seems the lack of a clear candidate played a larger 
role than external factors in 1995. The chapter then continued by analysing the 
impact of adopting a closed primary on the PS membership in 1995 and 2006. 
While both selections fall in the category of controlled democratization, the 2006 
primary had the added feature of a large-scale recruitment drive. The 1998 
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survey results supported the overall positive development of the party 
membership for both new and existing members when using a closed primary. 
Thus, all but one theoretical expectation were supported, as the primary did not 
have the expected negative impact on existing party membership quality but 
rather a positive one. The 2006 survey of new members further confirmed the 
theoretical expectations for this sub-group. Here, it is interesting to note that 
most interview partners were highly critical of the recruitment drive, which points 
to a more negative attitude of the membership towards the leadership than in 
1995 and highlights the need that such recruitment drives as part of primaries 
have to be carefully designed to avoid negative and unintended consequences. 
The second part of the chapter then studied the shift to an open primary in 
2009 and its use in 2011, pushing the party into the category of disempowering 
democratization. Again, the chapter found that the case study confirmed the 
theoretical expectations of the conceptual framework. The consequences from 
the party membership’s perspective seem to be overall more negative. While 
the discrepancy between new and existing members should be lower in open 
primaries compared to closed primaries with a large recruitment drive such as in 
2006, the tension between existing members and primary voters was high. The 
negative effect on existing members and membership overall came more from 
empowering individuals outside of the party rather than the new members that 
joined. However, the discrepancy between existing and new members still 
seems to be persisted. As the framework suggests, the empirical analysis 
showed that membership was declining, became more passive, and members 
only accounted for a very small share of the turnout. Thus, the process might be 
more democratic in form but the high level of inclusiveness and strict candidate 
requirements effectively disempowers party members and their ability to 
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influence the selection process. Further, members are less satisfied with their 
membership; the level of intra-party democracy and their attitude towards the 
leadership is negative resulting in a low level of perceived political efficacy 
among members. In the case of disempowering democratization, the interviews 
highlighted that there is a different conception of what party membership means 
for ordinary members and the elite, with the latter making little if any distinction 
between the views of members and voters, as they assume that the main goal 
for everyone is to win the election, and they think the more open the primary, 
the easier to achieve this aim. Thus, one activist summarized the current nature 
of party membership in the PS in the following way: “Being party activists was 
another form of party activism, as we did not have the same tools available; it is 
not the same thing and it's been very good for its time; party activism has 
evolved because the party has evolved over time; people who join are not the 
same, they have not the same issues in mind”.  
 In conclusion, the chapter further strengthens the usefulness and 
reliability of the conceptual framework developed in this project is for studying 
the impact of different leadership selection rules (in the form of selectorate and 
candidacy requirements) on the nature of party membership. 
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7 Conclusion  
7.1 Introduction 
The study set out to explore how party membership is affected by the use of 
primaries to select the party executive leader. More specifically, the central 
research question was to investigate the consequences of the adoption of 
different type of leadership selection rules for the individual level conception/ 
perception of party membership. The study builds on the so far mainly 
theoretical literature on the effect of primaries for parties and specifically party 
membership. The main theoretical divide is between scholars who see the 
introduction of inclusive leadership selection procedures as negative and those 
who view it as beneficial for the party membership. For example, Katz and Mair 
(1994), Lefebvre (2011) or Hopkin (2001) argue that primaries reduce 
membership power and diminish the role of active members within party 
organization in favour of passive or even non-members. In contrast, others see 
it as a chance to revitalize the party as a membership organization by providing 
a new participatory possibility to members and creating a more direct link to the 
party leadership, which is hoped to increase accountability, legitimacy and to 
empower members (Macpherson, 1977; Ware, 1979; Bille, 2001).  
 
The more detailed analysis presented in this thesis aims to resolve some 
aspects of the current debate in the literature. The central argument put forward 
here is that to reconcile the two opposing views, we have to theorize and then 
empirically study the interplay between the rules determining who can vote 
(selectorate) and who can run (candidacy requirements). The study sought to 
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provide a more detailed and holistic picture of the impact of different types of 
leadership selection rules for party membership by studying its effect on party 
size, turnout in the primary, changes in membership quality and attitude towards 
the leadership. A simultaneous study of these four dimensions does not only 
provide a more differentiated and nuanced understanding of the effect on 
members but transcends the simple argument of primaries as either good or 
bad for members. Further, the study also examines the effects of these reforms 
on existing and new members separately and, thus, offers an even more 
sophisticated insight. This point is based on Hirschman’s argument (1970) that 
organizational changes that aim to attract new members might have different or 
even reverse effects on the existing members of an organization. In short, the 
thesis aimed to challenge the basic assumption that primaries are either good 
or bad for members but rather claims that its positive or negative affect for the 
individual level conception of party membership (Gauja, 2015)—expressed 
through membership level, turnout in primary, membership quality and attitude 
towards the party leadership—depends on the combined effect of candidacy 
and selectorate rules. Thus, the thesis developed a conceptual framework to 
empirically test different hypotheses that reflect different constellation of primary 
rules. This is meant to empirically show that there is no uniform effect of IPD in 
from of primaries on party membership. Thus, for example, as the preceding 
chapters showed, closed primaries with permissive candidate requirements 
have a positive impact on the quality of party membership, while open primaries 
with strict candidate requirements have a negative effect.  
The concluding chapter is structured as follows. It, first, synthesize the 
empirical findings by comparing and contrasting the results of each individual 
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case study with each other. It then discusses the normative and practical 
implications of the findings before outlining their limitations. The chapter ends 
by suggesting various avenues for future research before bringing the thesis to 
a close. 
7.2 Empirical Findings 
This section synthesizes the empirical findings to answer the study’s central 
research question. To do so, it highlights the similarities and differences among 
the findings of the three cases along the four dimensions of membership level, 
turnout in the primary, quality of membership and attitude towards leadership. 
As a reminder, the central research question was to investigate the 
consequences of the adoption of different type of leadership selection rules for 
the individual level conception of party membership. For this purpose, the 
project developed a new conceptual framework outlining the effect on 
membership in terms of size, turnout, quality and attitude based on four distinct 
combinations of candidacy requirements and selectorate rules. These 
combinations produce four different types of intra-party democracy (IPD) from 
the members’ perspective (Table 7.1 on p. 220 below). 
 
Covering disempowering, protected and controlled democratization types of 
IPD, the detailed empirical analysis of the three case studies of German 
Greens, French PS and UK Conservative Party mostly confirmed the expected 
effect put forward by the conceptual framework. As chapter two outlined, the 
study is limited to parties operating in established Western European 
democracies and to parties, which voluntarily adopted primaries rather than 
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them being state imposed. A further practical constraint was the availability of 
pre- and post-reform membership surveys. Due to these limitations, the top left 
box of the category of atomized democratization remains empty. The absence 
of such a case in Europe is also logical, as most reforms were suggested, 
drafted and adopted by the party elite, and no party elite would voluntarily adopt 
a selection system that would lead to a total loss of power and control. Further, 
the cases of the two main US parties that would fit the type of atomized 
democratization are excluded here, as primaries are state imposed and 
regulated. They are also excluded as many scholars point out that the concept 
of party membership in the US is substantially different from the one in the 
European context (Stone et al., 2004; Heidar, 2006).  
In general, the empirical analysis above demonstrated that from a 
membership’s perspective closed primaries are more beneficial than open 
primary, as they have a positive effect on all dimensions of individual level 
membership conception. Further, candidacy requirements seem to reinforce 
either the negative or positive effect of open or closed primaries respectively. 
However, strict and permissive candidate requirements seem to have the 
reverse effect, if combined with selectorate rules. Thus, while permissive 
candidate requirements combined with a closed primary increase the positive 
effect on party members, combined with an open primary it increases the 
negative effects. Overall, from a party membership’s perspective, protected 
democratization represents the most desirable combination of a closed primary 
with permissive candidacy requirements. It does not only include members into 
the decision-making process by providing them with the right to select but 
further empowers them by allowing them to run as candidate. Overall, this type 
has a positive effect on the individual level conception of party membership 
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manifest in an increase in membership size, high turnout, increased 
membership quality and positive attitude towards the leadership. Also, the 
effects for both new and existing members are mainly the same and positive, 
compared to other combinations of rules where they divert substantially. This is 
supported by the empirical findings for the German Greens. Thus, similar to 
democracy at the state level, IPD requires a clearly defined demos but relatively 
unrestricted access for all members of this demos to compete in the selection 
process, if they wish to do so. The second-best scenario for members would be 
controlled democratization. However, this is more in line with Bolleyer and 
Weeks’ (unpublished manuscript: 22) argument that the expansion of 
membership rights in form of voting power can rather more strengthen and 
democratize the organizational structure members are embedded in than 
empower the individual members themselves. Nevertheless, the “reform re-
integrated members into organizational decision-making by giving them a direct 
say about [...] leadership selections” (Bolleyer and Weeks, unpublished 
manuscript: 14). Further Bolleyer and Weeks (unpublished manuscript) claim 
that contrary to the theoretical argument outlined in the literature review, linking 
the use of primaries to strengthen cartel-party model primaries can be part of “a 
movement away from organisational characteristics that theoretical literature 
associates with cartel model of party organisation towards characteristic 
echoing more traditional mass party structures” (Bolleyer and Weeks, 
unpublished manuscript: 2). Thus, primaries can be an effective way to take 
power away from the party in public office and to strengthen the party in central 
office and thereby indirectly or directly the party on the ground.  
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Table 7.1 Four Types of IPD with Indicators and Expected Effects 
Open 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Selectorate – 
Primary Zone 
Atomized Democratization 
Overall effect: -- 
Membership level  
Existing: - New: + 
Quality of membership 
Existing: -New: - 
Attitude towards leadership 
Existing: - New: + 
Turnout in primary 
Existing: low New: high 
Disempowering 
Democratization 
Overall effect: - 
Membership level  
Existing: - New: + 
Quality of membership 
Existing: - New: - 
Attitude towards leadership 
Existing: - New: +  
Turnout in primary 
Existing: low New: high 
Protected Democratization 
Overall effect: ++ 
Membership level 
Existing: o New: + 
Quality of membership 
Existing: + New: + 
Attitude towards leadership 
Existing: + New: + 
Turnout in primary 
Existing: high New: high 
Controlled 
Democratization 
Overall effect: + 
Membership level  
Existing: - New: + 
Quality of membership 
Existing: -New: + 
Attitude towards leadership 
Existing: - New: + 
Turnout in primary 
Existing: high New: high 
Closed Permissive             Candidate Requirements              Strict 
Explanation: (-): decrease ;(o): stays the same ;(+): increase 
 
The only theoretical expectation of the framework not supported here is 
the development of membership quality for existing members after the adoption 
of the closed primary by the PS in 1995. Contrary to the theoretical 
expectations, the primary had a positive effect on the membership quality for 
existing members. However, the case of the UK Conservative is also an 
example of controlled democratization supporting the negative expectations for 
existing party membership quality brought about by the primary. A possible 
explanation might be the two-round system of first MPs and then members 
voting employed by the Conservatives, while the PS only used a direct 
membership vote. Another slight discrepancy from the expected effect is that 
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the membership growth in the German Greens is lower than expected, but 
nevertheless the party increased in size. However, the party experienced 
substantial growth in the years before and since the introduction of the primary. 
Further, it is the only German mainstream party with membership growth. 
The empirical analysis was conducted using a mixed-method case study 
approach combining quantitative pre- and post-reform party membership 
surveys complemented by in-depth qualitative interviews of party members, 
mid-level elites and elites. Such an approach was suitable to examine the 
implications of my framework, because it allowed to analyse how party 
membership changed with the introduction of the primary, and how the reform 
was perceived at the individual membership level. Further, the interviews 
provided contextual and case specific information to fully understand and 
assess the impact of the change in leadership selection rules and to separate 
its effect as much as possible from both other factors that might have similar 
consequences and alternative explanations for changes in party membership 
development. Further, the interviews were opportunities to see to the extent to 
which the survey results are supported by observations and experiences of 
party members. Thus, the use of a mixed-method case study approach 
provided an opportunity to collect a large amount of data combining individual 
level as well as detailed and case specific information. This allowed to examine 
my framework’s suggested implications for party membership brought about by 
changes in leaderships selection rules. 
 
Generalizability of the Findings 
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One central question of research is the generalizability of the result of one’s 
study. Could for example, the positive effects of protected democratisation on 
membership be specific to the case under study? Or could they be specific to 
green parties, small membership parties or highly educated grassroots parties? 
In order to explore the generalizability of the newly developed framework, the 
study expands the small sample used so far to include further cases in each 
category. It covers parties from different party families and continues with 
varying party and political systems. The below brief discussion of additional 
cases should shed light on the question if we find the same associations 
between type of primary and development in party membership in different 
settings and parties. If this is the case, then the newly developed framework 
and findings of this study will be relevant and useful to evaluate the impact of 
primaries on party members more generally in a variety of situations. We expect 
the findings of this study to be relevant for other parties in the same categories. 
The generalizability of the above findings would be further supported if we find 
similar trends in the analysed additional cases below. The likelihood that other 
cases support the theoretical expectations of the framework are higher, if they 
also operate in established democracies, involve mainstream parties (Sartori, 
1976) and point to the voluntary adoption of the same leadership selection rules 
(not state regulated). As the brief discussion of other cases below will show, 
some of these strict criteria can be relaxed, and the framework still seems to be 
effective. Even if parties adopted multiple reforms towards more IPD in a short 
time, the effect of changes to the leadership selection method should have the 
most profound impact on members in an alleged age of presidentialization and 
personalization of politics (Poguntke and Webb, 2005). Overall, this seems to 
support the generalizability of the findings and the possibility to transfer the 
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newly developed framework to other situations with similar leadership selection 
rules in place to explore their effect on party membership. 
Thus, as mentioned above, this section briefly discusses very preliminary 
findings for further examples placed in the here developed framework. It does 
not offer a detailed analysis but rather aims at inspiring future research in the 
area, demonstrating the transferability of the conceptual framework and 
emphasizing its general validity44. The use of examples in the framework below 
indicates its wide reach in terms of political systems and countries and thus 
points to the vast number of potential cases to be explored. 
Table 7.2 Four Types of Primaries with Variety of International Cases45,46 
Open 
 
 
Selectorate – 
Primary Zone 
Atomized Democratization 
US; DP 2007 (I) 
 
 
Disempowering 
Democratization 
PASOK (G); UCR (A) 
Protected Democratization 
Conservatives(C); Greens (Ir) 
Bloc Quebecois (C); PS (P); 
FA (U); PSD (P); PN (U); 
New Dem (C) 
Controlled 
Democratization 
PS (B); Labour (Ir);LibDem 
(UK); PSOE (S); UMP/LR 
(F); PAN (M); PS (B); 
Closed Permissive             Candidate Requirements              Strict 
 
However, the possibility to analysis many of these cases is currently rather 
limited, mainly due to a restricted access to or complete lack of data. This could 
be addressed by the above suggested development of large-scale membership 
surveys. Consequently, the discussion below is restricted due to information 
available from secondary sources, and, thus, it was not always possible to 
                                            
44
 These cases are not selected based on any specific rationale other than their leadership 
selection rules. 
45
 Parties operating in Westminster, presidential, semi-presidential and consensus systems but 
also from a variety of countries: North America, Latin America and Europe. 
46
 A= Argentina, C= Canada, B= Belgium, C= Canada, F= France, G= Greece, Ir = Ireland, I= 
Italy, M= Mexico, P= Portugal, S= Spain, U= Uruguay, UK= United Kingdom. 
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discuss all four indicators in each instance. Nevertheless, with the use of 
proxies, it was possible to provide information for at least three of the four 
indicators in most examples. The cases discussed here are in bold and 
underlined in the table 7.2 above. 
 
Both the US Democrats and Italian Democratic Party (DP) are cases of 
Atomized Democratization with open primaries and permissive candidacy 
requirements.  
The first time the DP used an open primary was in 2007 to select its new 
leader, who later became the prime ministerial candidate in the 2008 general 
election. The candidate requirements were very low and only required 2,000 
signatures of party members. In terms of membership, it amounted to 615,414 
in the year of the primary and rose to 831,042 the year after (Sandri, 2014). 
However, it quickly started to decline again. The turnout was 3,554,169 voters 
composed of party members and (on the day) registered primary voters. If we 
assume that all members of the party voted, they would only amount to 17.3 per 
cent of the turnout. Thus, their voice was crowded out. The quality of the 
membership seems to be relatively high. A survey conducted in 2010 (Sandri, 
2010) showed that 73.9 per cent of members claim to be heavily involved in 
party activities. But a closer look at the types of activities they engage in reveals 
that they are largely very low cost activities (28.9 per cent) or representative 
activities (34.6 per cent). This seems to confirm the idea outlined in the 
conceptual framework that members are either professionals or rather inactive. 
Nevertheless, the survey also showed that 61.8 per cent perceive the chance to 
participate and influence party decision-making as effective. This combined with 
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a high level of 72.8 per cent satisfaction with IPD seems to point to a positive 
image of the party leadership. Thus, for the DP a rather mixed picture emerges 
with a membership in decline and a low turnout of members, a low membership 
quality but a positive membership attitude. 
The US Democrats use primaries to select their presidential candidate, 
but in contrast to most European countries primaries in the US are state 
regulated. Further, they developed—especially since the Fraser-McGovern act 
in 1968—in different states gradually over time rather than being introduced for 
all parts of the country at once (Cohen et al., 2008). In the US, it is more 
common to speak about party-identification rather than party membership. A 
Gallup poll by the Pew Research Centre shows that the Democrat party self-
identification dropped from above 40 per cent in the late 1960’s to just above 30 
per cent by 2010 (The Economist, 2010). A recent study by the American 
University's School of Public Affairs (Gans, 2010) shows that voter turnout in 
primaries dropped since the first primary after the Fraser-McGovern 
Commission Act. While in 1970, average turnout for the Democratic primaries 
was 19.3 per cent, it dropped to 8.3 per cent in 2010. Further, party 
membership quality also seems to have declined, as Americans participate less 
and less in election campaign activities, such as attending meetings, wear a 
button or donate money, since 1968 (Norris, 2002: 117). Norris (2002) also 
points out that the decline of activists within parties since the sixties reflects the 
erosion of grassroots party organizations. Further, looking at the overall external 
efficacy index soccer of the American Election Study, it can be seen that it 
mainly decreased since the Fraser-McGovern Act in 1968. While in 1968, the 
score was 57, in 2012 it was only 36 out of 100 (American National Election 
Studies, 2015). The case of the US Democrats seems to generally support the 
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theoretical suggestions of the conceptual framework for atomized 
democratization. 
 
The case of the 2007 Greek PASOK is an example of disempowering 
democratization, which combines an open primary but highly restrictive 
candidacy requirements. In the year of the primary, party membership rose to 
347,991, but in the years after it already drop again to 210,000 (Van Biezen et 
al., 2012) and further to 156,000 in 2009 (Sotiropoulos, 2013). The turnout with 
78.4 per cent or 769,156 votes was high (Rori, 2010), and the total electorate 
was composed of 347,991 members and 626,675 people in the status of the 
“friend of the party”, resulting in a total electorate of 974,666 (PASOK, 2007). If 
all members voted, they would have amounted to 35.7 per cent of the electorate 
and 45.2 per cent of the turnout. It can be seen that the voice of the members is 
substantially reduced by the large inflow of ’friends of the party‘. Unfortunately, 
the project was unable to find a membership survey for the PASOK case to 
assess the effect on membership quality and attitude. However, for the latter, 
there were various proxies that can be used. Sotiropoulos (2013) describes the 
PASOK leadership style as very hierarchical and closed, and the decisions to 
adopted a primary was taken ad-hoc and by a small circle of trusted advisors. 
He argued that this led to a small circle of party cadres competing for influence 
and party members becoming disheartened (Sotiropoulos 2013). Further polls 
before the primary revealed that PASOK members preferred Venizelos (62.1 
per cent) over Papandreou (25.7 per cent), but the latter won due to large 
external support (Mega News, 2007). Following the above, it can reasonably be 
assumed that the attitude of membership towards the leadership was very 
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negative. Based on these first impressions, the case of the PASOK seems to fit 
the expectations for disempowering democratization. 
 
The Irish Greens and Canadian Conservatives are both cases of protected 
democratization using a closed primary with permissive candidacy 
requirements. 
The Green Party has allowed its membership to vote the party leader 
since 2001. In 1990, the membership level was 1,200. It dropped to 700 in 1998 
but since then recovered and reached 2,000 in 2008 (Mair and van Biezen, 
2001, Van Biezen et al., 2012). Thus, it seems that the introduction of inclusive 
leadership selections had a positive impact. This is further supported by a 
membership survey from 2002, in which 49 per cent claimed to have joined the 
party in the current or past year (Rüdig, forthcoming). The same survey 
revealed that 90 per cent claimed to be strong party supporters and only 18 per 
cent stated to not have attended a party meeting in the past 12 months (Rüdig, 
forthcoming). In comparison to other European Green parties, this is a very high 
rate of participation and party support (Rüdig, forthcoming). Membership loyalty 
is average with 30 per cent of the respondents maintaining to be a party 
member for 5 years or more. Beside the high quality of party membership, the 
attitude towards the party leadership seems also positive as 82 per cent stated 
to be in favour of a single party leader (Rüdig, forthcoming); a position that did 
not exist in the Irish Green Party until 2001. Due to the small number of party 
members at the time, it can be assumed that most attended the vote and thus 
voter turnout was high.  
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The Canadian Conservative party moved to a full membership selection 
in 1995 and used it for the first time in 1998. Its membership figures are hard to 
determine, as they fluctuate extremely between years with and without 
leadership nomination contests (Cross and Young, 2004). Cross and Young 
note that membership levels routinely increase by 200 to 300 per cent in years 
with leadership selection but otherwise are very low (Cross, 2004b: p. 15). In 
the 2000 party membership survey, 45 per cent (Young and Cross, 2002) stated 
that to support the leadership candidate was a very important motivation to join. 
The turnout in 1998 was high in both rounds with 52 per cent of all party 
members voting in the selection (Cross, 2004a: 88). This is high given the 
substantive costs to gain voting rights, as voters have to join the party and pay 
a voting fee. In terms of membership quality, the survey showed that the 
Conservatives have a higher level of engagement in more intensive activities in 
comparison to other Canadian parties: 49 per cent served on riding association 
executives and 88 per cent attended them, 74 per cent helped with electoral 
campaigns and 84 per cent attended nomination meetings. The only party with 
a slightly better performance in some of these indicators is the Liberal Party, 
which used membership votes since 1990. However, when looking at other 
types of intra-party activities members’ engagement seems largely low, both in 
time and/ or financial investment. Nevertheless, overall the quality of party 
membership seems to be high. Unfortunately, direct measures for attitude and 
external efficacy are not accessible, but as a proxy the ideological self-
placement of the members and the party is apposite possibly indicating a 
positive attitude towards the party leadership. Based on this first discussion the 
two cases seem to fit the expectations for protected democratization. 
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The cases of both the Irish Labour Party and Belgium PS are examples of 
controlled democratization using a closed primary and candidacy is highly 
restricted.  
In the Irish case, the party opened its leadership selection process to its 
members in 1989 while keeping strict candidate requirements. Overall, it had 
five leadership selections since then, but only three included a membership 
ballot as the others only had one candidate (Rafter, 2016). In the years after the 
reform, party membership increased from 6,720 to 10,000 by 1992 but quickly 
started to decline over the decade (Webb et al., 2002). Turnout is high with 
approximately 60 per cent or 3,474 (Fitzgerald et al., 2004)47 member in 2002 
and 48.5 per cent in 2014 (2,720 members out of 5,606) (Weeks, 2014) voting 
in the primary. Unfortunately, there are no membership surveys to look at the 
development in membership quality or attitude. 
The Belgium PS has been using internal leadership selection since 1999. 
The 1999 leadership selection did not lead to a membership increase but 
continued decline from 107,581 to 103,713 (Van Haute, 2014). The same 
picture emerges for the 2003 and 2007 leadership selection. Wauters et al. 
(2015) argues that this might be related to the fact that the Belgium parties 
seem not to initiate large recruitment drives before leadership selections. 
Further, they point out (Wauters et al., 2015) that many party activists were 
reluctant to adopted primaries or were even against it, which might have led 
them to exit the party. In terms of turnout, in the first selection in 1999 it reached 
38.7 per cent but since then declined to 35.0 per cent in 2003 and 24.9 per cent 
in 2007. This is relatively low but as Wauters et al. (2015) point out, turnout in 
Belgium leadership selections is generally low reaching from 14.5 per cent to 
                                            
47
 Based on closed membership figures available from 2000 with 5,719 members. 
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67.6 per cent. So the PS is somewhere in the middle. The party membership 
survey form 2010 reveals that party membership activity is relatively high with 
35.4 per cent of all members participating in low cost activities, 23.4 per cent in 
campaign activities, 17.4 per cent in high cost activities and finally 23.8 per cent 
in representative activities (Sandri, 2011). The survey also show that political 
external efficacy is very low among members with 70.5 per cent stating they 
have low or weak perceived efficacy. This combined with the observation by 
Wauters et al.’ (2015) that many activists were sceptical if not against the 
adoption of the primary would suggest a rather negative attitude of party 
members towards the leadership. Thus, the case of the Belgium PS supports 
the framework in terms of existing membership decline, high turnout (for 
Belgium standards) and more negative attitude. But nevertheless, intra-party 
activism is relatively high and this is contrary to the framework’s suggestion. 
 
The above section explored the generalisability of the newly developed 
framework and findings of this study. It did so by presenting a first very 
preliminary application of the conceptual framework to seven other cases. The 
cases covered a variety of party families and countries. The above discussion 
further supports the association between leadership selection method and 
changes in party membership along the four indicators of membership size, 
turnout, activity and attitude. This provides a first indication of the framework’s 
generalisability and transferability to study the impact of different types of 
primaries in a large variety of settings. More importantly, it served as an 
illustration that the classification scheme works, captures something relevant 
and is useful to capture the impact of different types of primaries on party 
membership. The next step is to return to the normative perspective underlying 
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this thesis presented in the introduction and outlines the practical implications of 
the study’s overall empirical findings.  
7.3 Normative and Practical Implications 
Starting with the normative implications, they are complex as they not only 
affect democracy within parties but also democracy at the state level. As 
outlined in the introduction of this thesis, this study aims to help answer the 
question of whether a particular intra-party selection method can serve 
democracy more broadly (Hazan and Rahat, 2010: 166). In order to answer this 
question, the thesis returns to the following three guiding questions posed by 
Hazan and Rahat (2010: 166):48 
“1. Does the [leadership] selection method enable the expression of democratic 
norms (participation and competition), and does it produce democratic outputs 
(representation and responsiveness)? 
2. Does the [leadership] selection method serve the liberal norm of power 
diffusion? 
3. Does the [leadership] selection method enhance the general health of the 
party as a crucial organization for the functioning of democracy?” 
 
Before answering question 1 regarding leadership selection and how this study 
contributed to answer it, we need to define core terms. For democracy at state 
level, this is rather straightforward. Democracies should operate a system that 
allows all voters to participate in choosing between candidates that claim to 
better represent them. Thus, candidates compete for the support of voters, and 
after being elected are expected to remain responsive to the demands and 
needs, i.e. the electorate. For IPD and the relation to state-wide democracy, 
                                            
48
 These questions were originally used to study the link between candidate selection and 
democracy. However, executive top candidate selection is a specific type of candidate 
selection, and, thus, the very same questions are relevant and can be used. 
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definitions are more difficult. One important aspect in this regard is Hazan and 
Rahat (2010) observation that the maximization of some of these norms and 
outputs in the intra-party arena can have negative effect on their maximization 
in state-wide democracy. Further ’voters‘ cannot be easily replaced with ’party 
members‘, as the parties can use both open and closed primaries. 
Nevertheless, the aim of IPD should be to maximize these norms and outcomes 
to the degree that they benefit party members the most. Thus, in terms of the 
norm of participation, the voting right in primaries should be restricted to party 
members. In terms of competition, it should use permissive candidacy 
requirements to allow for a meaningful challenge of the leadership and fair 
legitimacy contest. Thus, the party leader should be representative of the party 
members’ interest and values and be responsive once elected. If this is given, it 
should have a positive impact for party membership, as it increases its value 
and power. Therefore, new members might join, participation in the primary is 
more meaningful and is more likely to encourage participation in other intra-
party activities, thus the quality of membership increases, and last but not the 
least, this should also improve the perceived responsiveness of the leader to 
the member better representing the views and values of members. The 
empirical analysis of the three case studies has clearly supported the idea that 
to generally maximize these outputs and norms within political parties, the 
combination of primary rules clearly matters. The careful design of selectorate 
and candidacy rules can achieve higher levels of competition, of participation of 
party members in primaries and of general intra-party activities and can lead to 
an improved perceived responsiveness of the party leader. It also shows the 
attempt to maximize inclusion in the primary by transcending the party 
membership as the selectorate. But a mere focus on increased participation in 
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primaries can have negative effects on the other democratic norms and 
outcomes in the intra-party arena. 
Similar to the above, before answering question 2, the term “liberal norm 
of power diffusion” needs to be defined. Democracy is not a system designed to 
produce certain norms and outcomes but rather a system to prevent the 
concentration of power and contain it. Thus from an IPD perspective, parties 
should adopt a structure, including leadership selections, that promotes power 
diffusion between the different actors in the party. The empirical analysis 
showed that the rules of the leaderships selection clearly matter in this regard, 
as they can act as a check and balance to the power of the party leadership. 
After all, the latter has to face membership votes and/ or the possibility that 
members challenge it by running in the selection process. It also shows that if 
the selectorate becomes too large, the perceived responsiveness of party 
leaders to party members declines, and, thus, members feel they lose the 
possibility to influence the leadership and hold it accountable. Thus, a careful 
combination of selectorate and candidacy rules can increase power diffusion 
and help to contain in within parties. In short, the careful combination of primary 
rules can enable the manifestation of democratic norms, produce democratic 
outputs and serve the liberal norm of power diffusion. Thus, primaries can be 
useful tools to contribute to the increase and generation of meaningful IPD. This 
thesis supports the suggestions made by some scholar that primaries can be an 
effective tool in addressing the current crisis of party decline, especially the 
crisis of the party on the ground.  
The last and probably most important aspect here is the third question, 
as it links the organizational level of democracy, IPD, to state-wide democracy. 
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As outline above, if parties are vital institutions of democracy, and their 
wellbeing is vital for the health of democracy (Hazan and Rahat, 2010: 168), 
then parties have to be careful of how leadership selection method affect one of 
the vital cornerstones of party organizations, membership; otherwise they might 
face unintended consequences for both the party as organization and 
democracy in general. Here, it is useful to return to the three key arguments 
about IPD identified in the literature: impossibility, danger and desirability of 
IPD. 
The underlying argument for the impossibility of IPD is the iron law of 
oligarchy (Michels, 1911). It is certainly true that some combinations of primary 
rules are more likely to further centralize power in the hand of the elite, but as 
shown here and by others (Hazan and Rahat, 2010), the careful design of intra-
party selection methods can be an effective way to diffuse power and to 
introduce new checks and balances to limit, if not avoid, the development of 
undemocratic pathologies. If this can be avoided within parties, it can contribute 
to avoid such developments at state-level. As putting more power into the hand 
of the membership and as a consequence of voters, it can be an effective way 
to do so. However, the warnings by Dahl (1970), Schattschneider (1942) and 
Sartori (1976) about the dangers of IPD for democracy are valid, if we expect 
IPD and state-wide democracy to adhere to the same democratic norms and 
produce the same democratic outputs. Rather than, for example, trying to also 
maximize inclusiveness, a key norm of state-wide democracy, IPD can help 
foster a culture of democratic participation, responsiveness and democratic 
linkage. Here, the effective use of primaries can support these efforts. Thus, 
IPD needs to be regulated differently to not just replicate democratic norms and 
output of the state-level but rather compensate for the shortcomings of certain 
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elements at the state-level. This finally leads to the desirability of IPD for party 
members and democracy at state-level. If correctly designed, IPD can 
contribute to many democratic norms and produce outputs required to ensure 
the functioning of democracy at state-level. Young (2013: 74) highlights that 
“declining party membership has roughly coincided with a decline in voter 
turnout, rising cynicism and distrust in politicians, and hollowed-out forms of 
participation”. Thus, as shown here, if primaries can lead to an increase in party 
membership, this could also translate in a positive development in these other 
areas. Increased IPD could contribute to a reversal of parties from “leader-
dominated, electorally focused state-supported entities” back to “membership-
based, participatory organizations” (Young 2013: 74). In addition to revitalising 
political and intra-party participation, increased IPD can also increase societal 
linkage. Increased societal linkage in turn would legitimize the parties’ selection 
of a leader and thus would require more responsiveness by the party between 
elections. In short, the thesis agrees with Young (2013) that intra-party decision-
making, such as primaries, play a key role in creating this linkage not only 
between members and the party but between citizens and the state. Last but 
not the least, IPD can increase deliberation among members and voters, and 
lead to more informed choice both in primaries and general elections .  
Overall then, it shows that the careful design of IPD in general and 
specifically in terms of leadership selection rules can make a positive 
contribution to the general health of democracy. Thus state-wide democracy 
and IPD together can maximize democratic norms and outputs, as long as they 
are not seen as having the same functions but rather aim to supplement each 
other. The next section highlights avenues for future research. 
 245 
 
The practical implication of the new conceptual framework developed in 
this thesis is that its findings can be used by parties and members to assess the 
impact of proposed leadership selection reforms. Consequently, it can help both 
members and party leadership to assess, whether the proposed reform can 
actually achieve what the party wants to achieve with it. For example, a party 
might adopt a primary for party organizational renewal or as an electoral tool. 
Depending on the aim, a different combination of primary rules might be 
required. In the case of party renewal, the party might decide to opt for rules 
that are more likely to produce membership revitalisation and empowerment, 
while, if primaries are used as an electoral tool, the party might prefer to choose 
rules linking it directly to the voters rather than only its members. 
 
Having discussed the implications of the new framework in both 
normative and practical terms, the next section briefly reflects more widely on 
the new typology of IPD developed here. More specifically what does it tell us 
about the link between leadership selection reform, party membership, party 
types and finally party change?  
The reforms in leadership selection method are part of a wider change in 
the relationship between members and parties. Over the past decade, many 
parties responded to dropping membership figure by granting new rights to its 
members or even supporters often through the use of intra-party ballots. 
Scarrow (2015) outlines that such internal ballots have two main aims first 
“making parties more popular by burnishing their democratic (or sometimes 
populist) credentials, and giving supporters more incentives to get active within 
their preferred party.” However as we have seen above, parties decided to 
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adopt different rules to organise the leadership selection that do not only have 
different consequences for members but also reflects the type of party it is or 
aims to be. Here Scarrow (2015; 206) observes that the “pattern of 
organizational evolution …has come almost full circle, with a more individualistic 
model of party activity replacing the group-based and subscriber-democracy 
templates first popularized by parties in the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries.” At the same time Bolleyer and Weeks (unpublished manuscript: 2) 
argue that primaries can be part of “a movement away from organisational 
characteristics that theoretical literature associates with cartel model of party 
organisation towards characteristic echoing more traditional mass party 
structures.” Thus the effect of organisational reform through leadership 
selection method seems to be able to go both ways and this needs to be 
reflected in any typology exploring the effects of such reforms on party 
membership. 
In addition, parties also went beyond formal membership and opened up 
to supports. Most of these reforms have not replaced traditional party 
membership but rather these new forms of affiliations, at least for the moment, 
existing on top of the traditional membership or traditional members even have 
to pay just like supporters or primary voters to enjoy certain rights, such as 
voting in the primary. Parties adopting this new types of affiliation seem to be 
more interested in electoral outcomes than in maintaining traditional structures 
(Scarrow 2014: 206) as parties aim to reach “supporters who may not be 
seeking long-term organizational commitments, but who are nevertheless 
interested in connecting with a party, and possibly in shaping its future” 
(Scarrow 2014: 206). How much this reform matters from a party organisational 
perspective depends on how much parties value and /or need their members as 
 247 
 
a source for party policies, personnel and legitimacy. Parties adopting primaries 
limiting voting rights to its members only, seem to value their membership much 
more compared to parties with open primaries who might see members more as 
fans to support and spread leadership message but with no or little further link 
in terms of accountability or policy influence between these fans and the 
leadership. Following Scarrow’s (2014) observation, it follows that by adopting 
open primaries parties move from cleavage parties and subscriber democracy 
parties towards the “ethos of political market parties, touting practices which 
keep them attentive to the wide swathes of voters who are their potential 
customers”(Scarrow 2014: 206). In short, subscriber-democracy parties’ leaders 
are accountable to a small group of members rather than to the wider party 
electorate but in political market parties their primary loyalty is to the voters at 
large, rather than to their members or to a specific ideology or group. Hence 
parties who see themselves as the former and would like to remain subscriber-
democracy parties would be better off to adopt close primaries with high 
membership influence. However, this might reduce the autonomy and room to 
manoeuvre of the party leadership. In contrast, political market parties would 
opt for open primaries with very restrictive candidacy rules. 
Returning to the here developed typology subscriber-democracy parties’ 
would adopt leadership selection reforms that make their members feel 
empowered or protect while more political market parties who care less about 
its members and in general prefers supporters to members would be more 
ready to adopt leadership selection reforms that create a feeling of 
disempowerment or atomization among its members. This is in line with the 
argument put forward by the advocates of the cartel party hypothesis that open 
primaries might actually empowers party leaders at the cost of mid-level elites 
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and activists within parties. Thus, for example Katz and Mair (2009: 759) argue 
that “the apparent democratization of the party through the introduction of such 
devices as postal ballots or mass membership meetings at which large numbers 
of marginally committed members or supporters…can be expected to drown out 
the activists”. However if reforms go too far, they might disempower both party 
leaders and activists and empower a fluid and unpredictable selectorate. Thus 
democratisation can be harmful for the party membership as outlined above but 
also the parties’ ability to act and undermine party values (Hazan and Rahat 
2010; Cross and Blais 2012). Overall then the choice of leadership selection 
method is not only an instrument in the tool box for parties to potentially re-
engage membership in nature and numbers but its use also has consequences 
for both party type and party change. Thus the choice of leadership section 
method can be instrumental in reinforcing the cleavage parties or subscriber 
democracy party type with mainly traditional conception of party membership or 
be part of a wider organisational reform to push towards political market party 
types with a conception of party affiliation more as supports or fans. The here 
newly developed typology reflects this overall trend in party organisational types 
and the underlying dynamics of either change or safeguarding the 
organisational structure and the role of membership within the party 
organisation, by classifying democratisation as either empowered or protected 
and disempowerment or atomisation from the memberships point of view. 
7.4 Limitations of the Study 
The study has offered an evaluative perspective on the impact of the interaction 
of different leadership selection rules on party membership with a specific focus 
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on the individual level conception of party membership. As a direct 
consequence of the methodology required to do so, the study encountered a 
number of limitations, which need to be considered. One of the main limitations 
of the study was data collection. However, this was less relevant for 
membership figures thanks to national databases and the MAPP projects and 
turnout, which are widely reported in the media or secondary literature (Sandri 
et al., 2015). However, the collection and access to party membership survey 
data is rather complex and unsatisfying at times. During the data collection, the 
project faced limited availability of parties’ membership surveys, both pre- and-
post reform. Further, in some cases where data did exist, it was not always 
made available or only available in part. For example, in the case of the 2011 
PS party membership survey, the project was only supplied with result per item 
but not the actual data set. This also limited the possible scope of statistical 
analysis. The project therefore only used descriptive statistics. Another 
limitation the project faced was the limited comparability between the surveys, 
mainly across cases but occasionally also within cases. In order to overcome 
this problem, the project relied on proxies and items testing for the same 
concept but using different questions (see chapter three for details). In addition 
to reanalysing secondary survey data, the project also conducted its own 
membership survey. Here the limitation was the political danger of bias and 
non-response. The project aimed to avoid bias by sending the link to all 
members who provided an e-mail address, when they joined the party (about 67 
per cent of all members; 41,000 out of 60,000 members). They all had an equal 
chance to participate, and thus using an online survey established a close to 
random sample. The second aspect is non-response. The survey sample was 
highly representative of the overall party membership with 38.6 per cent female 
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and 61.4 per cent of men in both the survey sample and overall membership in 
2015 (Niedermayer, 2015). Also, the average age was nearly the same with 50 
of the total membership (Niedermayer, 2015) and 53 in the survey. When 
looking at the overall age distribution, we can see that for all age groups, apart 
for the 26-30 category, the frequencies of the survey and total membership are 
very similar. 
Table 7.3 Green Party Survey and Overall Membership 2015 by Age Groups 
 
 
Further in order to maximize the response rate, the project sent out 
multiple reminders. The main cause of non-response here is probably refusal 
rather than no-contact or not able to answer. Overall, however, it is 
unfortunately rather difficult to deal with non-response. One general 
disadvantage with all individual level data collected through survey is the 
reliance on self-reported information, which are not objective and might lead to 
an overstatement of the level of activity or underreporting of party internal 
undesirable answers. However, the careful survey design and the large sample 
size will cancel out some of these effects (Podsakoff and Organ, 1986). The last 
limitation is the fact that it is hard to isolate effects, as changes are not solely 
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due to one organizational reform, and other factors also contributed to them. 
However, the reforms in leadership selection methods affected all aspects and 
facets of the party organization substantially, are therefore likely to play a large 
role and have a big impact on the development of membership. Further, some 
surveys include questions specifically asking for the effect of the reform in the 
leadership selection method on party membership.  
 To overcome some of these limitations the study opted to complement 
the survey results with in-depth qualitative party membership interviews. These 
provided detailed contextual information and triangulation of the survey findings. 
It allowed to ask members about the impact of the primary, and whether they 
felt the survey result reflected reality or not. Thus the mixed-method 
methodology chosen here, despite its limitations, still effectively permitted to 
investigate the development of party membership brought about by the use of 
primaries. Further, the avenues for research outlined below can be used to 
reduce these limitations in future. Here a large-scale cross-country membership 
survey and full access to all existing survey data would be particularly helpful in 
addressing still existing gaps. 
 Beside limitation of the data that limited somehow the broad and wide 
evaluation of the framework, the framework itself has some limitations. First, it 
has been developed to capture the effect of one very specific intra-party event, 
mainly party leadership selections. Therefore, it might be of more limited use to 
study the effect of similar intra-party events such as large scale candidate 
selection or votes on policy questions. However, both events are part of broader 
move towards IPD and its success can be captured along the same indicators 
and thus it would be possible to maintain the basic structure of the framework 
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developed here and adjust it to be applicable to other intra-party votes. The 
second limitation of the framework is that it does not capture the effect of 
changes in overall level of IPD on membership but only the effect of changes in 
leadership selection method, one aspect that can affect IPD on members. The 
thesis partly assumes that in order to have high levels of IDP one needs to have 
a certain kind of leadership selection rules. However, it is fully possible to 
achieve a high level of IPD and high quality party membership through other 
reform. Thirdly, the framework does not incorporate the design of selection 
method used in the primary. Thus, it could be that certain selection method 
amplify, reduce or even reverse positive and negative effect of the primary. 
Thus for example in a two round model, it could be that the candidates with the 
plurality in the first round lose in the second round leading to a large group of 
members unhappy with the primary. The last limitation of the framework is that it 
does not consider external factors that might have affected membership in the 
outline way. So for six types of party example, it could be that a recent electoral 
victory encourages new members to join and all members to become more 
active rather than the primary. Nevertheless the here newly developed 
framework remains a useful tool to study the link between change in leadership 
selection method and development in party membership. 
7.5  Avenues for Future Research 
Based on the above discussion of the findings and their broader implications, 
various further avenues for future research can be identified. The most 
straightforward is to apply the above developed framework to additional cases 
further test its validity. The table above already placed a diverse group of 
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parties that all use primaries into the conceptual framework and briefly 
discussed very preliminary findings. In this regard, it would be ideal to develop 
large-scale and cross-country membership surveys with specific items asking 
about the experience with IPD and more precisely the leadership selection 
method. This would not only provide new insight into party membership and its 
development but reduce many of the limitations this study faced in terms of data 
collection and comparability. Another avenue of future research is to study 
primaries and their consequences at other levels, such as the EU-level with, for 
example, the recent use of primaries by the European Greens and Socialist or 
at the regional and local level, such as the mayoral primaries in France. In 
addition to studying the impact on party membership, future reach should shed 
more light on the effect of primaries on other intra-party and electoral dynamics. 
In terms of electoral dynamics, it would be interesting to explore, for example, 
the effect of primaries on electoral campaigning, parliamentary cohesion and 
the profile of party leaders (beyond gender). While in terms of intra-party 
dynamics the consequences for internal power distribution, factionalism and 
party communication would be insightful themes to investigate. These 
suggestions for future research would not only allow a further testing of the 
conceptual framework developed in this thesis but increase our knowledge 
about IPD and primaries in general, but, more specially, our understanding of its 
effects on various aspects of politics and the party organization. 
7.6 Conclusion 
The thesis started with affirming the well documented trend of party 
membership decline, and how many parties responded to it by adopting new 
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participatory possibilities, often in form of direct votes on policies and personnel 
questions. One of the most prominent aspects of this is the use of open or 
closed primaries to select the party executive leader, studied here. Parties claim 
that all these reforms increase IPD and should have a positive impact on party 
membership. However, the impact of increase IPD—especially in form of 
primaries—for parties in general and specifically for party membership is highly 
contested in the current literature. This thesis’ aim was to shed light on one 
particular aspect of this debate by addressing the question of how different 
types of primaries, in terms of underlying rules, affect the individual level 
conception of party membership. In doing so, this thesis’ main contribution to 
the field is to provide a more complete picture of the effect of increased IPD; to 
do so it strengthened the membership perspective in the literature and moved 
beyond the analysis of its impact on party organization or electoral 
competiveness. Overall, the contributions of this thesis are threefold. First, 
conceptually, it combines the selectorate-candidacy regulations of primaries in a 
single and unified conceptual framework to study their joined impact on the 
individual level conception of party membership, in terms of changes in 
membership behaviour and attitude. Second, empirically, it collected new data 
and brought together existing data to demonstrate, in the form of three detailed 
cases studies, the validity of the conceptual framework to study the impact of 
different leadership selection rules on party members. The findings support the 
argument that the impact of primaries on party members is far from black and 
white, as frequently suggested in the existing literature. Rather different rules 
bring about distinct merits and perils for members. While the conceptual 
framework seems to capture something relevant, it needs to be further tested by 
applying it to more cases in different settings. Most importantly, it provides a 
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first step in increasing our knowledge in this area and offers a transferable tool 
for future research. Third, it challenges the normative assumption that the 
interests of party membership and elites are often at odds and instead argues 
that careful regulatory design can lead to positive outcomes for both. It can 
empower membership and, at the same time, increase the legitimacy of the 
party leader, bring new vital financial resources into the party and mobilize party 
members. Thus, the precise regulation of more inclusive leadership selections 
can reduce the perils of primaries to a large extend and maximize its merits for 
both party members and leadership. 
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Appendices 
I Overview of Interviews 
Elite, Mid-Level/ Activist, Ordinary Member  
Party and No. of Interview Type of Interviewee Party Member 
Since 
Length 
(in Min) 
UK Conservative Party   
1 Elite  1991 27:03 
2 Activist/ Former Young 
Conservative Officer 
1995 49:20 
3 Mid-Level 1999 Joint Interview: 
42:54 4  Ordinary Member Mid-1980’s 
5 Mid-Level 1991 58:46 
6 Elite 1970 47:20 
German Green Party   
1 Elite 2004 49:33 
2 Ordinary Member 2005 25:21 
3 Ordinary Member 2006 29:59 
4 Mid-Level 2003 35:42 
5 Mid-Level 2000 34:38 
6 Ordinary Member 1992 29:28 
7 Activist/ former Mid-
Level 
2004 33:30 
8 Mid-Level 2002 32:05 
French PS  
1 Ordinary Member 2007 Joint Interview: 
31:05 2 Ordinary Member 2007 
3 Mid-Level 2006 44:27 
4 Mid-Level 1988 43:49 
5 Ordinary Member 2004 42:16 
6 Activist 1978 45:38 
7 Elite 2008 51:37 
8 Mid-Level 2002 45:09 
9 Mid-Level 2002 and 2006 41:17 
10 Elite 1992 56:19 
Full interview transcripts are available on request in an anonymized format from the author. 
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II General Fact Sheet 
Fact Sheet for Interviewees (to be completed) 
Your gender: M____ F _____ 
Your age: _______ (year of birth) 
Party Member since: _______ 
Party office (internal or public mandate): Yes         No____ 
If Yes please specify (job title and level): 
 
           
           
            
 
Party office in the past (internal or public mandate): Yes ____ No____ 
If Yes please specify (job title and level): 
 
           
           
            
 
Did you vote in the past leadership selection? 
UK Conservatives 
2001: 
Yes____ No____ 
2005: 
Yes____ No____ 
 
German Greens 
2012: 
Yes____ No____ 
 
French PS: 
1995: 
Yes____ No____ 
2006: 
Yes____ No____ 
2011 
Yes____ No____ 
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III General Interview Guide  
Interview: 
Before Recording starts: 
Short briefing about aims and purpose of project and how interview contributes to it. 
Outline: The aim of the project is to study the consequences of party organizational reforms for 
party members. It will focus on how different leadership selection methods (closed and open 
primaries) affect party members in terms of participation, attitude and relations to the party 
leadership.  
 
Interview’s contribution: The interview provides me with an opportunity to collect more detailed 
information and a better understanding of party members and how different types of leadership 
selections affect them on an individual level. Further it allows to triangulate my findings in the 
survey. 
 
 
Asked permission to record:  
“What I did during pervious interviews it to take notes and record the interview. Would it be fine 
with you if I did the same in this interview? Of course you have the right to stop the recording at 
any time during the interview, and I can provide you with a transcript of the interview 
afterwards”. 
Fill in: Fact Sheet (see appendix A) 
Sign: Consent Form (see appendix B) 
Recording starts: 
Semi-structured interview by themes (in bolt) with sub-question for each theme (note: the order 
of themes can be changed and not all sub-questions have to be asked; they are more of a 
guide). 
1. Personal questions: 
- I can see from the fact sheet that you have been a member for a long/ short time. What 
was your initial motivation to join? 
- Has your motivation change since then? Do you see a general change in why people 
join the party? 
- Would you say this is the typical reason to join? 
- Tell me about your general experience as party member? (level of satisfaction) 
- If office holder: I can see you have/ had a party office, tell me more about it? Why did 
you decide to take up a party office or public mandate? 
 
2. Intra-party democracy with our party 
- What is intra party democracy for you? In your party (rules in your party)? 
- In general, how would you describe the distribution of power within the party? 
- Would you describe the party as overall democratic? 
- Do you think that (you as) ordinary member(s) have influence/ is heard in the party? 
- Could you provide an example of the typical way decisions are taken within the party 
and in your local branch? How do the two differ? 
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- Do you think that one group disproportionally dominates decision-making within the 
party 
- Do you see the promotion of IPD as something positive, and what do you think are its 
limits? 
- How could the party improve intra-party democracy or reduce it? 
 
3. Continuous influence of leadership selection method (especially PS and 
Conservatives) 
- How did the change in leadership selection method affect the party (positive/ negative)? 
In what way (participation/ attitudes etc.)? 
- Does it still affect the party? Is it highly debated among members? (since 2005, so 10 
years later-Labour Party effect). And in 2009 during the survey (year before the 
election) 
- Do the method and the debate surrounding it still affect the party today? 
- Is there a link between today’s members in the survey and the reform? 
- LINK Reform, survey and findings (interview) 
 
4. Context of adoption of leadership selection method 
- Where you part of the reform process? 
- What do you know about it or the context it was adopted in? 
 
5. Leadership selection with your Party (one aspect of IPD) 
- Did you take part in the last primary? Your party so far held XX primaries in how many 
did you vote? 
- What do you think about the new/ different (close to open) way to select the leader? 
- How would you like to change it in future (open to supporters, back to delegate meeting 
etc.)? 
- What do know about the candidate requirements (too open or strict)? 
- What do you think about the candidate requirements (too open or strict)? 
- Recent changes to rules? What you think? 
- In what way do you think the reform had an impact on the party as a whole and its 
members?  
- And on you personally? (based on this response move to one of the next themes: 5, 6 
or 7) 
 
6. Participation in party activities 
- In general, how active would you consider yourself in the party? (for example in hours 
per month) 
- Did your level of activity change over time and so why? Are there any specific changes 
or events (elections or reforms) that trigged these changes? 
- If you think about your activities in the party, what type of activities you usefully 
undertake (leaflets, donate money, etc.)? Is this the usual mode of participation in the 
party? 
- Did you ever consider running for a public or intra-party office? Why or why not? 
- What are your personal motivations to be (not) active in the party? To what extend do 
you think this is a general motivation among members? 
- Have you seen a change in patterns and intensity of participation since the direct 
leadership selection method was introduced? 
- Are there ways how the party could improve the level of participation within the party? 
(Or why there is no need to do so) 
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7. Attitude towards party leadership 
- How would you describe the general mood in the party and the relationship between the 
ordinary members and the national leadership? 
- How about the relationship between activist/ middle-level elites of the party? 
- Would you say the relationship between the different groups in the party has improved 
since the direct leadership selection or did new tensions develop? 
- Have you seen a change in the attitude since the direct leadership selection method 
was introduced? 
- How would you say the party could improve/ strengthen the relationship between 
members and elites? 
 
8. Your influence and role within the party (political efficacy) 
- How much influence do you feel you have in the party over 
(a) policy, 
(b) candidates,  
(c) leadership selections? (3 questions) 
 
- Do you feel there are many possibilities for party members to influence the party and 
its leadership? If so, which ones do you use? 
- Do you think the leadership listens to the views and needs of ordinary members or more 
to the voters? 
- Should the party strengthen the influence of member? How or why not, reduce it? 
- Do you think active and passive members should have the same rights and power, for 
example, in voting for the party leader? 
- What do you think about the recent development of providing party supporters (not full 
and formal members) with voting rights? Or should they have voting rights? 
- Is there any other specify group within the party that should have more say/ influence? 
 
9. The result of the survey 
- Did you complete the party membership survey in (year(s))?  
o If yes, how was your experience with it? 
o If no, why didn’t you complete it? 
- To what extent do you think certain results (a, b, c) are representative of the party as a 
whole? 
- Why do you think the party members have changed or not in the way the results for (a, 
b, c) suggest? 
- What question do you think we should have asked or asked differently? 
End of interview: Any comments you would like to add? 
Recording ends: 
-Snowballing and debriefing (from interview back to present) 
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IV Interview Consent Form 
PROJECT INFIRMATION/ CONSENT FORM FOR INTERVIEWS 
 
Title of Research Project 
The Merits and Perils of Intra-Party Democracy: Assessing the Effects of Party Reform in 
Western European Parties. 
 
Details of Project 
 
The aim of the project is to study the consequences of party organizational reforms and their 
impact on parties as organisations. The project will focus on consequences of the use of more 
inclusive leadership selection methods (closed and open primaries) for party members, as well 
as their relationship to party leadership, and party leadership. The project is based on the 
central research question of how organizational reform alters the behaviour, relations, role and 
nature of individuals and sub-groups within political parties. And if so, what are these changes 
and their impact on the party as an organization? 
 
The collected data for this research project therefore intends to explore the impact and changes 
intra-party reforms have on party members and party leadership by capturing their experience 
with the reforms of leadership selection methods and how they changed their behaviour. This 
PhD Project is funded by The University of Exeter Politics Department. The data will be used for 
the doctoral thesis, academic papers and other material related to the overall research project. 
There is also a small chance the PhD in its entirety could be published as an academic 
monograph. 
 
Contact Details 
For further information about the research or your interview data, please contact: 
Felix-Christopher von Nostitz, Department of Politics, Exeter University, Devon UK.  
E-mail:fv206@ex.ac.uk 
 
If you have concerns/ questions about the research you would like to discuss with someone 
else at the University, please contact: 
 
Professor Nicole Bolleyer, Department of Politics, Exeter University, Devon UK 
Email: N.Bolleyer@exeter.ac.uk 
 
Confidentiality  
Interview tapes and transcripts will be held in confidence. They will not be used other than for the 
purposes described above and third parties will not be allowed access to them (except as may be required 
by the law). However, if you request it, you will be supplied with a copy of your interview transcript so 
that you can comment on and edit it as you see fit (please give your email below). Your data will be held 
in accordance with the Data Protection Act until the project is submitted to the examination committee in 
2016, and then it will be held for an indefinite period of time on an anonymous basis. 
 
Anonymity 
 
If not agreed otherwise, all data will be held and used on an anonymous basis, with no mention of your 
name, but we will refer to the group of which you are a member. For example, the party you belong to. 
 
Please tick the anonymity option you prefer:  
 
 
 Complete anonymity   
 Use of initials 
 Use of full name  
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Consent  
I voluntarily agree to participate and to the use of my data for the purposes specified above. I can 
withdraw consent at any time by contacting the interviewers.  
 
TICK HERE:      DATE …………………………..................... 
 
Note: Your contact details are kept separately from your interview data 
 
Name of interviewee: ......................................................................................... 
Signature:   ......................................................................................... 
Email/ phone:  ......................................................................................... 
Signature of researcher: ......................................................................................... 
 
2 copies to be signed by both interviewee and researcher, one kept by each 
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V Green Survey Questionnaire 
 
 
 
Befragung der Mitglieder von Bündnis 90/Die Grünen  
2015 
 
 
Durchgeführt als Teil der Doktorarbeit von 
Felix-Christopher von Nostitz, 
University of Exeter 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In Fall von Rückfragen und Anmerkungen zu der Studie wenden Sie Sich bitte an: 
 
Felix-Christopher von Nostitz 
Department of Politics 
Amory Building 
Rennes Drive 
Exeter, Devon 
EX4 4RJ, United Kingdom 
E-Mail: fv206@exeter.ac.uk 
Mobiltelefone: 0044 (0) 75 96 51 11 92 
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Projektinformation 
 
Titel des Forschungsprojektes  
Die Vorzüge und Gefahren der innerparteilichen Demokratie: Diagnose der Auswirkungen von 
organisatorischen Reformen innerhalb westeuropäischer Parteien.  
 
 
Details zum Projekt  
 
Das Ziel des Projektes ist es, die Folgen von Reformen auf die Parteien als Organisationen zu 
durchleuchten. Das Projekt konzentriert sich hauptsächlich auf die Auswirkungen für Parteimitglieder, 
deren Beziehung zur Parteiführung und der Parteiführung selbst nach der Verwendung von mehr 
inklusiven Auswahlmethoden für die Bestimmung der Parteiführung (geschlossene und offene 
Urwahlen). Die zentrale Forschungsfrage des Projektes ist es, inwiefern Organisationsreformen 
Verhalten, Beziehungen, Rolle und Natur des einzelnen Mitglieds und der Untergruppen innerhalb der 
politischen Parteien verändern. Wenn das der Falls ist, welche Veränderungen finden statt und welche 
Auswirkungen haben diese auf die Partei als Organisation? 
 
Die durch das Projekt erhobenen Daten beabsichtigen daher Einsicht in die Auswirkungen und 
Veränderungen von innerparteilichen Reformen auf Parteimitglieder und Parteiführung zu gewähren. Die 
gesammelten Daten erlauben die Erfassung von unterschiedlichen Eindrücken, Erfahrungen und 
Reaktionen aller beteiligten Gruppen während und nach der Urwahl (offen oder geschlossen). 
 
Das Promotionsprojekt wird durch den Fachbereich Politik der University of Exeter finanziert. Die Daten 
werden für die Doktorarbeit, wissenschaftliche Arbeiten und andere Materialien im Zusammenhang mit 
dem Gesamtforschungsprojekt verwendet. Es besteht die Chance, dass die Promotionsarbeit in ihrer 
Vollständigkeit als wissenschaftliche Monographie veröffentlicht wird.  
 
Kontaktdetails 
 
Für weitere Informationen über das Forschungsprojekt kontaktieren Sie bitte:  
Felix-Christoph von Nostitz, Fachbereich für Politik, University of Exeter, Devon UK.  
E-mail: fv206@ex.ac.uk  
Wenn Sie Bedenken / Fragen über das Forschungsprojekt haben, die Sie gerne mit einem weiteren 
Ansprechpartner an der Universität diskutieren möchten, kontaktieren Sie bitte:  
Professor Nicole Bolleyer, Fachbereich für Politik, University of Exeter, Devon UK  
E-Mail: N.Bolleyer@exeter.ac.uk  
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Hinweise zum Ausfüllen des Online-Fragebogens 
 
- Bitte lesen Sie sich die jeweilige Frage einschließlich der Antwortmöglichkeiten vor der 
Beantwortung vollständig durch. 
 
- Die Mehrzahl der Fragen können Sie durch Ankreuzen beantworten. Setzen Sie Ihre Kreuze 
einfach in die dafür vorgesehenen Kästchen 
 
Beispiel: Ja
  Nein
 
-Nach vielen Fragen finden Sie in Klammern weitere Bearbeitungshinweise: 
 
Beispiel  (Bitte machen Sie in jeder Zeile ein Kreuz) 
 
- Für die Beantwortung einiger Fragen finden sich im Fragebogen sogenannte Skalen, Mit diesen 
können Sie Ihre Antworten zwischen zwei inhaltlichen Positionen abstufen, im Beispiel etwa 
zwischen „überhaupt nicht gern“ oder „sehr gerne“ 
 
Beispiel: 
 
Überhaupt                                                                                                                               Sehr 
nicht gerne                                                                                                                            gerne 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 
- An einigen Stellen des Fragebogens bitten wir Sie, Ihre Antwort frei zu formulieren. Verwenden 
Sie in diesen Fällen die dafür vorgesehenen Linien. 
 
Beispiel: ________________________________________ 
  ________________________________________ 
  (Bitte notieren) 
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1. Seit wann sind Sie Mitglied bei Bündnis90/Die Grünen? 
(bitte notieren Sie) 
 Seit dem Jahr___________________ 
 
2. Warum sind Sie Bündnis 90/Die Grünen beigetreten? Bitte geben Sie für jeden der folgenden 
Gründe an, wie wichtig dieser für Sie damals war. 
 
 
Sehr 
wichtig wichtig 
Teils-
teils 
Weniger 
wichtig 
Über- 
haupt 
nicht 
wichtig 
Wegen beeindruckender Persönlichkeiten 
an der Parteispitze 
     
Um mich für die Ziele der Partei 
einzusetzen 
     
Um den Einfluss der Partei zu stärken      
Aus Spaß an der politischen Arbeit      
Wegen des Einflusses von Familie und 
Freunden 
     
Um berufliche Vorteile zu erlangen      
Um meinen Ortsverband zu stärken      
Um mich besser über Politik zu 
informieren. 
     
Aus Interesse an einem Parteiamt      
Um nette Leute zu treffen      
Aus Interesse an einem öffentlichen 
Mandat 
     
Um einen bestimmten Flügel in der Partei 
zu stärken 
     
Um den politischen Kurs der Partei zu 
beeinflussen 
     
Weil ich mit den Grundwerten der Partei 
übereinstimme 
     
Um mich für eine ökologisch orientierte 
Politik einzusetzen 
     
Um meine Sympathie für die Partei zu 
zeigen 
     
Um meiner Verantwortung als Bürger(in) 
nachzukommen 
     
Weil sich die Partei für Leute wie mich 
einsetzt 
     
 
3. Wenn Sie sich an Ihren Beitritt zu Bündnis 90/Die Grünen zurückerinnern: Gab es damals einen 
besonderen Anlass, der Sie zu diesem Schritt bewogen hat?  
(Bitte notieren)  
__________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
4. Sind Sie seit Ihrem Beitritt dauerhaft Mitglied bei Bündnis 90/Die Grünen? 
Ja
Nein  
Falls nein, wie viele Jahre waren sie insgesamt Mitglied bei Bündnis 90/Die Grünen? 
Für (ca.) ___________ Jahre 
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5. Falls Sie der Partei im Jahr 2012 beigetreten oder wieder beigetreten sind, wie wichtig war dabei 
die Entscheidung der Partei, eine Urwahl durchzuführen. 
 
Sehr 
wichtig wichtig 
Teils-
teils 
Weniger 
wichtig 
Über- 
haupt 
nicht 
wichtig 
     
Oder  
Trift nicht auf mich zu 
 
6. Haben Sie an der Urwahl zur Bestimmung der beiden Spitzenkandidaten für die Bundestagswahl 
2013 teilgenommen? 
 
ja 
nein
 
Falls JA Frage 7 
Falls Nein Frage 8 
 
7. Falls ja, wen haben Sie gewählt? (Bitte geben Sie beide Kandidaten an, falls sie nur einen 
gewählt haben, kreuzen Sie den ersten Kandidaten und dann p) an. 
 Thomas Austermann     Friedrich Wilhelm Merck  
 Katrin Göring-Eckhardt   Claudia Roth  
 Patrick Held      Hans-Jörg Schaller  
 Nico Hybbeneth     Franz Spitzenberger  
 Roger Kuchenreuther    Jürgen Trittin  
 Renate Künast     Werner Winkler  
 Alfred Mayer     Peter Zimmer  
 Markus Meister     nur eine Stimme abgegeben 
 Weiß Ich nicht mehr 
8. Wie zufrieden sind Sie alles-in-allem-mit Ihrer Mitgliedschaft bei Bündnis90/Die Grünen? 
 
Sehr 
zufrieden 
Eher 
Zufrieden 
Teils-
teils 
Eher 
Unzufrieden 
Sehr 
Unzufrieden 
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9. Wie stark sind Sie an Politik interessiert?  
 
Sehr 
interessiert 
Eher 
interessiert 
Teils-
teils 
Eher nicht 
interessiert 
Überhaupt 
nicht  
interessiert 
     
 
10. Es gibt verschiedene Formen der Mitarbeit in Parteien. Natürlich hat kaum jemand die Zeit und die 
Möglichkeit, dies alles zu tun. Wie oft haben Sie in den letzten Jahren die nachfolgenden Aktivitäten 
ausgeübt? 
(Bitte machen Sie in jeder Zeile ein Kreuz. Bei keinerlei Aktivität bitte das Kästchen  
„selten/ nie“ nutzen) 
 
 Sehr 
häufig 
Eher 
häufig 
manchmal Eher 
selten 
Selten/ 
nie 
Plakate geklebt, Flugblätter und 
Informationsmaterial von Bündnis 90/Die Grünen 
verteilt 
     
Bei Festen und anderen geselligen 
Veranstaltungen der Partei mitgemacht 
     
Die Parteiversammlung besucht      
Bei sozialen Aktionen der Partei mitgemacht 
(z.B. Seniorenbetreuung, Kleidersammlung) 
     
In persönlichen Gespräch neue Mitglieder 
geworben 
     
An Informationsständen von Bündnis 90/Die 
Grünen mitgearbeitet. 
     
Bei Bedarf zusätzlich Geld gespendet      
In Arbeitskreisen oder anderen Gremien der 
Partei an der Formulierung politischer Aussagen 
mitgewirkt 
     
Für ein Amt in der Partei kandidiert      
Ein Amt in der Partei übernommen      
Für ein öffentliches Amt kandidiert      
Ein öffentliches Amt übernommen      
Bei der Organisation der Parteiarbeit mitgeholfen       
 
11. Wie viel Zeit verwenden Sie normalerweise pro Monat für die Mitarbeit bei Bündnis 90/ Die Grünen 
auf? (Bitte nur ein Kästchen ankreuzen) 
keine
bis unter 5 Stunden
5 bis unter 10 Stunden
10 bis unter 20 Stunden 
20 bis unter 30 Stunden
30 bis unter 40 Stunden
40 Stunden  mehr
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12. Wie würden Sie Ihre gegenwärtige Aktivität in der Partei insgesamt einschätzen? Für wie aktiv halten 
Sie sich persönlich?  
(Bitte nur ein Kästchen ankreuzen)  
 
sehr aktiv  
ziemlich aktiv  
weniger aktiv  
überhaupt nicht aktiv  

13. Wenn Sie Ihre gegenwärtige Aktivität in der Partei betrachten, wie würden Sie einschätzen, hat sich 
diese in den letzten 5 Jahren verändert? 
 
Aktiver  
Weniger aktiv  
Ungefähr gleich  
Bin erst seit Kurzem Mitglied bei Bündnis 90/ Die Grünen 
 
14. Wie oft nehmen Sie an Treffen Ihrer lokalen Partei teil. (Kreisverband, Ortsverband, etc) 
 
Überhaupt                                                                                                                               Sehr 
nicht                                                                                                                                             oft 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 
15. Wurden Sie als Mitglied von Bündnis 90/Die Grünen schon einmal in eines der folgenden Ämter 
gewählt oder haben Sie ein Mandat übernommen? Falls Sie eines der unten angeführten Ämter oder 
Mandate derzeit inne haben, kreuzen Sie bitte auch das ganz rechte Kästchen, „habe der es derzeit inne“, 
an. (Bitte machen Sie in jedem zutreffenden Kästchen ein Kreuz) 
 
 Nein, 
noch nie 
Ja, 
einmal 
Ja, 
mehrfach 
Habe es 
derzeit inne 
Vorstandsmitgliedschaft  
Mitglied des Ortsvorstandes     
Mitglied des Kreis- oder Bezirksvorstands     
Mitglied des Landes-oder Bundesvorstands     
Vorstandsvorsitz  
Vorsitzende(r) des Ortsvorstandes     
Vorsitzende(r) des Kreis- oder Bezirksvorstands     
Vorsitzende(r) des Landes- oder 
Bundesvorstandes 
    
Delegierte(r) für den...  
Kreis- oder Bezirksparteitag     
Landesparteitag     
Bundesparteitag     
Mandatsträger  
Mandat im (kreisangehörigen) Stadt- oder 
Gemeinderat 
    
Mandat im Kreistag oder dem Rat einer kreisfreien 
Stadt 
    
Mandat im Landesparlament     
Mandat im Bundesparlament     
Mandat im Europaparlament     
     
 
16. Wenn von Politik die Rede ist, hört man immer wieder von links und rechts. Bitte geben Sie an, wo 
auf der folgende Skala von links nach rechts Sie sich selbst einstufen würden. 
 
Links                                                                                                                                                                            Rechts 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
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Wo Sie die Parteiführung einstufen würden: 
 
Links                                                                                                                                                                            Rechts 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 
Und wo Sie die Partei insgesamt einstufen würden: 
Links                                                                                                                                                                            Rechts 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 
17. Es gibt verschiedene Gründe dafür, sich stärker oder schwächer in einer Partei zu engagieren. 
Inwieweit stimmen Sie den folgenden Aussagen zu?  
(Bitte machen Sie in jeder Zeile ein Kreuz) 
 
 Stimme 
voll und 
ganz zu 
Stimme 
eher zu 
Teils-
teils 
Stimme 
eher nicht 
zu 
Stimme 
überhaut nicht 
zu 
Wer sich in einer Partei engagiert, 
kann mit Achtung und Anerkennung 
rechnen 
     
Neben einem anstrengenden Alltag 
noch auf Partei-veranstaltungen zu 
gehen, kann sehr ermüdend sein.  
     
Für eine Partei zu arbeiten, kann sehr 
langweilig sein.  
     
Das Engagement in Parteien lässt 
häufig zu wenig Zeit für Freunde und 
Familie.  
     
Als aktives Parteimitglied kann man 
interessante Leute kennenlernen.  
     
Nur wenn man als Parteimitglied 
auch aktiv ist, kann man für 
politische Fragen Sachverstand 
entwickeln.  
     
Die aktive Mitarbeit in Parteien ist 
ein geeigneter Weg, um persönlich 
Einfluss auf die Politik auszuüben.  
     
Als Mitglied einer Partei wird man 
heutzutage schief angesehen.  
     
 
18. Was meinen Sie: Wie sehr treffen die nachfolgenden Aussagen auf Bündnis 90/Die Grünen zu? (Bitte 
machen Sie in jeder Zeile ein Kreuz) 
 
 Stimme 
voll und 
ganz zu 
Stimme 
eher zu 
Teils-
teils 
Stimme 
eher nicht 
zu 
Stimme 
überhaut 
nicht zu 
Bei Bündnis 90/Die Grünen hat jedes 
Mitglied die Möglichkeit, die Politik der 
Partei aktiv mitzugestalten.  
     
Bei Bündnis 90/Die Grünen wird auf 
Kritik von Seiten der Mitglieder 
eingegangen. 
     
Bei Bündnis 90/Die Grünen wird es nicht 
gern gesehen, wenn man sich gegen die 
Meinung der Mehrheit stellt. 
     
Die Meinung der einfachen 
Parteimitglieder findet bei den 
Entscheidungsträgern von B‘90/Die 
Grünen kein Gehör. 
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19. Gibt es in Ihrem persönlichen Umfeld jemanden, der derzeit ebenfalls Mitglied von Bündnis 90/Die 
Grünen ist?  
 
nein
ja, und zwar 
 
(Bitte notieren Sie alle Personen, die Ihnen einfallen, z.B. Vater, Ehepartner, ein Freund) 
__________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
ja in der Vergangenheit, und zwar 
 
(Bitte notieren Sie alle Personen, die Ihnen einfallen, z.B. Vater, Ehepartner, ein Freund) 
__________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
20. Welche Vorstellung haben Sie darüber, wie B‘90/Die Grünen als Partei sein oder wie Sie sich in der 
Politik verhalten sollte? Wie sehr stimmen Sie persönlich den nachfolgenden Aussagen zu?  
(Bitte machen Sie in jeder Zeile ein Kreuz)  
 
 
 Stimme 
voll und 
ganz zu 
Stimme 
eher zu 
Teils-
teils 
Stimme 
eher nicht 
zu 
Stimme 
überhaut 
nicht zu 
Die innerparteiliche Diskussion bei 
Bündnis 90/Die Grünen sollte niemals so 
intensiv geführt werden, dass die 
Geschlossenheit der Partei gefährdet wird.  
     
Es sollte für Bündnis 90/Die Grünen 
wichtiger sein, konkrete Probleme zu 
lösen, als an seinen Grundwerten 
festzuhalten.  
     
Bündnis 90/Die Grünen sollten fachlich 
qualifizierte Kandidaten für Parlamente 
und öffentliche  Ämter aufstellen, auch 
solche die nicht Mitglied der Partei sind. 
     
Die Abgeordneten von Bündnis 90/Die 
Grünen sollten sich stärker an den 
Meinungen der Parteimitglieder 
orientieren, als den Meinungen der Wähler 
nachzulaufen. 
     
Interessierte Nicht-Parteimitglieder sollten 
bei Bündnis 90/ Die Grünen 
gleichberechtigt mitarbeiten können. 
     
Bündnis 90/Die Grünen sollten in ihrer 
Programmatik nicht dem Zeitgeist 
nachlaufen, auch wenn dies zum Verlust 
von Wählerstimmen führt. 
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21. Nachfolgend stehen einige Aussagen zur Politik. Bitte geben Sie für jede Aussage an, inwieweit Sie 
ihr zustimmen. (Bitte machen Sie in jeder Zeile ein Kreuz)  
 
 Stimm
e voll 
und 
ganz 
zu 
Stimme 
eher zu 
Teils-
teils 
Stimme 
eher nicht 
zu 
Stimme 
überhaut 
nicht zu 
Die ganze Politik ist so kompliziert, dass 
jemand wie ich nicht versteht, was 
vorgeht. 
     
Ich traue mir zu, in einer Gruppe, die sich 
mit politischen Fragen befasst, eine aktive 
Rolle zu übernehmen.  
     
Die Politiker kümmern sich nicht viel 
darum, was die Leute denken 
     
Die Politiker bemühen sich im 
Allgemeinen darum, die Interessen der 
Bevölkerung zu vertreten. 
     
  Die Parteien wollen nur die Stimmen 
ihrer Wähler, ihre Ansichten interessieren 
sie nicht. 
     
Die Parteien sind alles in allem zu-
verlässig und verantwortungsbewusst. 
     
Die Parteien betrachten den Staat als 
Selbstbedienungsladen.   
     
Den Parteien geht es nur um die Macht.      
 
 
22. Bitte geben Sie für jede nachfolgende Aussage an, inwieweit Sie mit ihr zustimmen. 
(Bitte machen Sie in jeder Zeile ein Kreuz)  
 
 
 Stimme 
voll und 
ganz zu 
Stimme 
eher zu 
Teils-
teils 
Stimme 
eher nicht 
zu 
Stimme 
überhaut 
nicht zu 
Insgesamt sind die internen 
Entscheidungsprozesse der Partei 
höchst demokratisch. 
     
Insgesamt kann man der Führung 
der Partei vertrauen.  
     
Die meisten Parteiabgeordneten 
versuchen im Interesse des 
Gemeinwohls zu handeln, selbst in 
Fällen, wo dieses nicht ihren eigenen 
Interessen entspricht. 
     
Aussagen von Mitgliedern der 
Parteiführung in den Medien sind 
normalerweise wahrheitsgetreu. 
     
Abgeordnete, die wir in öffentliche 
Ämter gewählt haben, halten 
normalerweise ihre Versprechen, 
die sie während des Wahlkampfes 
gemacht haben 
     
Die meisten Kandidaten, die durch 
die Partei aufgestellt werden, sind 
gut qualifiziert, um die Probleme, die 
diesem Land bevorstehen, zu 
bearbeiten. 
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23. Mit der Einführung der Urwahl wurde die parteiliche Organisationsform mehr oder weniger 
demokratisch? 
 
 
Demokratischer 
Ungefähr gleich 
Weniger demokratisch 
 
 
24. Nachfolgend stehen einige Aussagen zur innerparteilichen Demokratie und der Grünen. Bitte geben 
Sie für jede Aussage an, inwieweit Sie ihr zustimmen. 
(Bitte machen Sie in jeder Zeile ein Kreuz)  
 
 Stimme 
voll und 
ganz zu 
Stimme 
eher zu 
Teils-
teils 
Stimme 
eher nicht 
zu 
Stimme 
überhaut 
nicht zu 
In meiner lokalen Parteiorganisation 
sind die Entscheidungsprozesse 
höchst demokratisch. 
     
Mit der Einführung der Urwahl wurde 
die parteiliche Organisationsform 
demokratisiert. 
     
Die Urwahl motiviert mich, an mehr 
Parteiaktivitäten teilzunehmen. 
     
Die Urwahl half der Partei, Stimmen 
und Unterstützung im Wahljahr 
2013 zu gewinnen. 
     
Die Spitzenkandidaten der Partei 
machen gute Arbeit. 
     
Die Partei hat ihre „grünen“ Ideale 
aus den Augen verloren. 
     
 
25. Als nächstes würden wir Ihnen gerne ein paar Fragen bezüglich Ihres persönlichen Einflusses in der 
Partei stellen. 
 
 Sehr 
zufrieden 
Eher 
zufrieden 
Teils-
teils 
Eher 
unzufrieden 
Sehr 
unzufrieden 
Sind Sie zufrieden mit der 
persönlichen Einflussnahme, die Sie 
innerhalb der Partei haben? 
     
Sind Sie zufrieden mit der 
persönlichen Einflussnahme, die Sie 
auf die Wahl der Parteitags- 
delegierten haben? 
     
Sind Sie zufrieden mit der 
persönlichen Einflussnahme, die Sie 
auf die Wahl der 
Bundesparteiführung haben? 
     
Sind Sie zufrieden mit der 
persönlichen Einflussnahme, die Sie 
auf die Wahl der Parteivorsitzenden 
haben. 
     
Sind Sie zufrieden mit der 
persönlichen Einflussnahme, die Sie 
auf die Wahl der 
Bundestagsabgeordneten haben? 
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26. In wie stimmen die nachfolgenden Aussagen über den Einfluss von Mitglieder in Bündnis 
90/Die Grünen zu? (Bitte machen Sie in jeder Zeile ein Kreuz)  
 
 Stimme 
voll und 
ganz zu 
Stimme 
eher zu 
Teils-
teils 
Stimme 
eher 
nicht zu 
Stimme 
überhaut 
nicht zu 
Es gibt viele offizielle Möglichkeiten 
für Mitglieder, das Handel der  
Parteiführung zu beeinflussen. 
     
In unserer Parteiorganisation haben 
die Mitglieder das letzte Wort, wie die 
Partei arbeitet, egal wer im Amt der 
Parteiführung ist 
     
Mitglieder wie ich haben keinen 
Einfluss darauf, was die Parteiführung 
macht 
     
Dank der Verwendung der Urwahl 
habe ich das Gefühl von mehr Einfluss 
in der Partei 
     
 
27. Bitte geben Sie an, wie sehr Sie den jeweiligen Aussagen persönlich zustimmen. 
 
 Stimme 
voll und 
ganz zu 
Stimme 
eher zu 
Teils-
teils 
Stimme 
eher nicht 
zu 
Stimme 
überhaut 
nicht zu 
Ich betrachte mich als qualifiziert 
genug, um an der Politik 
teilzunehmen 
     
Ich habe ein relativ guten 
Überblick über die wichtigen 
politische Themen, die dieses 
Land betreffen. 
     
Ich denke, ich könnte eine genauso 
gute Arbeit in öffentlichen Ämtern 
leisten wie alle anderen. 
     
 
 
28. Als nächstes würden wir Ihnen gerne ein paar Fragen bezüglich Ihrer Einstellung gegenüber 
politischer Partizipation in Form einer Urwahl fragen: 
 
 Stimme 
voll und 
ganz zu 
Stimme 
eher zu 
Teils-
teils 
Stimme 
eher nicht 
zu 
Stimme 
überhaut 
nicht zu 
Das Einbeziehen aller Parteimitglieder 
verringert die Bedeutung und Rechte aktiver 
Parteimitglieder. 
     
Die Integration aller Parteimitglieder bei der 
Wahl der Kandidaten spiegelt den 
innerparteilichen demokratischen Charakter 
der Partei wieder. 
     
Aktive und passive Mitglieder haben die 
gleichen Rechte und Pflichten. 
     
Aktive Mitglieder sollen eine wichtigere 
Rolle in internen Entscheidungsprozessen 
als passive Mitglieder spielen.  
     
Alle Mitglieder, ungeachtet der Länge ihrer 
Mitgliedschaft, sollten das Recht haben, 
sich in der Urwahl als Kandidat 
aufzustellen. 
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29. Kommen wir nun zu einem anderen Thema: In welchen Vereinigungen oder Arbeitskreisen von 
Bündnis 90/Die Grünen arbeiten Sie mit? In welchen sind Sie Mitglied? Und außerdem: In welchen 
haben Sie ein Amt inne?  
(Bitte in jedem zutreffenden Kästchen ein Kreuz machen) 
 
 Arbeite mit, ohne 
Mitglied 
zu sein 
Bin  
passives 
Mitglied 
Bin  
aktives 
Mitglied 
Habe 
ein  
Amt 
Campusgrüne. Bündnis grüne-alternative 
Hochschulgruppe 
    
Grüne Jugend     
Grüne Alte     
Gewerkschaftsgrüne     
Landesarbeitsgemeinschaft, und 
zwar:______________ 
    
Landesarbeitsgemeinschaft, und 
zwar:______________ 
    
Landesarbeitsgemeinschaft, und 
zwar:______________ 
    
Bundesarbeitsgemeinschaft, und 
zwar:______________ 
    
Bundesarbeitsgemeinschaft, und 
zwar:______________ 
    
Bundesarbeitsgemeinschaft, und 
zwar:______________ 
    
Andere, und zwar:______     
 
30. In welchen weiteren Organisationen außerhalb Ihrer Partei arbeiten Sie mit? In welchen sind Sie 
Mitglied? In welchen arbeiten Sie aktiv mit? Und außerdem: In welchen haben Sie ein Amt inne?  
 (Bitte in jedem zutreffenden Kästchen ein Kreuz machen)  
 
 Arbeite mit, ohne 
Mitglied 
zu sein 
Bin  
passives 
Mitglied 
Bin  
aktives 
Mitglied 
Habe 
ein  
Amt 
Berufsverband     
Gewerkschaft     
Unternehmerverband     
Freizeitverein (z.B Musik-, Sport- oder 
Kleingartenverein) 
    
Freiwillige Feuerwehr     
Wohlfahrtsverband/ Kriegsopferverband     
Traditions- und Heimatverein     
Umweltschutzverband     
Tierschutzverband     
Bürgerinitiative     
Frauengruppe bzw. -vereinigung     
Jugendorganisation, soweit nicht kirchlich     
Kirchliche/ religiöse Gruppe     
Andere Organisation, und 
zwar:__________ 
    
 
Und nun noch einige Angaben zu Ihrer Person  
 
31. Geschlecht:  
weiblich  
männlich 
 
32. In welchem Jahr sind Sie geboren? (Bitte notieren)  
_____________ 
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33. In welchem Bundesland leben Sie? 
___________________ 
 
 
34. Welches ist Ihr höchster allgemeinbildender Schulabschluss? 
(Bitte nur ein Kästchen ankreuzen) 
 
Bin zur Zeit Schüler(in)  siehe Frage 30 
Schulausbildung beendet ohne Abschluss  
Volks-/ Hauptschule bzw. Polytechnische Oberschule, vor der 10. Klasse abgegangen  
Mittlere Reife, Realschule bzw. Polytechnische Oberschule 10. Klasse (Fachschulreife)  
Fachhochschulreife (Abschluss einer Fachoberschule), Ingenieurschule, Erweiterte Oberschule 
(EOS) ohne Abschluss  
Abitur, allgemeine Hochschulreife, Erweiterte Oberschule (EOS) mit Abschluss  
 
35. Falls Sie noch Schüler(in) sind: Welchen Schulabschluss streben Sie an?  
(Bitte nur ein Kästchen ankreuzen) 
 Hauptschulabschluss 
Mittlere Reife, Realschulabschluss, Fachschulreife  
Fachhochschulreife, Abschluss einer Fachoberschule  
Abitur, allgemeine oder fachgebundene Hochschulreife  
 
36. Welche der folgenden Beschreibungen trifft gegenwärtig auf Sie zu?  
(Mehrfachnennungen möglich) 
 
Ganztags erwerbstätig, auch mithelfend (mit 35 Stunden/ Woche und mehr)  
Teilzeit erwerbstätig (mit 15 bis unter 35 Stunden/ Woche) 
Geringfügig erwerbstätig (mit unter 15 Stunden/ Woche) 
Gelegentlich oder unregelmäßig beschäftigt  
Zurzeit arbeitslos 
Umschulung 
In Berufsausbildung/ Lehre (einschließlich Fachschule) 
In Schulausbildung/ Hochschule (einschließlich Fachhochschule) 
Wehrdienst/ Zivildienst/ Soziales Jahr 
Mutterschafts-, Erziehungsurlaub, Elternzeit oder sonstige Beurlaubung 
Hausfrau/Hausmann, nicht (mehr) berufstätig 
Rentner/ Pensionär 
Im Vorruhestand  
 
37. Welcher der folgenden Berufsgruppen gehören Sie an (oder gehörten Sie zuletzt an)?  
(Bitte nur ein Kästchen ankreuzen)  
Arbeiter   
Angestellte in der Wirtschaft   
mithelfende Familienangehörige   
Beamte/ Angestellte im öffentlichen Dienst/ Berufssoldaten  
Selbständige im Handel, Gewerbe, Handwerk, Industrie, Dienstleistungen  
selbständige Landwirte   
Akademiker im freien Beruf (Ärzte, Rechtsanwälte, Steuerberater u.ä.)  
 
38. Eine letzte Frage: Es wird heute viel über die verschiedenen Bevölkerungsschichten gesprochen. 
Welcher Schicht rechnen Sie sich selbst eher zu? 
(Bitte nur ein Kästchen ankreuzen)  
Unterschicht 
Untere Mittelschicht  
Mittlere Mittelschicht  
Obere Mittelschicht  
Oberschicht    
Keiner dieser Schichten    
 
Vielen Dank für Ihre Mithilfe! 
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Haben Sie Vorschläge für Ergänzungen oder Anmerkungen zum Fragebogen? Wir sind für jede 
Anregung dankbar!  
_____________________________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________ 
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VI Certificate of Ethical Approval 
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VII Selectorate and Candidacy Requirement Types in Framework  
a)Selectorate 
 
Open 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Selectorate – 
Primary Zone 
 
 
-Public/Voters 
-Registration on the day 
possible 
-Primary Voter Membership 
with no other rights attached 
to membership 
-No formal links to Party 
spontaneous voting 
possible 
 
 
 
-Full Party Members 
-Light Members and 
Supporters with additional 
rights than voting in primary 
-Pre-registration to vote 
required  
 
Closed  
 
b) Candidacy Requirements 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-Voters (no restrictions) 
-Party Membership and low 
additional rules (low 
candidacy fees, no time 
limits, supporting signature of 
membership only) 
-no additional approval 
required 
-No veto power of other intra 
party organ(s) or actor(s) 
after low requirement are met  
-Party Membership with 
strict additional rules (time 
limits, signature of multiple 
groups) 
- Limited to MPs 
-Approval required by intra-
party Election Commission 
or Electoral Commission 
- Multiple hurdles with veto 
power of other intra party 
organ(s) or actor(s)  
 Permissive          Candidate Requirements              Strict 
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les démocraties occidental. Paris: Presses de Sciences Po. 
 
BALE, T. 2011. The Conservative Party: From Thatcher to Cameron, Wiley. 
 
BALE, T. & WEBB, P. 2013. Members only: views of the Conservative Party’s rank-and-
file [Online]. PSA: Poltical Insight. Available: http://www.psa.ac.uk/insight-
plus/members-only-views-conservative-party%E2%80%99s-rank-and-file 2013]. 
 
BARNEA, S. & RAHAT, G. 2007. Reforming Candidate Selection Methods: A Three-
Level Approach. Party Politics, 13, 375-394. 
 
BERDAHL, C. 1942. Party Membership in the United States, I. American Political 
Science Review, 36, 16-50. 
 
BILLE, L. 2001. Democratizing a Democratic Procedure: Myth or Reality?: Candidate 
Selection in Western European Parties, 1960-1990. Party Politics, 7, 363-380. 
 
BOISSIEU, L. 2013. Élection présidentielle 2012 [Online]. Available: http://www.france-
politique.fr/election-presidentielle-2012.htm [Accessed 06.05.2014. 
 
BOLLEYER, N. 2013. New parties in old party systems : persistence and decline in 
seventeen democracies, Oxford, Oxford University Press. 
 
BOLLEYER, N., VON NOSTITZ, F.-C. & SMIRNOVA, V. 2016. Conflict regulation in 
political parties: An account of tribunal decision-making. Party Politics, 
OnlineFirst, 1-14 
 
BOLLEYER, N. & WEEKS, L. unpublished manuscript. From Cartel Party to Traditinal 
Membership Organization: The Organisatinal Evolution of Finna Fail. 
 
 281 
 
BOUCEK, F. 2009. Rethinking Factionalism: Typologies, Intra-Party Dynamics and 
Three Faces of Factionalism. Party Politics, 15, 455-485. 
 
BRYMAN, A. 2016. Social Research Methods, Oxford, Oxford University Press. 
 
BÜNDNIS 90/DIE GRÜNEN-LÄNDERRAT 2012a. Urabstimmungsordnung. Beschluss. 
Lubeck. 
 
BÜNDNIS 90/DIE GRÜNEN-LÄNDERRAT 2012b. Verfahren Findung 
SpitzenkandidatInnen. Beschluss. Berlin. 
 
BÜNDNIS 90/DIE GRÜNEN. 31.10.2012. Die Urwahl in Zahlen [Online]. Available: 
http://www.gruene.de/partei/urwahl/die-urwahl-in-zahlen.html [Accessed 
13.05.2014. 
 
CAMPBELL, A. 1954. The Voter Decides, Peterson, Row. 
 
CARTY, R. & BLAKE, D. 1999. The Adoption of Membership Votes for Choosing Party 
Leaders: The Experience of Canadian Parties. Party Politics, 5, 211-224. 
 
COHEN, M., KAROL, D., NOEL, H. & ZALLER, J. 2008. The party decides : 
presidential nominations before and after reform, Chicago, University of 
Chicago Press. 
 
COLOMER, J. 2011. Personal Representation; the neglected dimeension of electoral 
system, Colchester, ECPR Press. 
 
CORDERO, G. & COLLER, X. 2015. Cohesion and Candidate Selection in 
Parliamentary Groups. Parliamentary Affairs, 68, 592-615. 
 
CRAIG, S., NIEMI, R. & SILVER, G. 1990. Political Efficacy and Trust: A Report on the 
NES Pilot Study Items. Political Behavior, 12, 289-314. 
 
CRESWELL, J. & PLANO CLARK, V..2011. Designing and Conducting Mixed Method 
Research Thousand Oaks, CA, Sage. 
 
CROSS, W. 2004a. Political parties, Vancouver, UBC Press. 
 
CROSS, W. & BLAIS, A. 2012a. Who selects the party leader? Party Politics, 18, 127-
150. 
 
CROSS, W. & BLAIS, A. 2012b. Politics at the centre : the selection and removal of 
party leaders in the Anglo parliamentary democracies, Oxford, Oxford University 
Press. 
 
CROSS, W. & KATZ, R. 2013. The challenges of intra-party democracy, Oxford, Oxford 
University Press. 
 
CROSS, W. & PILET, J.-B. 2015. The Politics of Party Leadership: A Cross-national 
Perspective Oxford, Oxford University Press. 
 
CROSS, W. & YOUNG, L. 2004. The Contours of Political Party Membership in 
Canada. Party Politics, 10, 427-444. 
 
CROSS, W. & YOUNG, LISA 2004b. Political Parties as Membership Organizations. 
Political Parties. Vancouver: UBC Press. 
 282 
 
 
DAHL, R. 1970. After the Revolution?, New Haven, CT, Yale University Press. 
 
DALTON, R. & WATTENBERG, M. 2002. Parties Without Partisans:Political Change in 
Advanced Industrial Democracies: Political Change in Advanced Industrial 
Democracies, Oxford University Press Oxford. 
 
DARGENT, C. & REY, H. 2014. SOCIOLOGIE DES ADHÉRENTS SOCIALISTES 
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